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Foreword
‘Industrial policy is back!’ This is the message given in the European Commission’s
October 2012 communication on industrial policy (COM (2012) 582 ﬁnal), which seeks
to reverse the declining role of the manufacturing industry, and increase its share of
European Union GDP from about 16 percent currently to above 20 percent. Historical
evidence suggests that the goal is unlikely to be achieved. Manufacturing’s share of
GDP has decreased around the world over the last 30 years. Paradoxically, this relative
decline has been a reﬂection of manufacturing’s strength. Higher productivity growth
in manufacturing than in the economy overall resulted in relative decline. A strategy to
reverse this trend and move to an industrial share of above 20 percent might therefore
risk undermining the original strength of industry – higher productivity growth.
This Blueprint therefore takes a diﬀerent approach. It starts by looking in depth into
the manufacturing sector and how it is developing. It emphasises the extent to which
European industry has become integrated with other parts of the economy, in
particular with the increasingly specialised services sector, and how both sectors
depend on each other. It convincingly argues that industrial activity is increasingly
spread through global value chains. As a result, employment in the sector has
increasingly become highly skilled, while those parts of production for which high skill
levels are not needed have been shifted to regions with lower labour costs.
But this splitting up of production is not driving the apparent manufacturing decline.
Participation in global value chains within Europe is strongly EU-oriented with a central
position for the EU15 and in particular Germany in EU manufacturing. This inter-
nationalisation of production has resulted in deeper integration of EU manufacturing,
with member states specialising in sectors according to their comparative advantage.
It has therefore helped to raise productivity and growth. As a result, the foreign content
of countries’ exports has increased. Germany, in particular, has been able to beneﬁt
from the greater possibilities to outsource parts of production to central and eastern
Europe and to emerging markets, and is in fact one of the countries with the smallest
manufacturing share declines in the last 15 years. The Blueprint also highlights the
importance of energy for the structure and specialisation of manufacturing.
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Capital-intensive manufacturing faces both urgent challenges and medium-term
challenges. In the short-term, one of the most pressing problems is the fragmentation
of ﬁnancial markets in Europe, which undermines access to ﬁnance. This aﬀects small-
to medium-sized ﬁrms in particular because they are the most dependent on bank
credit. In some southern European countries, even the ﬁnancing of working capital is
endangered. It should therefore be a high priority for policymakers to ﬁx Europe’s
banking problems and create better functioning capital markets, including for venture
capital.
A second important conclusion is that, given the strong links between innovation,
internationalisation and ﬁrm productivity, it is important to erase the dividing lines
between industrial policy, single market policy, ICT policy and service sector policy. A
highly integrated economic system needs a coherent set of policies that aim at
improving business conditions everywhere. Attempts to promote one sector at the
expense of another one are likely to result in signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies and weaker
overall growth. Governments are notoriously bad at picking winners. Instead, Europe
needs policies that are conducive to a better business climate, less-burdensome
regulations and the right framework conditions.
Third, public policies need to be more supportive of industry and other parts of the
economy. For example, the education system is of central importance for the economy
and needs to be adapted to the needs of modern economies. The single market is
important for both manufacturing and services and progress is needed to unleash its
potential for growth. Reducing trade barriers is particularly important for industrial
ﬁrms that increasingly rely in global value chains. Distortions in energy prices are also
detrimental to industrial activity and should be avoided.
‘Manufacturing Europe’s future’ therefore means getting the policies right for ﬁrms to
grow and prosper. It is not about picking one sector over another, but primarily about
setting the right framework conditions for growth, innovation and jobs.
Guntram Wolff, Director of Bruegel
Brussels, September 2013
FOREWORD
1 Manufacturing Europe’s
future growth
BY REINHILDE VEUGELERS
A new and important debate on the future of manufacturing has emerged recently in
Europe, the United States and Japan. Manufacturing is in relative decline compared to
services, but the ﬁnancial crisis has brought back into focus the beneﬁts of a stable
manufacturing base. In order to consider the questions raised by this, we need to know
why manufacturing has been declining, and if this is, in fact, a problem for our
economies. Should steps be taken to stop the decline, and if so, what steps? Can
economies prosper without a substantial manufacturing base, and what role should
manufacturing play to help bring economies out of the crisis and put them back on a
sustainable growth path?
After a long period of decline for manufacturing, there are some encouraging signs.
Recently, the pace of decline has stopped or at least slowed. The oﬀshoring of jobs to
Asia has also slowed, with even some reshoring taking place. The debate about a new
re-industrialiation phase has mostly taken place in the US (see eg Boston Consulting
Group, 2011; Simchi-Levi, 2012; Morgan Stanley, 2013). The US manufacturing revival
has been further helped by the shale gas windfall, reducing energy costs for US
manufacturers.
Other trends point to a brighter future for global manufacturing. These include new
sources of demand for manufactured goods, with a large pool of consumers in
emerging economies who will enter the global consumer class for manufactured goods.
On the manufacturing supply side there is a pipeline of new technologies waiting to be
further exploited to bring new kinds of manufactured products to the market, reinvent
existing products and improve the eﬃciency of manufacturing processes. Examples
include additive manufacturing using 3D printers, robotics, nanotechnology, smart
communication systems and ‘big data’ management.
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Questions that arise from these trends ﬁgure prominently in European Union policy
discussions. Decision makers want to know how the potential for industrial rejuvena-
tion can be realised, and if it will also take place in Europe. Will the outcome be a larger
manufacturing sector or will the sector continue its decline overall with only
improvements in some niches? In which sectors, companies and countries will
manufacturing growth take place? Even if Europe can take up the new opportunities,
the question remains of whether they will generate the same number and type of
manufacturing jobs as in the past.
These considerations are part of the heated and repeated discussions on what kind of
industrial policy Europe should pursue. Proponents of a ‘vertical’ approach want to
support speciﬁc sectors and ﬁrms, while proponents of a ‘horizontal’ approach see the
role for policy as providing the framework conditions and incentives for investment
and eliminating barriers faced by entrepreneurs. While in the 1970s and 1980s,
targeted approaches were more common, the consensus since the early 1990s at EU
level has moved to a more holistic, integrated approach to industrial policy, leveraging
the EU’s internal market and competition instruments and stimulating R&D and
innovation. Various EU policy communications on industrial policy, the Lisbon Agenda
and the current EU2020 strategy all embody this horizontal integrated approach
towards industrial policy. This does not mean that sectoral policies have been absent,
as the attention paid to information and communication technologies illustrates.
In 2012, the European Commission published a new industrial policy communication
(European Commission, 2012), which starts from the premise that “Europe needs
industry” and sets out a roadmap for reindustrialising Europe, with the aim of “raising
the share of industry in GDP from the current level of around 16 percent to as much as
20 percent in 2020”. Although the Commission stressed the need for a comprehensive
vision “mobilising all the levers available at EU level, notably the single market, trade
policy, SME policy, competition policy, environmental and research policy in favour of
European companies’ competitiveness”, the communication returned to a more
targeted approach, identifying six priority action lines (including key enabling tech-
nologies, clean vehicles and smart grids). The communication was followed up with
action plans for speciﬁc sectors, such as steel (European Commission, 2013).
Identifying the right policies to support the manufacturing sector’s contribution to
Europe’s future growth requires an understanding of the changing role of manu-
facturing in Europe’s growth agenda. It is doubtful if the European Commission
communication, by targeting a minimum share of GDP for manufacturing and focusing
on speciﬁc sectors and technologies, approaches the discussion from the right angle.
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The issue is not whether manufacturing is or should be important for economies, nor
is it how many manufacturing jobs to have or save. Rather it is what type of activities
Europe should focus on in the value chain for goods, which will allow the creation of
sustainable jobs and growth in Europe, and within what global networks these activities
should be developed. This discussion cuts across sectoral boundaries. We need a
clearer horizontal picture of Europe’s relative strengths and weaknesses, at the level
of activities rather than a sectoral view. The discussion should be about establishing
the right conditions for economies to create and capture value from activities that are
part of the production and selling of manufactured goods, and which contribute most
strongly and sustainably to Europe’s growth and external competitiveness.
Chapter 2, Trends, challenges and prospects for manufacturing in Europe by Reinhilde
Veugelers, takes stock of the evidence about manufacturing decline and the shifts in
the sector’s contribution to overall economic growth. The EU is compared with other
regions and the various manufacturing sub-sectors are examined. Chapter 2
documents how, despite the continued shift in almost all EU countries and in almost
all manufacturing sectors from manufacturing towards services jobs, manufacturing
still matters, but its contribution to European economies is changing: creating fewer but
more skillintensive jobs. With this new proﬁle, manufacturing remains a major
contributor to productivity growth, innovation performance and Europe’s external
competitiveness, despite its shrinking share of GDP. The shift away from low-skilled
activities towards the high end is happening in all types of sectors, even in low-tech
sectors such as textiles and food. Manufacturing jobs also increasingly resemble
service-type jobs in areas such as design, R&D, and after-sales and support services
related to manufactured goods. At the same time, the manufacturing sector is an
important buyer of services (both locally and internationally), and manufactured
capital goods are an important contributor to productivity growth in services.
Manufacturing and services thus complement rather than substitute for each other.
Of speciﬁc concern in Europe are the growth prospects of southern European countries.
Chapter 3, Manufacturing as a source of growth for Southern Europe: opportunities
and obstacles by Erkki Vihriälä and Guntram Wolﬀ, assesses the degree to which
disparities in growth performance between the north and the south are due to diverging
manufacturing trends, and considers the measures the south needs to take so that
manufacturing can help drive growth in southern Europe. The relatively small size of
manufacturing in the southern euro-area countries is explained by structural factors
that inhibit ﬁrm growth, weak integration into global production chains and declining
price competitiveness. Additionally, current tight funding conditions constrain growth
further and increase the required labour-market adjustment. However, chapter 3 also
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shows that the strength of manufacturing in Germany is unusual. Behind this diﬀerent
pattern in Germany are the integration of the German economy with central and eastern
Europe and changes to the German corporate model. Recent strong export growth in
parts of southern Europe indicates the potential of the region’s ﬁrms, but access to
ﬁnance is a central obstacle to growth and is creating an uneven playing ﬁeld
compared to competitors in the north. The completion of banking union and the
continued pursuit of structural reforms remain necessary.
Manufacturers are involved in an intense global competition. The drive for eﬃciency
has led to a slicing up of the value chain for goods and allocation of each component of
the value chain to wherever in the world it can be most eﬀectively performed, with the
challenge being to coordinate and integrate the geographically dispersed activities. The
resulting global value chains (GVCs) have dramatically changed European manu-
facturing because they have fostered industrial restructuring in diﬀerent EU economies
and between the EU and the rest of the world. Chapters 4 and 5 delve deeper into GVCs.
Chapter 4, Manufacturing in global value chains by Koen DeBacker, Sébastien Miroudot
and Alexandros Ragoussis. Looks at the recent evidence on the involvement of
European countries and sectors in GVCs. The chapter documents the increasing trend
of outsourcing, oﬀshoring and embodying of foreign content in export ﬂows. The
authors ﬁnd that EU countries on average are as involved in GVC activities as other
large economies such as the US and Japan. Within the EU, size and industrial structure
explain to a great extent the diﬀerences in countries’ involvement in GVCs. Global
manufacturing is regionally organised, with production concentrated around hubs in
Europe, North America and Asia. Within Europe, the EU15 and in particular Germany
are the focus for GVCs. The organisation of production in European value chains has
resulted in the deeper integration of EU manufacturing, with diﬀerent member states
specialising in diﬀerent industries/activities according to their comparative advantage.
This has resulted in EU exports having an increasingly foreign (primarily EU) content,
but has also signiﬁcantly beneﬁtted the competitiveness of the EU and its member
states in a global perspective. Confronted with growing competition from emerging
economies, the competitiveness of EU manufacturing is increasingly driven by
innovation, knowledge-based capital and embodied/embedded services. The positive
eﬀect of knowledge-based capital on a nation’s competitiveness is greater in industries
that are oﬀshoring-intensive, suggesting a strong complementarity between
knowledge-based capital and integration in GVCs.
In chapter 5, Meeting the manufacturing ﬁrms involved in global value chains,
Reinhilde Veugelers, Francesca Barbiero and Michael Blanga-Gubbay use the EFIGE
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database1 to study how widespread GVC involvement is, and what impact GVC
involvement has at the ﬁrm level. GVC-involved ﬁrms are identiﬁed as those ﬁrms that
simultaneously import components, have production activities located abroad and
sell their produced goods abroad. Sector and country patterns of GVC involvement are
consistent with the patterns reported in chapter 4. But even within sectors and
countries that are typically identiﬁed in the GVC literature as being more GVC-involved
(countries such as Hungary and France, and sectors such as electronics, textiles and
chemicals), there is still substantial heterogeneity in terms of how intensively ﬁrms
within these sectors and within these countries are GVC-involved. Only a few ﬁrms are
intensively involved in GVCs, but these few ﬁrms matter for Europe’s knowledge-based
growth and competitiveness performance, because they are large, trade-intensive,
more innovative and more productive. These ﬁrms substantially drive the creation of
total value added, employment and, particularly, trade ﬂows in most sectors and
economies. The analysis also shows that the, often smaller, ﬁrms that produce
intermediate goods for GVCs can be very productive when they have unique innovative
capacities. In line with the ﬁndings of chapter 4, the international activities of most
European manufacturing ﬁrms take place within the EU. These ﬁrms involved in
European value chains do not experience any productivity discount or premium
compared to ﬁrms involved in global value chains, suggesting that for European value
chain ﬁrms, the foregone opportunities of global sourcing are cancelled out by avoiding
the higher coordination costs of global value chain organisation. Overall, the ﬁrm-level
analysis conﬁrms that ﬁrms involved in GVCs are well placed to be the engines of
Europe’s innovation-based growth and to drive its external competitiveness on the
basis of globally sustainable comparative advantage.
When looking at the set of location factors determining where manufacturing invest-
ments will be made, aﬀordable and reliable access to energy and raw materials are
important because they account for a signiﬁcant part of the cost in many industries.
Higher and rapidly rising energy prices in Europe compared to other regions have led
to concerns about a loss of European manufacturing competitiveness. Chapter 6,
Energy competitiveness by Georg Zachmann, looks at the importance of energy prices
as a location factor for manufacturing, and as a driver for countries to specialise in
speciﬁc sectors. The chapter documents recent developments in energy prices, and
explores the reasons behind price trends. Electricity and natural gas prices in Europe
are higher than in the US. This is partly because of diﬀerent resource availability and
partly because of diﬀerent policies. But there are multiple channels through which
energy prices tend to equalise. The second part of the chapter provides an empirical
MANUFACTURING EUROPE'S FUTURE GROWTH
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1. http://www.eﬁge.org/.
assessment of which sectors are likely to be most aﬀected by international energy
price disadvantages, and what this implies for overall competitiveness. The assess-
ment ﬁnds that countries with lower energy prices than their competitors, specialise
in diﬀerent sectors to countries with higher energy prices. The sectors that low-energy
price countries typically specialise in (eg basic precious and non-ferrous metals) are
unsurprisingly more energy intensive. High-energy-price countries tend to specialise
in more heterogenous sectors, developing competitiveness on the basis of non-energy
sensitive assets.
The concluding chapter, Policies to manufacture the EU’s future growth, by Reinhilde
Veugelers and André Sapir makes recommendations for EU policymaking, based on
the evidence presented in this Blueprint. That evidence shows that the challenge for
policymakers is how to attract those high-value manufacturing activities within global
manufacturing chains that are the basis for sustainable growth and competitiveness.
These will be activities based on unique innovative capabilities, for goods that will be
produced and traded within international value chains. Such high-value activities can
be identiﬁed within all manufacturing sectors, both low-tech and high-tech, and do not
necessarily require all the activities of the whole value chain to be located at home.
GVCs challenge prevailing approaches to competitiveness policy. The growing
upstream and downstream interconnections increase the interdependence of
countries and limit the eﬀectiveness of national policies, requiring more coordination
of policies internationally, which for European countries, because of the regional focus
of European ﬁrms involved in GVCs, means ﬁrst and foremost at EU level. Enabling GVC
participation implies that all kinds of trade costs should be reduced, and inter-
connecting infrastructure should be prioritised. This is however not only about ‘border’
policies; a holistic ‘behind-the-border’ policy framework is required. As large, open and
interconnected product markets remain a major location factor, eﬀective internal
market and competition policy instruments will and should remain an EU priority.
Completing the single market, particularly the single market for supporting services
(including cross-border transport, broadband and energy infrastructure) is perhaps
the most important goal in order to reinforce manufacturing’s role in driving growth. A
further challenge is the structural shift from classic production jobs towards higher
value added types of jobs, and the implications this has for the labour market.
Governments will need to facilitate this structural shift. As the challenges and trends
are common for all manufacturing sectors, any type of government intervention should
be suﬃciently horizontal, and governments should not succumb to the temptation to
pick particular industries to support.
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2 Trends, challenges and
prospects for
manufacturing in Europe
BY REINHILDE VEUGELERS
How much does manufacturing contribute to Europe’s growth and jobs? Will Europe’s
manufacturing employment decline continue? What kind of manufacturing will support
future growth in Europe?
This chapter provides empirical evidence to help answer these questions. We compare
Europe to other economies, particularly the United States and Asian economies, and
look at the heterogeneity within Europe. Section 2.1 considers current trends in
manufacturing. Section 2.2 examines trends at the level of individual manufacturing
sub-sectors. Section 2.3 takes a snapshot view of the challenges ahead for
manufacturing. We conclude by digesting the evidence and analysing the implications
for the future of manufacturing in Europe.
2.1 The contribution of manufacturing to the European economy
Manufacturing employment and manufacturing’s share in GDP has continuously
declined over a number of years in the European Union and currently represents about
15 percent of value added and 14 percent of total employment1. Despite its declining
and currently small share of value added and employment, manufacturing still plays
an important role in the European economy, contributing disproportionally to exports
7
1. Unless otherwise stated, manufacturing includes all activities in section C of the NACE rev 2 used by Eurostat.
Section C includes all activities involving the physical or chemical transformation of materials, substances or
components into new products. In ISIC 3, manufacturing includes divisions 15-37.
and research and development. It also contributes disproportionally to productivity
growth, particularly since 2010. These trends and characteristics of manufacturing
(Figures 1 and 2) are not speciﬁc to Europe. Trends in manufacturing in other western
economies are similar, most notably in the US (McKinsey, 2012).
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Figure 1: The importance of manufacturing for the EU economy: some key
numbers
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat database and OECD TiVA. Note: Growth rates computed as annual average growth
rates over the period. Exports within the EU27 account for 40 percent; exports out of the EU27 account for 27
percent. Business R&D expenditure data as of 2009, excluding Greece and Luxembourg from the EU aggregate.
Value added: the gross value added at basic price is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between output at basic prices and
intermediate consumption at purchasers’ prices.
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2.1.1 Manufacturing’s declining share of value added
Manufacturing’s share of total value added (GDP) has gradually and steadily declined
in all western economies since the 1970s. This is most evident in the US, where
manufacturing now accounts for about 12 percent of value added. The situation in Asia
is more heterogeneous. In Japan, like in the west, manufacturing has been losing
value-added share. In contrast, despite a downward trend, manufacturing still accounts
for about one third of total value added in China, while in Korea, the manufacturing
share of value added has risen.
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Figure 2: Manufacturing and total EU economy growth rates
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Growth rates computed as annual average growth rates over the periods.
Total (economy) excludes ‘agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing’.
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Part of the loss of manufacturing value added in the west is often attributed to a shift
towards new emerging markets, most notably China. China indeed has increased its
share of global manufacturing and has become the biggest manufacturing nation in
the world, slightly bigger than the US. The European Union’s share of global
manufacturing value added dropped from 30 percent in 2003 to only 23 percent in
2010, somewhat more than the US. Within the European Union, the most important
contributors to manufacturing value added are Germany, Italy, France and the United
Kingdom.
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Figure 3: Manufacturing share of value added, 1980-2010, EU and other
economies
Source: Bruegel on the basis of World Bank and OECD.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
EU
US
Japan
Korea
China
Manufacturing’s contribution to value added can be decomposed into its contribution
to employment and to (labour) productivity. Much of the recent debate about de-
industrialisation and the potential decline of the manufacturing base has focused on
the loss of manufacturing employment. This will be discussed in section 2.1.2. The
contribution through (labour) productivity will be discussed in section 2.1.3. The eﬀect
of the declining prices of manufactured goods is discussed in section 2.1.6.
2.1.2 Dwindling manufacturing jobs
The EU has seen a steady decline in the share of manufacturing in total employment:
manufacturing jobs have been lost, or manufacturing employment has increased less
than employment in other sectors, most notably services.
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Figure 4: Countries’ shares of world manufacturing value added
Source: Bruegel on the basis of World Bank data. Note: Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC 3,
divisions 15-37. Data in current US dollars.
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The US has witnessed the most marked decline in manufacturing employment, which
currently represents less than 10 percent of total US employment. The trend has also
been downward in the EU, but the EU still has a higher share of manufacturing
employment in total employment than the US: about 15 percent in 2011, similar to
Japan and Korea. China is the outlier case: the former high levels of manufacturing
employment were initially reduced in line with the process of market opening and
restructuring of state owned enterprises. But Chinese manufacturing employment has
been slowly increasing since 2003 to stand at almost 30 percent of total employment
in 2010.
Manufacturing’s share of total employment has declined in all European countries, but
there are some marked diﬀerences between countries. The UK has seen the strongest
decline and currently has one of the lowest shares within Europe. France also has a
relatively low share of manufacturing employment in total employment. Although
Germany has also seen a major decline in manufacturing employment, it still remains
at a relatively high level within Europe. Italy also has a relatively high level and has
been through a more modest decline relative to other EU countries, the US and Japan.
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Figure 5: Manufacturing employment as % of total employment, EU and other
economies, 1990-2011 (or most recent year)
Source: Eurostat, OECO STAN and National Bureau of Statistics China (data available from 2003).
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Diﬀerent trends in diﬀerent countries are correlated with diﬀerent levels of develop-
ment. The strongest relative decline in manufacturing employment and the lowest
levels of manufacturing employment overall are in the EU15 countries, while central
and eastern European countries and Portugal have seen smaller declines and still have
higher shares of manufacturing employment. Outliers in this development pattern are
Italy and Germany, two EU15 economies with relatively high manufacturing
employment shares, and Greece and Ireland, two former cohesion countries with
relatively low manufacturing employment shares.
The drop in manufacturing employment in the EU, as in other economies, is a
consequence of a combination of:
• Productivity eﬀects (labour saving)
• Trade eﬀects (shift towards lower-cost countries)
• Demand eﬀects (drop in demand for manufactured goods relative to services)
There is considerable controversy over which of these factors is the most signiﬁcant2,
but we leave this to one side and discuss each of the factors in turn.
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2. There is a lively debate in the US on the importance of productivity growth and trade eﬀects for manufacturing job
losses. Most analysts support the importance of productivity growth (eg McKinsey 2011), but Brookings (2012)
puts a greater weight on trade eﬀects; Edwards and Lawrence (2013) argue that much of the relative decline in
manufacturing can be explained by the fact that high productivity growth in the sector has not been matched by
an oﬀsetting increase in demand.
Figure 6: Manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, 1995-2009
Source: OECD Statistics, 2009 or most recent year.
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2.1.3 Manufacturing’s superior productivity growth
2.1.3.1. The contribution of manufacturing to total productivity growth
Despite its relative decline within the total economy, manufacturing output and
employment continue to contribute substantially to overall economic growth, because
of strong manufacturing productivity growth. The contribution of the manufacturing
sector to total productivity growth (1995-2009) is substantially higher than its share
of value added, reﬂecting the superior productivity performance of the manufacturing
sector compared to the rest of the economy (Figures 1 and 2).
In the central and eastern European countries, manufacturing was the strongest force
driving productivity growth, especially in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Manufacturing
also made a substantial contribution to the high productivity growth rates seen in
Finland and Sweden during the past decade. In France and Germany, manufacturing
accounted for the bulk of aggregate productivity growth. In several other countries,
including Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom, however, manufacturing accounted
for only a small share of aggregate productivity growth over the past decade. In the UK
case, this is because of specialisation in service sectors. In Portugal, it is a result of
below-average productivity growth within manufacturing sectors.
The contribution of manufacturing to productivity growth in the US has been markedly
greater than in the EU15 in the post 1995 period3.
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3. Because of major diﬀerences in productivity performance between pre-2004 EU members and those that joined
the EU in 2004 and after, the analysis in this subsection will split the EU into the EU15 and central and eastern
Europe, and will compare the EU15 with the US.
2.1.3.2 Manufacturing productivity growth compared to other sectors
Manufacturing contributes to an economy’s productivity growth rate through a
combination of its productivity growth rate and its importance to the economy. With its
share of the total economy continuously declining, the contribution of manufacturing
must increasingly come from superior productivity performance. When looking at the
productivity growth rates of manufacturing in diﬀerent countries, we see for most
countries substantial average annual growth rates in the period 1995-2008: from 2.3
percent in the EU15 to 5.1 percent in the US and 7.5 percent in central and eastern
European countries (for these countries, the high rate is related to their economic
catching-up). This rate was at least twice as high as the market services sector. For
central and eastern European countries, it was 3.5 times greater.
On average, although the share of manufacturing in the EU15 economy is larger than
in the US, the EU15 performance in terms of manufacturing productivity growth has
MANUFACTURING IN EUROPE
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Figure 7: The contribution of different sectors to productivity
Source: Bruegel based on OECD. Note: ‘EU15’ includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain and UK. The value-added based measure of labour productivity by industry is constructed by the
diﬀerence in the aggregate rates of change of value added and employment respectively, computed as share-
weighted averages of industry-speciﬁc rates of change of value added and employment, where weights reﬂect the
current-price share of each industry.
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
1985-1995 1996-2008 1985-1995 1996-2008
EU15 US
Market services
Social services
Construction
Utilities
Manufacturing
Total business economy
been much weaker, with the growth rate declining after 1995, in contrast to the US.
This explains the smaller contribution of manufacturing to productivity growth in the
EU15 compared to the US.
Although manufacturing contributed less to productivity growth in the EU15 after 1995
compared to the US, most of the EU-US gap in labour productivity growth is not down
to the manufacturing sector. This is because of the relatively low weight of the
manufacturing sector in the total economy, and because the EU-US productivity growth
gap is even bigger in other sectors. In services in particular the US markedly
outperforms the EU15. The post-1995 boom in US productivity growth is mostly
attributable to the production and use of ICT, primarily by service sectors (see section
2.2.4).
The productivity growth performance of the manufacturing sector is very hetero-
geneous in the EU15. The weakest performance has been in Italy and Spain, but even
in these countries, manufacturing is still doing better than market services, which have
had negative productivity growth rates. The strongest performers are Sweden, Finland
and Ireland, with annual average growth rates (AAGR) in excess of 6 percent, superior
to the AAGRs for their service sectors. In Finland in particular, manufacturing has
outperformed services by this measure by a factor of six. In contrast to the EU15
average trend, the productivity growth rate of German manufacturing after 1995 was
three times the productivity growth rate for services. In the UK, manufacturing
productivity growth is high, but manufacturing has no edge over services.
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Table 1: Labour productivity growth in the manufacturing sector compared to
services (services sector = 100)
US Japan EU-15 Central and eastern
Europe
80-95 3.8 381 3.1 124 3.1 221 NA NA
95-08 5.1 213 3.7 336 2.3 230 7.5 357
UK France Germany Italy
80-95 4.2 233 2.9 207 2.2 129 3.4
95-08 3.1 107 2.8 280 2.6 325 0.2
Sweden Finland Netherlands Belgium
80-95 4.4 275 5.1 189 3.0 300 4.1 256
95-08 6.0 400 6.2 620 2.8 138 2.8 311
Spain Greece Portugal Ireland
80-95 2.7 NA NA 2.1 111
95-08 0.4 3.6 129 2.7 386 6.1 235
Source: Uppenberg (2011). Note: ﬁrst column gives AAGR, second column gives ratio of labour productivity growth of
manufacturing relative to market services (=100); relative ratios only reported for positive productivity growth rates
of market services.
2.1.4 Manufacturing as the driver of R&D
A major driver of productivity growth is innovation and R&D. Consistent with its superior
productivity growth performance, manufacturing pushing forward in this respect.
Manufacturing still accounts for most business expenditure on R&D (its share of
business R&D is at least four times larger than its share of value added, see Figure 1).
Figure 8 shows for a number of countries how much more R&D intensive the
manufacturing sector is compared to other sectors. R&D intensity is calculated as the
ratio between R&D expenditures and value added. In the US and Japan, manufacturing
is about ﬁve times more R&D intensive than the total economy. In Europe, manu-
facturing is also far more R&D intensive than other parts of the economy, but in Italy
and Spain manufacturing is far less R&D intensive than in other countries.
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4. See Veugelers (2013), for an analysis of the increasing importance of China in R&D and innovation.
The share of the manufacturing sector in total business R&D has declined somewhat
over time for a variety of reasons, such as growing R&D in certain service sectors, and
the outsourcing of R&D to specialised R&D labs that are classiﬁed as part of the service
sector (OECD, 2006). The decline has been most marked in the US, though it has been
reversed somewhat more recently, leaving US manufacturing with the lowest share
compared to its European and Asian counterparts (about 70 percent of total business
R&D). China, Korea and Japan all have shares above 80 percent.
The increase in Chinese and Korean business R&D expenditure has been remarkable,
particularly China’s. China is now the world’s second biggest R&D spender, after the
US, and is similar in R&D size to Germany, France and Italy combined4.
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Figure 8: Total economy and manufacturing R&D intensity
Source: OECD STAN. Note: 2009 or most recent year (US and Germany: 2008, France and UK: 2006). R&D intensity is
the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added.
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2.1.5 Fewer but better paid jobs?
High productivity levels building on higher R&D intensities allow the manufacturing
sector to sustain higher wages. Average labour compensation per employee in
manufacturing is typically higher than in the average economy. In Europe, it is about
20 percent higher. In Korea and the US it is higher still. Within Europe, the highest ratios
are in the UK, Austria, Germany and the northern countries. In Portugal and several
central and eastern European countries, labour compensation per employee in
manufacturing is however lower than in the overall economy. Over time, and in line
with the process of relative job shedding, manufacturing pay has increasingly
exceeded average compensation in the overall economy in particular in Korea, Japan,
the US and most northern European countries, particularly Germany and Austria. This
illustrates a shift within manufacturing in these countries towards fewer but higher
skilled jobs that are more productive and better paid. France and Italy however do not
reﬂect this pattern, while Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Greece saw a marked decline in
manufacturing labour compensation.
Higher productivity levels are especially important for economies with higher labour
costs that must compete with locations/countries with lower labour costs. Hourly
compensation costs in manufacturing diverge substantially between countries. Even
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Figure 9: Share of manufacturing in total business R&D expenditure, 2009
Source: Bruegel based on OECD STAN. Note: EU aggregate (excluding Greece and Luxembourg) from Eurostat.
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though these costs have risen faster in China and India (respectively 17 percent and
10 percent increases between 2006-08) than in the West (for example, US: 2.7
percent, western Europe: 2 percent), the diﬀerence remains huge. The diﬀerence
between China ($1.07) and India ($1.17) and western Europe is a ratio of 40 to 1, with
southern Europe it is a ratio of 30 to 1, and with eastern Europe it is a ratio of 10 to 1
(source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics). Such huge diﬀerences show that hourly wage
costs are only one factor determining the attractiveness of locations for manufacturing
activities.
2.1.6 Declining demand and prices for manufactured goods
Part of the decline in the share of manufacturing in value added is a result of lower
demand for manufactured goods. As income levels rise, households spend an
increasingly smaller share of their income on goods relative to services (Figure 11).
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Figure 10: Labour compensation in manufacturing relative to the total economy
Source: OECD STAN. Note: 2009 or latest available year; Portugal: 2006; France, Poland and UK: 2008. EU* is the
average obtained using as weights the number of employees in the manufacturing sector, excluding Ireland due to
data availability. The index represents the ratio of labour compensation for the manufacturing industry to the
number engaged divided by the ratio of labour compensation for the total economy to the number of persons
engaged for the total economy (total economy = 100) and allows us to look at the development of manufacturing
workers’ relative wages, compared to the economy as a whole.
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Part of this relative decline in spending on manufactured goods is a result of price
eﬀects. In contrast to many services, the prices of which have increased over time,
many manufactured products have become relatively cheaper. Lower prices for
manufactured goods reduce the contribution of manufacturing to GDP, but they beneﬁt
consumers and thus contribute to society’s welfare. In addition, a substantial portion
of manufactured goods are inputs into other sectors. Lower manufacturing prices thus
also contribute to increased performance in other sectors, which are able to use
cheaper manufactured goods as inputs.
The price decline for manufactured goods holds particularly for chemicals and ICT
equipment. More aﬀordable ICT investments are an important contributor to growth in
other sectors, particularly ICT-using manufacturing and services, thereby increasing
the indirect contribution of manufacturing to the economy (McKinsey, 2012; see also
section 2.2.4).
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Figure 11: Ratio of household spending on goods relative to services EU, 2000-10
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat
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2.1.7 Manufacturing as the driver of trade
Another manufacturing trend is the decline in the share of manufacturing in trade ﬂows.
Nevertheless, the contribution of manufacturing to trade and to countries’ trade
balances remains important. Manufacturing accounts for more than three quarters of
total exports from Europe (Figure 1), about ﬁve times greater than its weight in value
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Figure 12: Productivity gains are passed on in terms of lower prices
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS.
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A. Manufacturing and financial & business services price index relative to total economy
B. Manufacturing sectors price index relative to total manufacturing
added. When considering the EU as a bloc, and thus excluding intra-EU trade, the
contribution of manufacturing to total EU trade drops somewhat, to slightly below its
share in US trade. The share of manufacturing in Asian trade is higher than in the west.
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Figure 13: Share of manufacturing in total trade (gross exports and imports),
1995 and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on OECD TiVA database. Note: EU does not include intra-EU trade.
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Manufacturing is important both for exports and imports. Increasingly this trade occurs
simultaneously, with sectors and ﬁrms importing components so that they can
manufacture products for export markets. This is a consequence of the growing
integration of manufacturing production at the global level, and the increasing spread
of global value chains. See chapter 4 for an analysis of manufacturing global value
chains.
In most northern European countries (excluding Denmark), the manufacturing trade
balance is positive, and compensates for the negative trade balance in other sectors.
This is particularly the case for Germany and Ireland, and also for Finland, Belgium and
Japan. In the countries in which the manufacturing trade balance is negative, such as
the US, the UK and most southern European countries (excluding Italy), the
manufacturing deﬁcit is accompanied by a deﬁcit in other sectors.
2.1.8 The rise of Asian emerging countries in manufacturing trade
Manufacturing export markets have seen a marked geographical shift, with the rise of
China as the key country of origin of export ﬂows. This is not a simple shift from west
to east, because it is the US and Japan that have seen the strongest decline in their
share, while the EU has managed to more or less maintain its position in manufacturing
world markets. Asia and particularly China, however, have not just emerged as centres
for the production and export of manufactured goods. Asian economies are also
increasingly more important as destinations for manufactured goods from the west.
Box 1 discusses the role of emerging economies as new centres of gravity for
manufacturing.
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Figure 14: Manufacturing and trade balance, 2008
Source: Bruegel based on OECD STAN.
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Figure 15: Country/region’s share of manufacturing exports and imports, 1995
and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on OECD TiVA
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5. The global middle class is deﬁned as all those living in households with daily per capita incomes of between $10
and $100 in PPP terms (Kharas, 2010).
BOX 1: EMERGING ECONOMIES AS NEW CENTRES OF GROWTH
There are various reasons for the growing importance of emerging economies in the
world economy, included the typically lower costs, especially labour costs, in these
countries compared to more developed economies. Another important factor
however is the presence of large and growing markets for manufactured goods in
these countries: production activities go where the markets are (OECD, 2011).
The attractiveness as locations for investment of Brazil, China, India and South Africa
depends greatly on their large and rapidly growing home markets. Branstetter and
Foley (2007) show that until 2006, US ﬁrms mainly located plants in China to gain
access to the Chinese market: almost 75 percent of the sales of these US aﬃliates
were directed to the Chinese market, and less than 10 percent was exported to the
United States. The room for growth in emerging markets is substantial; several Asian,
Latin American and African countries boast burgeoning middle classes, compared to
often-saturated markets in OECD countries.
China and India are the world’s most populated countries and have high GDP growth
rates. They are quickly becoming important markets for ﬁrms in many industries.
While global consumer demand has previously been concentrated in rich OECD
economies, a new middle class5 is emerging in China and India. While the middle
class worldwide could increase from 1.8 billion to 3.2 billion people by 2020, and to
4.9 billion by 2030, almost 85 percent of this increase is expected to be in Asia. In
2000, Asia (excluding Japan) only accounted for 10 percent of global middle-class
spending; this could reach 40 percent by 2040 and almost 60 percent in the long
term (Kharas, 2010).
The emergence of new growth centres will signiﬁcantly shift the world’s centre of
economic gravity eastwards (Quah, 2011). Kharas (2010) located the global
economic centre of gravity in 1965 at the mid-point of Europe, the United States and
Japan. Since then, the economic centre has been moving to the south east, close to
the axis connecting Washington DC and Beijing. India, China, Indonesia and Vietnam
are expected to pull the centre of economic gravity further to the east.
Source: OECD (2013).
2.1.9 The ‘servitisation’ of manufacturing and the blurring of the boundary between
industry and services
All too often the correlation between the decline of manufacturing and the rise of
services is seen as evidence that the sectors are perfect competitors: the rise in
demand for services is seen as leading to less demand for manufactured goods, while
greater demand for services jobs drives away employees from jobs in industry. But
the relationship between manufacturing and services is much more intricate.
The boundaries between manufacturing and services are blurring. Manufacturing ﬁrms
do much more than make products. They provide solutions to the customers’ needs.
The services provided can be either explicit, such as pre- and after-sales service of a
product, and/or embedded in the solution (such as design activities). The actual
production phase in the manufacturing goods value chain may be increasingly the
less pivotal part in the creation of value-added from producing goods, as the ‘smile
curve’ illustrates (Figure 16).
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Figure 16: The ‘smile curve’
Source: Bruegel based on an OECD presentation at a Bruegel workshop, Brussels, 27 June 2013.
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The main trends in the interaction between manufacturing and services are: service
activities increasingly performed by manufacturing ﬁrms; manufacturing ﬁrms
outsource activities to services ﬁrms, and buy services from independent service
providers as an intermediate input.
To illustrate the growing importance of service activities performed by manufacturing
ﬁrms, Figure 17 looks at service-related jobs in manufacturing. It shows that in Europe
about 40 percent of the jobs in the manufacturing sector involve service-related
occupations, a share that is continuously increasing in most countries. The share of
jobs in manufacturing that can be considered as services-related ranges from about 50
percent in the UK and recently also in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands and Denmark, to about or below 30 percent in countries such as Greece
and Portugal.
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Figure 17: Share of service-related jobs in the manufacturing sector
Source: Bruegel based on EU LFS. Note: Services-related occupations cover ISCO classes 100-500, 830, 910, 933. In
this ﬁgure, we consider services-related activities available from Eurostat extraction of EULFS: managers,
professionals, clerical support workers, service and sales workers, technicians and associate professionals. We
therefore excluded elementary occupations that are services-related as no breakdown was available from publicly
available data. Data for Netherlands is 2011.
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On average, services make up about one quarter of all inputs bought by the EU
manufacturing sector. This share of services purchases by manufacturing is growing
in most countries. It is highest in the UK at more than 40 percent, similar to the US.
Greece and Cyprus are outliers on the high end. Germany has a marked lower share of
services purchased, about 15 percent, similar to Korea and China. The biggest com-
ponent of services purchases in the EU is from trade (37 percent) and social services
(30 percent), with only one third of services purchases from communication and
transport (16 percent), business services (16 percent) and R&D services (4 percent).
MANUFACTURING IN EUROPE
29
Figure 18: Share of services in total manufacturing intermediate consumption
Source: Bruegel based on OECD Input-Output Tables (Total).
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2.2 Trends in manufacturing subsectors
The sectors that compose the aggregate manufacturing sector diﬀer substantially by
various measures, as Box 2 details. These diﬀerent characteristics translates into
diﬀerent trends and challenges faced by each of the sectors. Table 2 shows the
diﬀerent subsectors that we consider in this section, and their relative sizes (in terms
of value added). Chemicals, pharmaceuticals and rubber and plastics combined make
up the biggest manufacturing sector in the EU (2010 ﬁgures), with an increased share
of total EU manufacturing value added since 2000. The textiles and Clothing and metals
and metal products sectors have lost value added share.
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Table 2: Manufacturing industries’ shares of total manufacturing value added, EU,
2000 and 2010
2000 2010
Food, drinks, tobacco 13.3% 12.8%
Textiles & Clothing 5.5% 3.7%
Wood, paper, publishing & Furniture 13.2% 11.8%
Chemicals, Pharma, Rubber & Plastics 13.8% 16.9%
Metals and Metal Products 14.6% 13.0%
Machinery & Equipment 9.9% 9.7%
Electr(on)ics 9.7% 11.7%
Transport Equipment 9.8% 10.5%
Other 10.2% 9.9%
Source: Bruegel based on EUROSTAT.
BOX 2: A BIRDS’ EYE VIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT
MANUFACTURING SECTORS
• Chemicals and transport equipment (cars) are typically medium to high
technology intensive. Pharmaceuticals and electr(on)ics typically record the
highest levels of R&D intensity. Textiles and clothing and food have typically lower
technology intensities.
• For chemicals, pharmaceuticals and transport, being close to customers is
important, meaning these sectors are medium tradable. Electr(on)ics and textiles
and clothing are highly tradable. Food products are typically low tradable.
• Food and textiles are labour intensive, while electr(on)ics, motor vehicles and
chemicals have low labour intensities.
• Energy issues are more important for the sectors wood and paper, basic metals,
chemicals and rubber and plastics.
Source: On the basis of McKinsey (2012).
The classiﬁcation of manufacturing subsectors leaves a lot of scope for heterogeneity,
especially because some classiﬁcations (for example the pooling of chemicals,
pharmaceuticals and rubber and plastics into one group) combine a wide range of
companies and activities. But even within more homogenous sectors, there might still
be substantial heterogeneity of ﬁrms. For instance, in lower-tech sectors, such as
textiles, food and metals, one can ﬁnd ﬁrms that are strong technology leaders. These
ﬁrms are often the stable market leaders in otherwise typically turbulent sectors. To
capture this heterogeneity one needs to go the ﬁrm level (see chapter V).
2.2.1 The specialisation of countries in manufacturing sectors
An implication of the heterogeneity of manufacturing sectors is that the trends and
challenges that individual countries and regions experience can to a great extent be
related to the manufacturing subsectors that are most important in the make-up of the
economies of those countries and regions.
Figure 26 in the Annex compares EU countries on the basis of the manufacturing
sectors in which they specialise. Portugal, Italy, Greece and several central and eastern
European countries specialise in textiles. While central and eastern European countries
have reduced their specialisation in textiles, Portugal, Italy and Greece have reinforced
theirs. Ireland, Hungary and Belgium specialise in chemicals (excluding pharmaceuti-
cals). The large EU countries: France, Germany, UK, Italy and Spain have all lost their
specialisation in pharmaceuticals. It is only the smaller countries such as Sweden,
Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and Slovenia which continue to specialise in pharmaceuti-
cals. Germany and Finland have strong positions in machinery. Finland, Germany and
Ireland specialise in electr(on)ics. Germany and the Czech Republic specialise in
transport equipment. Italy, Belgium, Sweden and Spain are abandoning their
specialisations in this sector6.
2.2.2 Employment trends by sector
Although all manufacturing sectors have witnessed drops in their shares of total
employment, the drop is more notable in some, particularly textiles and clothing, than
in others. Electronics has gained employment share in Korea, but has remained stable,
or has even lost share, in the west and Japan.
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6. See also European Commission (2011) for an analysis of the industrial structure in EU member states.
2.2.3 Trade eﬀects by sector
The two most tradable manufacturing sectors, textiles and electr(on)ics have also seen
the most marked shift from west to east. The rise of China and Korea in electronics has
hurt most prominently the US and Japan. The EU27 has been relatively less aﬀected,
but mostly because these sectors were already smaller in the EU than in the US and
Japan. The chemicals sector has seen much smaller shifts, and in transport, the shifts
have also been modest.
The importance of trade eﬀects for explaining manufacturing job losses in the west
varies strongly in diﬀerent sectors. Signiﬁcantly more developed-economy jobs have
been lost because of trade in sectors with tradable products, such as electronics and
textiles, for which the centre of gravity has shifted towards Asia. European countries
that specialise in these sectors, such as Portugal in textiles, have seen more job losses
because of trade eﬀects.
Clearly, because tradability diﬀers in diﬀerent manufacturing sectors, and countries
specialise in diﬀerent types of manufacturing activities, the composition of the
manufacturing trade balance diﬀers substantially in diﬀerent countries. While the
contribution of the textiles sector has been negative in most western economies, this
is not the case in Greece, Portugal and Italy. Electr(on)ics also contributes negatively
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Figure 19: Share of sectors in manufacturing employment, 1995 and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on EUROSTAT and OECD STAN. Note: not available for China; * 2009 or most recent year.
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Figure 20: Manufacturing sectors’ shares of total world imports & exports, 1995
and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on OECD TiVA
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to the manufacturing trade balance in most western economies, but not in Finland,
Hungary and France. Chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) contributes positively
to the manufacturing trade balance in the US, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, the UK
and Germany. The pharmaceuticals sector contributes positively to the manufacturing
trade balance in the UK, Slovenia, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Ireland. The motor
vehicles sector contributes positively to the manufacturing trade balance in Spain,
Japan and several central and eastern Europe countries.
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Figure 21: Contribution of selected industries to the manufacturing trade balance,
2008
Source: OECD STAN. Note: The ‘contribution to the trade balance’ can be interpreted as an indicator of ‘revealed
comparative advantage’, because it indicates if an industry performs relatively better or worse than the
manufacturing total, no matter whether the manufacturing total itself is in deﬁcit or surplus. If there were no
comparative advantage or disadvantage for any industry, a country’s total trade balance (surplus or deﬁcit) should
be distributed across industries according to their share in total trade. The ‘contribution to the manufacturing trade
balance’ is the diﬀerence between the actual and this theoretical balance. A positive value for an industry indicates
a structural surplus, and a negative value indicates a structural deﬁcit. The indicator is additive and individual
industries can be grouped together by totalling their respective values: by construction, the sum across all
industries is zero. To allow comparisons between countries, the indicator is generally expressed as a percentage of
total trade.
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2.2.4 Growth in real value added by sector: ICT production and ICT capital use
Since 1995, the ICT revolution has led to marked diﬀerences in productivity growth
patterns in diﬀerent manufacturing sectors. ICT impacts the analysis of manufacturing
sectors in two ways: ﬁrst there are diﬀerent trends in the ICT producing sectors com-
pared to other sectors, and second, there is the use of ICT capital goods by other sectors.
The ICT manufacturing sector (electr(on)ics, Nace 30-33) has displayed the strongest
growth in real value added. It has also been the sector with the strongest growth in ICT
capital and total factor productivity (TFP). The growth of real value added in other
manufacturing sectors has been much less, with the lowest increase in textiles and
food. Textiles and food are also the sectors with the lowest increase in ICT capital (in
textile, there has even been a decline). ICT capital growth has also been a substantial
contributor to the growth in value added in the car manufacturing sector. All this
suggests a strong correlation between ICT production and ICT use and the growth
performance of manufacturing sectors7.
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7. For more on the impact of ICT on productivity growth, see eg Strauss and Samkharadze (2011).
Figure 22: Sectoral real value added and ICT capital, average 1995-2007 indices
(1995=100)
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EUKLEMS and EIB (2011).
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Divergence between the EU15 and the US in manufacturing productivity growth, and
the superior performance of some European countries over others, can be linked to
their ICT-producing industries. ICT capital formation has been somewhat more
important in labour productivity growth in the manufacturing sector in the US than in
the EU15, particularly in the 1990s. But the most marked diﬀerence is in the
performance of the ICT producing sector, electr(on)ics, in which the US massively
outperformed the EU15. Within Europe, ICT-producing industries have made a large
contribution to productivity growth in Finland, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden (Pilat et al,
2006; see Figure 23a).
But perhaps the biggest contribution that ICT durables has made to the growth of value
added in other sectors was in the services sector. Investment in ICT capital has been
a major contributing factor to labour productivity growth in business and ﬁnancial
services, both in the EU and the US, but more so in the US, thus further reinforcing ICT’s
contribution to the EU-US productivity growth gap (see Figure 23b).
2.2.5 From low-skilled to high-skilled jobs
The loss of manufacturing jobs has been mostly the loss of low-skilled jobs while the
number of high-skilled jobs in manufacturing is increasing. This holds for all sectors,
but is most pronounced in textiles, which has been through the sharpest decline in
low-skilled jobs relative to high-skilled jobs. Even in textiles, there has been an
expansion in high-skilled jobs, but the increase has been much lower than in other
sectors. The food sector has seen the greatest increase in high-skilled labour, and is the
sector with the most marked shift from low- to high-skilled jobs.
Table 3: High versus low-skilled labour shedding in manufacturing, average 1995-
2007 indices (1995=100)
High-skilled labour Low-skilled labour Ratio high/low
Electr(on)ics 122 98 125
Transport Eq 129 97 133
Chemicals 122 94 130
Paper&Publish 120 92 130
Metals 127 100 127
Food 135 94 143
Textiles 111 75 148
Source: Strauss and Samkharadze (2011) on basis of EUKLEMS.
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Figure 23a: Contribution of ICT to labour productivity in total manufacturing and
ICT producers (annual average growth rate, %)
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Figure 23b: Contributions to labour productivity in ICT using services
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS. Note: ‘EU15’ consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK. * Electrical and optical equipment.
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2.2.6 Manufacturing sectors as the drivers of R&D
Technology intensity and the scope for technology-driven innovation and productivity
and sales growth diﬀers substantially in diﬀerent sectors. Three sectors account for the
bulk of private R&D expenditure: chemicals (including pharmaceuticals and rubber
and plastics), motor vehicles and electr(on)ic equipment. The latter has however lost
importance in Europe and particularly in the US. These three sectors also have the
highest R&D intensity of all manufacturing sectors.
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Figure 24: Manufacturing sectors, share of total business R&D
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EUROSTAT and OECD, ANBERD. Note: Data for EU does not include Austria, Belgium,
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta or Romania. Data for diﬀerent
manufacturing sectors over time is not available for China. In 2009, 84 percent of China’s business R&D was in
manufacturing sectors.
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Within manufacturing, the sector with the highest R&D intensity is pharmaceuticals.
This is the case in all countries, but most notably in the US and UK. Both countries
account for a large share of total pharmaceutical sector R&D. Electronics, cars and
chemicals have more medium R&D intensity rates. In electronics, US and Japanese
manufacturers stand out with the highest R&D intensity, compared to their European
counterparts. The car sectors in European countries, especially France and Germany,
have higher R&D intensities. For more on which countries have a technology strength
in which sectors, see Cincera and Veugelers (2012).
2.3 Challenges for manufacturing in Europe
The global trends and challenges that are inﬂuencing and shaping the future of
manufacturing globally will also inﬂuence and shape the future of European
manufacturing8. Looking at global opportunities, the ﬁrst opportunity for manufacturers
is the new consumers who will enter the consumer class for manufactured goods.
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8. See Future Manufacturing Council of the Australian government (2011) and World Economic Forum (2012) for a
more elaborate discussion of future opportunities and challenges for global manufacturing.
Figure 25: R&D intensity by sectors and countries
Source: Bruegel based on OECD STAN.
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9. A 2008 survey done by EIU for the European Voice, polling 337 executives from the manufacturing sector, identiﬁed
as major challenges for manufacturing in Europe: competition from emerging markets and controlling the costs of
material. Of secondary importance were energy and climate change regulations, particularly for respondents from
the chemicals sector.
These consumers will mostly be supplied by the growing middle class in emerging
markets. On the manufacturing supply side, a pipeline of innovations from new
technologies provides further opportunities to bring new kinds of manufactured
product to the market, to reinvent existing products and to improve the eﬃciency of
manufacturing processes. Examples include manufacturing via 3D-printing, robotics,
nanotechnology and IT developments allowing easier management of ‘big data’.
The global challenges for manufacturers include:
• The changing patterns of consumer behaviour; consumers in many countries are
more urban, aﬄuent, mobile and ageing;
• Rapidly evolving and increasingly more modular technologies, which are much less
sensitive to economies of scale and challenge large incumbents;
• A more globally integrated world with diverging growth perspectives and conse-
quential shifts in market demand and competition;
• A lurking scarcity of supply for many natural resources (such as petroleum, rare
earths, metals), with a resulting pressure on prices;
• A scarcity of speciﬁc skills, especially technical, multidisciplinary and entre-
preneurial talent. This scarcity exists even though there is mass unemployment,
and is evident particularly in ageing societies and when labour and education
markets are inﬂexible;
• Global warming and subsequent climate change.
These challenges will have to be dealt with in conjunction with a more volatile and
uncertain environment for European manufacturing. The euro crisis has created greater
uncertainty about macroeconomic and ﬁnancial-market conditions. There is also more
uncertainty about whether and how governments will intervene in markets: if they will
be more protective or more liberal, with more/fewer or diﬀerent regulations9. Input
prices for some resources (raw material, energy) will continue to be volatile. Climate
change will introduce more and bigger shocks, more diﬃcult to handle with normal
risk-management practices. Because of global integration, external shocks will diﬀuse
faster and wider. International supply chains further amplify the impact of external
shocks. Firms engaged in global manufacturing are more vulnerable to the disruption
of their supply chains. A local disruption in the supply chain reverberates through the
international network because the intermediate goods traded are relationship-speciﬁc,
meaning it is not easy to shift to another supplier10.
Translating the looming opportunities into real strengths for manufacturing in Europe
depends on how these challenges are addressed:
• Climate change and the scarcity of some natural resources calls for manufacturing
processes and products with greater environmental sustainability.
• Consumers’ expectations for sustainable and personalised products will require
manufacturers to customise their products to meet individual tastes and
preferences. From the design and production perspectives, manufacturers will need
to respond quickly to a much wider variety of product speciﬁcations.
• Manufacturing technologies are likely to increasingly play a prominent role in
enabling mass customisation. Key enabling technologies such as nanotechnology
and biotechnology, rapid prototyping and additive manufacturing have the potential
to support the development of new, improved, sustainable and higher value-added
products and production processes. New manufacturing technological innovations
also provide the opportunity for low-volume manufacturing without relatively
expensive set-up costs (for example, 3D printing), reducing entry barriers for new
players in the global market and reducing the need to oﬀshore production to
locations where economies of scale and lower labour costs can be achieved.
Computing and the ICT revolution have had a particularly signiﬁcant impact on
manufacturing industries in the past, providing the opportunity for more agile, just-
in-time processing, high-performance manufacturing, and accelerated introduction
of new products. Continuing developments in hardware and software technologies
(such as cloud computing) will continue, if not accelerate, these trends in the future.
• Because many new entrants into the workforce are pursuing careers outside the
manufacturing industry, manufacturing faces tough competition in the labour
market. Consequently, the ability of companies and the industry as a whole to
market manufacturing as a viable and rewarding career path will be vital to recruiting
new generations of employees. This will particularly be the case for attracting
multidisciplinary creative talents that are needed to research, develop and
implement the new manufacturing technology innovations discussed in this
chapter. This will require more ﬂexible labour and higher education markets in
Europe.
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10. In the automobile industry, for example, it takes six months to a year to change suppliers depending on how
complicated the part is to produce. As a French automobile manufacturer realised, the unavailability of only one
engine part could shut down whole assembly lines. For more on the amplifying impact of global value chains on
shock sensitivity, see for example Escaith and Gonguet (2009).
• The ability of European ﬁrms to identify and exploit new and emerging markets will
also be critical. The disposable incomes of the middle classes in emerging markets
are increasing. This represents a major opportunity for European manufacturers to
export their high value-added products. At the same time, these markets remain
attractive locations for manufacturing tasks, given their large pool of well trained, still
relatively cheap labour, and increasingly also their R&D strengths (Veugelers,
2013).
These global trends shaping the future of manufacturing will also change the set of
factors that will be most pivotal for determining the countries and regions in which
manufacturers will locate their activities and jobs. The two major location factors,
access to markets and access to (cheap) resources, will remain important. But
increasingly important will be: access to speciﬁc skills and research capabilities; the
availability of high-quality support services, and a network of sophisticated lead
customers and suppliers.
As an example, the 2012 PWC-CEO survey (PWC, 2012) identiﬁed China as the country
most frequently noted by respondents as the most important new country for
company growth, with the US in second place. Of the motives why these countries are
important new growth countries for their companies, the overwhelmingly most
important motive mentioned was to grow the ﬁrm’s customer base. In second tier came
being able to access their local talent base, followed by building internal service
delivery capacity and building R&D capacity. Of only minor importance were building
of manufacturing capability, access to resources & components and access to capital.
All this suggests that pre- and post- production activities rather than the assembly-
production activities, will be more pivotal for value creation and growth in the
manufacturing sector, as the ‘smile curve’ already suggested page 27.
For the companies that identiﬁed an EU country as their most important new growth
market (Germany, France, UK), the customer base was the main reason, while the
opportunity to build manufacturing capacity was least important. This is reminiscent
of the importance of access to the single market as point of attractiveness for locating
future manufacturing activities in the EU.
China’s attractiveness as the most important new-growth country is a combination of
almost all factors, underlining that China is more than just a manufacturing base.
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Table 4: Most important country for growth prospects of your company, % of
respondents (N=1258) mentioning country
China US Brazil India Germany Russia UK France Japan Australia
30 22 15 14 12 8 6 5 5 4
Source: PWC-CEO survey, 2012.
Table 5: Reasons for importance of countries for growth prospects of your
company, % of respondents mentioning reason
All location EU countries US China
countries (Germany, UK,
(weighted France)
average) (weighted
average)
Grow customer base 78 75 71 79
Access local talent base 51 38 46 55
Build internal service delivery capacity 42 34 30 46
Build R&D capacity 25 21 26 27
Build Manufacturing capacity 24 11 17 30
Access raw material & components 24 10 19 34
Access local sources of capital 15 13 23 14
Source: PWC-CEO survey, 2012.
2.4 Main insights
The major trends characterising the recent past of manufacturing in Europe are likely
to continue to inﬂuence its future prospects. These trends include the continued
decline of the share of manufacturing in the total economy in terms of production,
employment and value added. The share of the manufacturing sector in total economic
activity is not likely to rebound substantially in most European countries. The relative
decline of European manufacturing results from relatively slow growth in demand for
manufactured products, with demand for services growing more rapidly. The relative
and absolute decline in manufacturing employment is due to strong productivity
growth, but is also aﬀected by shifting geography, with the growth of manufacturing
capacity in Asian countries.
In addition, the character of manufacturing production in Europe is changing.
Manufacturing activity increasingly involves intellectual assets and high value added
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activities, such as research and development, design, ﬁnancial and aftersales services
and logistics. The emphasis on high value added activities translates into a growing
servitisation of manufacturing and the greater importance of innovative capacity. The
sources of innovative capacity for manufacturing are present and developed
worldwide. Aspects of high-technology production are increasingly carried out in Asian
countries. Research and development capacity is growing strongly in emerging
markets, particularly in China.
Manufacturing production continues to be more and more integrated at the global level.
Manufacturers increasingly explore which aspects of production can be carried out at
arms’ length, either within their own country or abroad, or by their foreign aﬃliates.
Chapter 4 looks at the impact of global value chains in more detail.
What do all these continuing trends bode for the future of manufacturing in Europe?
Despite the declining share of manufacturing employment and value added, manu-
facturing will continue to matter for European economies, but primarily for its
innovation and productivity-growth capacity, directly and indirectly. Even if the decline
stops (as the discussion on the rebirth of manufacturing would suggest, a discussion
particularly going on in the US, riding on the shale gas windfall, see for example Morgan
Stanley, 2013), high levels of manufacturing employment will not return to Europe,
because of productivity increases and the forces of global competition. The issue is
not so much how many jobs, but which types of manufacturing activities and jobs will
ensure Europe’s future prosperity. Manufacturing activities and jobs will increasingly
be beyond the production stage, providing manufactured solutions with high value
creation.
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Annex
Figure 26: EU countries and sectors, revealed symmetric comparative advantage
based on value added for EU
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Source: Bruegel based on OECD STAN. Note: The RSCA index is computed considering EU as the reference total.
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3 Manufacturing as a source of
growth for southern Europe:
opportunities and obstacles
BY ERKKI VIHRIÄLÄ AND GUNTRAM B. WOLFF
Growth in southern Europe remains elusive. Private sector deleveraging, the gradual
reduction of public deﬁcits, a weak business environment and the comparatively high
borrowing costs weigh on economic growth. These factors combined with the need to
adjust high external debt levels suggest that growth should come from the external
sector, ie from exports of goods and services.
The manufacturing sector is one of the key sectors determining export performance
and an important source of growth. In the US, the EU and Japan, productivity growth in
the manufacturing sector has signiﬁcantly outpaced that of the rest of the economy in
the last few decades. Yet at the same time, the manufacturing sector has been
undergoing a steady relative decline. In the south of Europe in particular, but also in
France, the manufacturing sector’s weight in the economy has been limited and
declining, while in Germany manufacturing has retained its relative importance.
In this chapter, we document the evidence of the decline in manufacturing in southern
Europe. We assess to what extent the decline has been diﬀerent from the decline
elsewhere and contrast it in particular with Germany. We then discuss diﬀerent
explanations for the decline in manufacturing in southern Europe. As well as the trend
of a natural decline in manufacturing, the rise in unit labour costs and capital costs
and structural factors and agglomeration eﬀects play a role in explaining the decline
of the sector in the south.
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3.1 Growth and manufacturing: stylised data
The pre-crisis booms in the south were associated with a decline in manufacturing –
its share of total value added dropped from 18.6 percent in 2000 to 13.8 percent in
2009 (Figure 1). The decline in the 2000s has been similar in France and Belgium,
even though the level is even more subdued, declining to 11 percent in 2009. In
contrast, northern Europe, and Germany in particular, has not experienced such an
erosion of its manufacturing base. Since 2009, the decline in the share of the
manufacturing sector seems to have stopped in the south and centre of Europe.
Figure 1: Share of manufacturing in total gross value added for euro-area country
groups, 2000-12
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Centre = Belgium, France; North = Austria, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands; South = Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain. The aggregates are weighted.
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Because domestic demand is expected to remain subdued for the foreseeable future,
exports have become a primary source of growth. A signiﬁcant trade surplus is also
necessary to service and reduce the sizeable net foreign liabilities in the region, which
ranged from a manageable 24 percent in Italy to a very high 117 percent of GDP in
Portugal in 2012.
Traditionally, southern Europe’s exports have been more concentrated than the EU as
a whole in services, tourism in particular, relative to manufacturing. Additionally, goods
other than manufactured goods make up a larger share of exports from the south than
from the north of Europe. Speciﬁcally, manufactured goods made up about 60 percent
of total exports of EU members in 2012, whereas services accounted for approximately
25 percent. In contrast, in the southern European countries, the share of manufacturing
was about 55 percent. Nevertheless, the share of service exports was less than 1
percentage-point greater than in the EU as a whole. Consequently, the diﬀerence
relative to the EU aggregate is explained primarily by the larger share of non-manu-
factured goods in total exports. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the southern
countries. In Italy, the share of manufacturing in exports was 67 percent compared to
20 percent in Greece. Conversely, services accounted for 47 percent of Greek exports,
whereas the share for Italy was only 18 percent.
The external balance of southern euro-area countries has adjusted considerably since
the beginning of the crisis (Figure 2). In Spain and Portugal, a healthy increase in
exports has been the primary driver1. Greece has adjusted exclusively through import
compression. But the trade balances could improve considerably more should
manufacturing regain some of its former weight.
1. In Ireland the increase in the current account balance has also been driven by the export sector. We do not cover
Ireland in detail, however, because its manufacturing sector is considerably larger than that of southern EU
countries and suﬀers from fewer structural problems. Additionally, Ireland posted a healthy current account surplus
of 3.7 percent of GDP in 2012.
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Figure 2: Change in trade balance 2007-12, selected countries (% of 2012 GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
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Between 2007 and 2012, manufacturing accounted for 85 percent and services for
16 percent of the increase in net exports, while net exports of non-manufactured goods
declined somewhat. However, gross exports of services grew faster (7.1 percent) than
exports of manufactured goods (3.5 percent) in southern Europe in relative terms.
These were both dwarfed by growth in gross exports of non-manufactured goods (64
percent).
This snapshot shows that a deeper analysis of the manufacturing sector in southern
Europe is needed. How diﬀerent are the long-term trends in the manufacturing sector
in the region from those seen elsewhere? In addition, we explore whether the
introduction of a common currency or price- and non-price competitiveness factors
can explain developments in the 2000s. Finally, we study the ﬁnancing conditions for
potential exporters in southern Europe and assess the potential impact on the
manufacturing sector of more restrictive ﬁnancing conditions.
3.2 A historical perspective on the role of manufacturing
Figure 1 showed the decline of manufacturing during the 2000s. The reported relative
fall, however, has been steady: across the developed world, the share of manufacturing
has been declining for decades. Figure 3 shows the share of manufacturing in total
gross value added for selected country groups and individual economies over a longer
time span. Clearly, the decline of manufacturing has been widespread, persistent and
strikingly linear. It also started before the integration of China and other emerging
markets into the world economy. The question is therefore what has driven this
downward trend and to what degree it is reasonable to assume a reversal in southern
Europe.
The picture is similar if we analyse manufacturing‘s share of employment (Figure A1
in the Annex). The most signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that the relative share of manu-
facturing has also continued to decline in Germany when measured by this indicator.
The southern aggregate (Figure 3) masks diﬀerences in the signiﬁcance of
manufacturing for each country. The sector has traditionally been quite large in Italy,
whereas the Greek manufacturing sector is the smallest as a share of gross value
added (Figure 4).
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Figure 3: Share of manufacturing in total gross value added for euro-area country
groups, Japan and the US (1969-2012)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO. Note: Figure 3 is the long-term counterpart of Figure 1. However, the two use
diﬀerent sources and numbers therefore diﬀer somewhat. AMECO has the advantage of yielding a longer time series.
Eurostat has ﬁgures for all countries for 2012. Country groups as in Figure 1. Note that Germany = West Germany up
to 1990.
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Edwards and Lawrence (2013) argue that much of the relative decline of manu-
facturing can be explained by high productivity growth in the sector not being matched
by an oﬀsetting increase in demand. Therefore, productivity growth has coincided with
lower prices, a lower-value share of total output and lower employment in the sector.
In a nutshell, manufacturing is undergoing the same process as the agricultural sector
did.
Figure 5 shows the greater increase in manufacturing productivity compared to the
economy as a whole (EU15). Between 1970 and 2007, manufacturing productivity
more than tripled, whereas productivity in the total economy increased by a factor of
less than 2.5. As a result, manufacturing productivity increased 40 percent more than
aggregate productivity. However, the relative price of manufactured products declined
by almost 20 percent.
Figure 4: Share of manufacturing in total gross value added for southern euro-area
countries (1960–2012)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
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As the decrease in the relative price of manufactured goods has not been matched by
a commensurate increase in demand, households spend an increasingly smaller share
of their income on goods relative to services (Figure 6).
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Figure 5: Manufacturing productivity and prices relative to total economy in the
EU15, 1970-2007 (1970=100)
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS database. Notes: (i) Productivity is measured by gross value added per hour
worked. The price index is derived from the diﬀerence in nominal gross value added growth and volume growth. (ii)
The two measures are calculated by setting productivity and prices indices in total economy and manufacturing
equal to 100 in 1970. The lines in Figure 5 plot the evolution of the manufacturing-total economy ratio of these
indices. For instance, the value of 146 for productivity in 2007 is equal to 334/229*100, where 334 is the
productivity index for manufacturing in 2007 and 229 the corresponding index for total economy. Consequently, the
relative productivity of the manufacturing sector increased by 46 percent over the period. Because the total
economy includes the manufacturing sector, manufacturing productivity has grown even faster relative to other
sectors.
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3.3 Unit labour costs as an explanation for the decline in manufacturing
One hypothesis is that the size of the manufacturing sector is driven by the
appreciation of the exchange rate. In particular, since the introduction of the euro, real
exchange rates have diverged signiﬁcantly in the euro area. Figure 7 illustrates the
relationship between changes in real exchange rates and the share of manufacturing
in gross value added, since the introduction of the euro.
Figure 6: Ratio of household spending on goods relative to services, selected
countries (1975-2012)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
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An appreciating real exchange rate is associated with a decline in the share of
manufacturing. The Greek, Italian and Spanish manufacturing sectors contracted by
less than expected given the strong exchange rate appreciation after 1999. However,
the particularly severe decline in Portugal after the introduction of the euro coincided
with relatively muted relative cost increases.
The general decline of manufacturing in the developed world can be attributed to
technological and demand eﬀects. However, price competitiveness issues also impact
the size of the manufacturing sector in southern Europe. The steep rise in manu-
facturing unit labour costs in the south before the crisis (Figure 8) corroborates this
hypothesis.
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Figure 7: Change in manufacturing share vs. change in ULC-based REER 1999-
2008
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO. Note: The REER used is relative to 36 industrial countries. ULC change on x-axis,
change in manufacturing shares on y-axis.
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2. The OECD unit labour cost data for manufacturing extends only until 2011Q2, so it cannot be used to judge how
much adjustment has occurred up to present.
Figure 9 shows the evolution of hourly compensation in manufacturing2. Hourly
compensation in 2012 was 10 percent below its 2009 level in Greece in nominal terms.
Furthermore, wages have grown more slowly in Spain and Portugal than in the euro
area as a whole since the crisis. In Italy, though, there was no wage devaluation relative
to the monetary union aggregate.
Figure 8: Unit labour cost growth in manufacturing relative to the euro area
(2001Q1-2008Q3)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD and AMECO. Note: The index is calculated by setting unit labour cost indices in all
countries equal to 100 in 2001Q1. The evolution of the ULC index is then averaged across countries in a given group.
The sum of manufacturing gross value added during 2001–2008 is used as a country-speciﬁc weight. Finally the
group index is divided by the EA-17 index.
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Wage costs matter for the viability of manufacturing because manufactured goods
have to compete on international markets. Consequently, the increase in labour costs
during the ﬁrst ten years of the euro partly explains the decline of manufacturing in the
south. Since the onset of the crisis, costs in the south have partly adjusted relative to
the euro-area average.
3.4 Agglomeration eﬀects
A further explanation for the decline in manufacturing might be the increasing
agglomeration of economic activity. Such agglomeration eﬀects can arise from
increased economic integration in Europe. The introduction of the euro, in particular,
could have inﬂuenced ﬁrms and industries to locate to certain regions to reap the
beneﬁts of economies of scale and decreasing transportation (or more broadly
transaction) costs. Box 1 surveys the literature on determinants of industry location
and the transformation of the European industrial landscape.
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Figure 9: Evolution of manufacturing nominal hourly compensation 2000-12
(2000=100)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB.
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BOX 1: AGGLOMERATION EFFECTS IN EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING
Classical trade theory (Ohlin, 1933) explains why countries specialise in diﬀerent
industries based on their relative factor abundance. The new trade theory that
ﬂourished in the 1980s aimed to explain intra-industry trade based on economies
of scale. Related to this, the new economic geography (Krugman, 2009 and 2011,
surveys the literature) concentrates on the question of what determines industry
location. If transport costs are not prohibitive, economies of scale provide an
incentive for industries to concentrate their production in selected geographical
areas. Given that economies of scale can be achieved anywhere, industry location
is determined by minimising aggregate transportation costs. This is done by locating
production in the largest market. This core-periphery model implies that lower
transportation costs would lead to the de-industrialisation of remote areas and a
concentration of economic activity in the centre. Furthermore, the concentration of
industries would be supported by external economies of scale such as labour
pooling by similar ﬁrms. Closeness of ﬁrms would give rise to information sharing
and mutually helpful feedback.
Economic integration in Europe and particularly the introduction of the euro ignited
debate about the eﬀects on the continent’s industrial landscape. The theoretical
framework of Krugman and Venables (1996) implied that concentration could be
limited if trade costs fell only by little. Drastic reductions in trade costs, though,
would favour strong industry concentration.
A crucial question was whether increased integration would favour more inter-
industry or intra-industry trade. For instance, Kenen (1969) and Eichengreen (1992)
argued that integration would lead to greater specialisation by diﬀerent countries
in diﬀerent industries. This would mean that industry-speciﬁc shocks would become
more important, subjecting members of a currency union to more heterogenous
business cycles because they could not pursue independent monetary policy.
Conversely, Ricci (1997) argued that a monetary union would favour the
development of intra-industry trade. He postulated that exchange rate ﬂexibility is
conducive to inter-industry specialisation, because relative price ﬂuctuations act
as an absorber of industry-speciﬁc shocks. Therefore a move to a ﬁxed exchange
rate system would favour relatively more intra-industry trade between diﬀerent
regions.
Relatively little empirical research has assessed changes in European industrial
landscape in the last decades. Bagoulla and Péridy (2011) stress market and supply
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The literature surveyed in Box 1 does not provide strong evidence that the unusual
pattern of manufacturing in Germany can be explained by the euro. Certainly, Germany
with its large market and central location appears to have all the ingredients for a
Krugman-type concentration of activity. In particular, the integration of German
industry with eastern Europe has been exceptional. Gräf et al (2013) show that the
global value chains of German companies are a source of competitive edge over rivals.
The foreign value added content of German exports has increased faster than in other
countries since the mid-1990s. This is because German companies have been
especially active in integrating eastern Europe and other emerging markets into their
production chains. This in turn, according to Gräf et al (2013), increased their
competitiveness. Arguably, this eﬀect is not related to the monetary union but rather
to the enlargement of the EU to central and eastern Europe. German manufacturing
has stabilised since the early 1990s, not only since the introduction of the euro.
Instead of the euro, a more plausible explanation for the current strength of German
industry is thus the disappearance of the iron curtain. Germany, more than other
countries, was exposed to the resulting increased competition and the opportunity to
reorganise its production structure. The competitive pressure forced Germany to
engage in labour market reforms that reduced wage growth substantially. A further
important factor was the corporate deleveraging that started in 2001 and is
documented by Ruscher and Wolﬀ (2012). A combination of high debt, a shock to the
access as determinants of location choice for industries in the Euro-Mediterranean
area, which includes EU and some non-European countries. They also found that
concentration of high-technology manufacturing increased between 1990 and
2003. Brülhart and Traeger (2005) summarised the literature by stating that “this
diagnosis of a slowly more concentrated European industrial geography is
supported by the majority of analyses, but there are numerous exceptions.” They
empirically estimated the concentration of industry by both the relative employment
shares of diﬀerent industries in diﬀerent regions, and by examining the geographical
dispersion of production. They found that in terms of employment shares,
manufacturing is concentrating in Europe. Topographically, however, it is diverging
because manufacturing is moving to lower-density regions. The authors argue that
this methodological diﬀerence explains the conﬂicting results in previous literature.
Finally, Höhenberger and Schmiedeberg (2008) ﬁnd that when using a three-sector
classiﬁcation (agriculture, manufacturing, services), there was convergence in
employment shares in the EU15 without Luxembourg between 1970 and 2004/05.
MANUFACTURING IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
61
stock market and changes in the cost of ﬁnance because of the abolition of the public
guarantees for Landesbanks (Gewährträgerhaftung) initiated a major corporate
deleveraging period (Schumacher, 2006). This deleveraging substantially
strengthened the ﬁnancial position of German industry and further contributed to its
current strength.
One important question is why French industry did not beneﬁt from similar locational
advantages. Transportation costs between France and central and eastern Europe
arguably are not so great, and France beneﬁted from lower transportation costs to and
from the Iberian Peninsula, which was booming up to the beginning of the crisis.
Nevertheless, the French manufacturing sector has declined dramatically and is
among the smallest in relative terms in the EU. This question clearly deserves further
analysis.
3.5 Structural factors
Other factors contribute to the weakness of manufacturing in the south of Europe. Such
non-price-competitiveness factors are familiar, multiple and not speciﬁc to only
manufacturing. However, they are certainly a major part of the weakness of southern
European industry. Southern countries rank badly according to many structural
indicators relating to labour and product markets and education levels, all of which
depress ﬁrm productivity (see Darvas & Pisani-Ferry, 2011, for a comparison of
structural indicators).
One factor that coincides with low productivity is the small average size of southern
European companies (Figure 10). One of the important insights of modern ﬁrm-level
research is that ﬁrm size is one of the most important factors associated with corporate
performance (Altomonte et al, 2012). In Greece, ﬁrms with fewer than 10 employees
account for 46 percent of total employment in manufacturing compared to only 6
percent in Germany. Ireland is clearly more northern than southern based on
manufacturing ﬁrm size, which might partly explain why its export performance since
2007 has been the best of the aﬄicted countries. Barriers to ﬁrm growth in southern
Europe involve trade costs, innovation costs and tax distortions (Crespo et al, 2012.).
The EFIGE study (see chapter 5) singles out innovation costs as the quantitatively
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Figure 10: Micro manufacturers (0-9 employees) and large manufacturers (250+
employees), share of total employment in 2012
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission’s SME performance review.
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Figure 11: Interest rate on new loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations, loans of up to
€1 million (Jan 2007-Apr 2013)
Source: Bruegel based on ECB.
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largest impediment to ﬁrm expansion.
3.6 The crisis: ﬁnancing conditions as a drag on manufacturing
Manufacturing is a relatively capital-intensive sector. Therefore its growth relies on
adequate credit to ﬁnance investment as well as the working capital. As the southern
manufacturing sector consists to a great extent of relatively small companies, we
assess in particular the ﬁnancing conditions facing small- and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) in the region.
Interest rates on comparatively small loans remain far higher in the south than in
Germany (Figure 11). Greek and Portuguese companies already faced higher
borrowing costs before the crisis, but Spanish and Italian borrowing costs deviated
from Germany only in 2011.
In addition to the cost of credit, there are quantitative restrictions. Of the German SMEs
that applied for credit in the second half of 2012, 85 percent obtained the full amount3.
The average for the southern European countries was 41.8 percent, with a low of 25
percent for Greece. In addition, whereas only 2 percent of German SMEs did not apply
for credit for fear of rejection, the average in the south was 10.6 percent, with a high of
16 percent in Greece.
There are a number of reasons for these diﬀerences. To the extent that spreads for
corporate borrowing represent the varying risks of businesses in diﬀerent countries,
markets are working eﬃciently. However, if manufacturing companies that primarily
rely on (common) export markets face diﬀerent borrowing costs in diﬀerent countries,
it can be a sign of ﬁnancial fragmentation.
Evidence of bank discrimination against SMEs based on their performance or export
status is limited. Lawless and McCann (2011) explore this question using Irish survey
data for 2010. They tested if ﬁrm productivity, sales or export status had an eﬀect on
loan outcomes. They found that banks did not discriminate between heterogeneous
SMEs, which points to ineﬃciencies in credit allocation in a crisis.
Holton et al (2012) used the SAFE survey4 to test determinants of SME access to
3. According to the European Central Bank’s ‘Survey on the access to ﬁnance of SMEs’ (SAFE), available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html.
4. Ibid.
ﬁnance at the European level. They found that ﬁrms that self-report better performance
face fewer constraints when obtaining credit, which would indicate functioning
markets. Nevertheless, this result is based on a panel regression of ﬁrms from 11 euro-
area countries, and does therefore not reveal if the result holds in southern Europe.
A potential cause of fragmentation is the health of the banking system in distressed
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Figure 12: Bank non-performing loans as a % of total loans, selected countries,
2007-12
Source: Bruegel based on IMF.
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economies. Non-performing loans have not yet peaked in southern Europe (Figure 12)
and weak banks often do not extend loans.
Non-performing loans are also a counterpart to high levels of corporate debt. Figure
13 plots the evolution of non-ﬁnancial corporate debt in southern economies. The rapid
growth in outstanding credit stopped around the end of 2008 after which (absolute)
debt levels have stayed ﬂat in Italy, Portugal and Spain and decreased somewhat in
Greece. As nominal GDP was lower in all four countries in 2012 than in 2008, relative
debt levels have actually increased since the crisis.
The corporate deleveraging process in southern Europe has thus not yet been
completed and dramatically weighs down on growth. As the external growth environ-
ment remains relatively weak and corporate bankruptcy/debt restructuring processes
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burdensome, the corporate sector as a whole remains structurally weak. Banks are
likely to demand a generalised risk premium for all corporations because of the
diﬃculty in clearly and easily distinguishing between good and bad borrowers.
However, the resulting higher cost of capital has dramatic eﬀects on industry and
growth. Higher capital costs will – all other things being equal – reduce the optimal
size of the capital stock. During the transition phase, investment rates will be
Figure 13: Nominal non-ﬁnancial corporate debt 2005Q1-2012Q3 (2007Q4=100)
Source: Bruegel based on BIS.
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BOX 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL COST, FACTOR USE
AND REQUIRED WAGE ADJUSTMENT
This box presents a simpliﬁed model that examines the impact of an increase in
capital cost on ﬁrms’ decisions about how much capital and labour they need. The
simulations we include also illustrate the wage adjustment need arising from a shock
to the cost of capital.
Assume a proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm with decreasing returns to scale employing capital
(K) and labour (L) to produce output (y). The assumption of decreasing returns to
scale represents constraints in how ﬂexibly a ﬁrm can reorganise its production in
the short run.
π = LαKβ; α,β > 0, a + b < 1
For a small ﬁrm the price of the output (p), wage level (w) and capital cost (r) are
given. It chooses the optimal level of labour and capital given these prices in order
to maximise proﬁts (π).
π K, L= pLαKβ – wL – rK
The ﬁrst order conditions (i)–(iii) are that the marginal product of capital and labour
equal their marginal cost.
∂π(i) ––– = αpLα–1Kβ – r = 0
∂L
∂π(ii) ––– = βpLαKβ–1 – w = 0
∂K
The two equations can be solved for the two unknowns, the amount of labour and
capital employed.
Next, we use the model to roughly illustrate the eﬀects of an increase in capital costs,
which represents the tight ﬁnancing conditions that southern European companies
have experienced since the crisis (Table 1).
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Table 1: The effects of an increase in the cost of capital
Required wage
Increase in Change in K Change in L Change in K/L adjustment to
capital cost employed employed keep L at
original level
5% -11% -6% -5% -2%
10% -20% -12% -9% -3%
25% -41% -26% -20% -8%
Source: Bruegel. Notes: (i) The ﬁgure for the increase in capital cost reﬂects a relative increase, not a %-point
increase in the interest rate. It is therefore invariant to the original cost of capital. (ii) The parameter values we
use are and , where represent the labour and capital income shares and is a scalar characterizing the intensity of
decreasing returns to scale.
Table 1 shows the eﬀects of diﬀerent increases in capital cost. An increase of 10
percent, representing for instance an increase in the interest rate from 5 percent to
5.5 percent, would reduce the amount of capital employed by 20 percent,
employment by 12 percent and the capital-labour ratio by 9 percent. The exact
ﬁgures have limited substance but illustrate the fact that a rise in capital costs leads
to lower employment because the marginal productivity of labour decreases. The
amount of capital decreases even more in relative terms, which causes a drop in the
capital-labour ratio.
The model also illustrates that the wage level would need to decrease after the shock
to the capital cost in order to keep employment constant. This can be considered as
an indication of the need for southern manufacturing companies to cut labour costs
to reverse part of the jump in unemployment caused by the increase in capital cost.
We assume here that the ﬁrm in question sells its output exclusively abroad so that
demand for its goods is not aﬀected by a reduction in domestic wages. In our
simulations, a 10 percent increase in capital cost would need to be oﬀset by a 3
percent fall in wages to keep employment constant.
dramatically reduced. But lower capital levels also change the optimal amount of labour
employed by ﬁrms (Box 2). Therefore wages need to adjust by even more than they
otherwise would in order to limit the rise in unemployment. Higher capital costs are
thus a further burden holding back adjustment.
3.7 Implications for policy
Growth in southern Europe remains weak. The most important contribution to growth
comes from the external sector and in particular from manufacturers. Because
domestic demand is likely to remain weak, further improvement in the competitive-
ness of the manufacturing sector would be required to increase growth through
exports.
However, a number of signiﬁcant factors are holding back manufacturing. First,
manufacturing has experienced a decades-long natural decline across the developed
world, and southern Europe is no exception. By contrast, the constant share of
manufacturing in Germany stands out as exceptional and can likely be ascribed to
successful integration of German industry into the European and global value chain.
In particular, the fall of the Iron Curtain triggered a number of important policy changes
and business decisions, which led to the vertical and cost eﬃcient integration of
German manufacturing with central and eastern Europe.
The currently low levels of manufacturing production in southern Europe could be
raised by further cost adjustment. In particular, the adjustment of unit labour costs is
one relevant factor.
It may be more important, however, to enhance productivity so that southern
manufacturers produce innovative goods that the rest of the world wants. This would
require a host of structural reforms related to promoting ﬁrm growth. Reductions in
trade and innovation costs, and in tax distortions as emphasised by Crespo et al
(2012), are needed. Also ﬁrm size is far below the European average in the south, and
small ﬁrm size is identiﬁed as one of the factors associated with low levels of
innovation and limited export performance.
Finally, the currently tight ﬁnancing conditions for SMEs in the south are a major
hindrance to the resumption of growth. They reduce optimal investment levels and
increase the need for relative wage adjustment. A thorough review of the state of the
banking system, followed by an adequate recapitalisation, is required to resume a
healthy ﬂow of credit to viable ﬁrms in southern Europe. The establishment of a fully-
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ﬂedged banking union would also greatly contribute to improved ﬁnancing conditions.
Other innovative measures (see Darvas, 2013) can also be considered to help ease
ﬁnancing conditions in the short run. Nevertheless, eventually credit allocation should
remain the job of a healthy private ﬁnancial system.
The strong export growth in parts of southern Europe since the crisis is an indication
of the potential of the ﬁrms in the region. But they face an uneven playing ﬁeld
compared to competitors in the north because of the south’s structural shortcomings
and because of current tight ﬁnancing conditions. Action by policymakers is required
to overcome these obstacles.
ANNEX
The share of employment in manufacturing has declined.
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Figure A1: Share of manufacturing in total employment for euro-area country
groups, Japan and the US (1970-2012)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
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Among EU countries, only the group of northern European countries has had a broadly
stable share of manufacturing in terms of value added since the mid-1990s. Germany
in particular stands out. It is the only country that increased the share of manufacturing
in value added during both the pre- and post-crisis period (Table A1). But even in
Germany manufacturing accounts for a declining share of employment. Among the
other northern countries, the decline in manufacturing’s share of value added and
employment in Finland since it became part of the euro area has been striking. This was
inﬂuenced for instance by the structural decline of the forestry industry and, more
recently, the poor performance of Nokia.
The most drastic declines in manufacturing employment and value added pre-crisis
were in Portugal and Spain, with reductions of over four percentage points . Greece’s
manufacturing sector contracted relatively little pre-2008, although this was probably
related to it being the smallest to begin with. From 2008-12, the fall in manufacturing
employment was fairly similar in all ‘Centre’ and ‘South’ countries. However, whereas
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manufacturing’s share in gross value added declined by more than 2 percent in Italy,
it actually increased in Greece and Portugal. However, this was because other sectors
were shrinking even faster.
Table A1: Changes in the %-share of manufacturing in total economy.
Change 1999-2008 Change 2008-12 Change 1999-2008 Change 2008-12
employment employment value added value added
North -1.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1
Austria -1.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.3
Finland -2.4 -1.8 -3.2 -4.6
Germany -1.6 -0.8 0.6 0.1
Netherlands -2.1 -0.6 -1.9 0.1
Centre -2.8 -1.2 -4.0 -1.2
Belgium -2.8 -1.5 -3.7 -1.6
France -2.8 -1.2 -4.0 -1.2
South -3.1 -1.3 -3.5 -1.1
Greece -0.5 -1.5 -1.6 0.8
Italy -2.4 -1.6 -2.7 -2.1
Portugal -4.0 -1.2 -4.2 0.6
Spain -4.8 -1.4 -4.3 -0.5
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (employment data in persons) and AMECO (value added). Note: Initial
employment share change for ‘South’, Greece and Spain is measured during 2000-08 due to missing data. Change in
value added share for ‘Centre’ and France in the latter period is measured during 2008-11 for the same reason.
Figures A2–A5 take an even longer-term view by plotting the manufacturing share
against the change in the real exchange rate based on unit labour costs, and
highlighting the year of euro accession. The downward trend in the share of
manufacturing in Italy did not change when it joined the euro. In Greece, the share of
manufacturing if anything stabilised after its euro membership, albeit at a very low
level. In Portugal and Spain, however, the manufacturing share stabilised to some
degree in the mid-1990s, but resumed its decline after the adoption of the euro.
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Figures A2–A5: Evolution of manufacturing share in total gross value added and
ULC-based real exchange rate, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (1970-2012)
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO.
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4 Manufacturing in global
value chains1
BY KOEN DE BACKER, SÉBASTIEN MIROUDOT AND ALEXANDROS RAGOUSSIS
4.1 New competitive dynamics in global manufacturing
4.1.1 The rise of global value chains
As a consequence of the dispersion of value chain activities around the world,
manufacturing has become increasingly organised within so-called global value chains
(GVCs). A value chain includes the full range of activities that ﬁrms engage in to bring
a product to the market, from conception to ﬁnal use; such activities range from design,
production, marketing and distribution to support to the ﬁnal customer (Porter, 1986;
Gereﬃ et al, 2001). The activities in a manufacturing value chain might be performed
by a single company or divided between several (supplier) ﬁrms; they cover goods
and services and can be concentrated in one location or spread out over diﬀerent
locations. Many companies have broken up their value chains by outsourcing parts of
their value chains to external partners and oﬀshoring production stages to diﬀerent
countries, hence the term global value chain (GVC, Figure 1).
73
1. This chapter is based on OECD (2013) Interconnected economies: beneﬁting from global value chains, which sets
out the main evidence and policy implications from the OECD work on global value chains. Note on data on Israel:
statistical data on Israel is supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli
settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. Note on data on Cyprus by Turkey: the
information in this document with reference to ‘Cyprus’ relates to the southern part of the island. There is no single
authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus. Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey
shall preserve its position concerning the ‘Cyprus issue’. Note on data by all the European Union member states
of the OECD and the European Union: the Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations
with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the eﬀective control of the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
This international fragmentation of production in GVCs is driven by technological
progress, costs, access to resources and markets, and trade policy reforms. Rapid
advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have resulted in
cheaper and more reliable telecommunications, information management software
and increasingly powerful personal computers, leading to a marked reduction in the
cost of co-ordinating complex activities within and between companies over long
distances. Technological progress in transportation through containerised shipping,
standardisation, automation and greater intermodality of freight has brought down
transportation costs. Trade liberalisation has resulted in reduced trade barriers. These
developments have enabled companies to look at relative costs and factor endow-
ments and build eﬃcient value chains incorporating many ﬁrms and locations.
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Figure 1: Firms’ outsourcing and offshoring strategies
Source: based on Van Welsum and Vickery (2006), OECD (2007), and Miroudot et al (2009).
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While GVCs may not be an entirely new phenomenon (Gereﬃ and Lee, 2012), they are
a deﬁning feature of modern globalisation. Baldwin (2009) describes the end of the
need to perform manufacturing stages near each other as the ‘second unbundling’, as
opposed to the ‘ﬁrst unbundling’ that allowed production to be done far from the point
of consumption. Particularly new are the speed, scale and complexity that have been
added to the process of economic globalisation. GVCs have deepened the process of
globalisation geographically (by including more countries, including emerging
economies), sectorally (by aﬀecting manufacturing but also increasingly services)
and functionally (by including not only production and distribution but also R&D and
innovation).
Empirical evidence demonstrates the growing importance of outsourcing (ie the
purchase of intermediate goods and services from specialist external suppliers) and
oﬀshoring (ie purchases of intermediate goods and services from foreign providers)2.
Going back to the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and De Backer and Yamano
(2012), aggregate indicators based on input-output tables show that the share of
externally sourced intermediates in production (ie outsourcing) and the share of
imported intermediates in total intermediates (ie oﬀshoring) increased in the European
Union and in most EU member states between 1995 and 20093.
Unsurprisingly, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are leading actors in GVCs because
of their extensive international activities through their foreign aﬃliates. So-called
‘buyer-driven’ chains have developed around large retailers such as Walmart and
highly successful brand merchandisers such as Nike. Their products are often
relatively simple, eg apparel, housewares and toys. The manufacturing of such
products require relatively little capital and few skilled workers. Lead ﬁrms in these
GVCs focus almost exclusively on marketing and sales. They have few factories of their
own but source products (often via intermediaries such as trading companies) from a
large network of independent supplier ﬁrms.
By contrast, producer-driven GVCs are typically found in high-technology sectors, such
as the semiconductor, electronics, automotive and pharmaceuticals industries.
Because these industries rely on technology and R&D, large ﬁrms such as GM, Sony
and Apple control the design of products as well as most of the assembly, which takes
place in a number of countries. Technology (including design) and production expertise
are core competencies that are largely developed in-house in the lead ﬁrms or in
aﬃliates and captive suppliers that can be prevented from sharing technology with
competitors.
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2. Oﬀshoring includes both international outsourcing (where activities are contracted out to independent suppliers
abroad) and international in-sourcing (the transfer of particular tasks within the ﬁrm to a foreign aﬃliate) – see
Figure 1.
3. Evidence on GVCs at the aggregate level has been limited and until recently there was little internationally
comparable data on the importance of GVCs for diﬀerent economies, in contrast to the growing number of case
studies on individual product GVCs (eg Apple’s iPod and iPhone). However the OECD has addressed the
measurement of GVCs during the past years using (international) Input-Output Tables; the OECD/WTO database on
Trade in Value Added provides new data and indicators on GVCs for a 57 economies.
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The participation of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in GVCs is more
limited. Smaller ﬁrms often supply intermediates to exporting ﬁrms in their country
and are as such relatively more integrated in domestic value chains. Slaughter (2013)
calculated that the typical US MNE buys more than $3 billion in inputs from more than
6000 US SMEs – or almost 25 percent of the total input purchased by these ﬁrms.
Overall, SMEs face serious challenges in terms of ﬁnding the ﬁnancial and managerial
resources that will enable them to integrate into GVCs. Their small scale is often
insuﬃcient to support the costs of adequate R&D, the training of personnel, and the
fulﬁlment of strict requirements in terms of product standards and quality. However,
SMEs may see new opportunities to expand their business abroad in GVCs (OECD,
2006). The supply base of the automotive industry, for example, has globalised,
resulting in the rapid internationalisation of smaller companies that have become key
suppliers (ie second- or even ﬁrst-tier suppliers). Often, as car assemblers set up ﬁnal
Figure 2: Outsourcing and offshoring, 1995 and 2009
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assembly plants in new locations, they have helped/urged their suppliers to move
abroad with them (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010).
4.1.2 ‘Made in the world’
As production stages and technologies have become more mobile, a single ﬁnal
manufactured good is nowadays often processed in many countries with sequential
stages in the value chain being performed in the location most suited to the activity.
Complexity has risen in parallel with mobility: Miroudot and De Backer (2013) showed
that the number of production stages that a good or service goes through before it
reaches the ﬁnal customer has increased over the past two decades and that most of
this increase is explained by the international part of the value chain. Figure 3 presents
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Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database). Note: outsourcing is calculated
as the purchase of intermediate goods and services from specialist external suppliers as percentage of production,
while oﬀshoring is calculated as the purchases of intermediate goods and services from foreign providers as
percentage of intermediate inputs.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ire
la
nd
M
al
ta
Hu
ng
ar
y
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Cy
pr
us
Sl
ov
en
ia
Be
lg
iu
m
De
nm
ar
k
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Sw
ed
en
Cz
ec
h
Re
p
Au
st
ria
Fi
nl
an
d
Bu
lg
ar
ia
La
tv
ia
Ro
m
an
ia
Po
rtu
ga
l
Po
la
nd
Gr
ee
ce
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce UK
Ita
ly
Sp
ai
n
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Si
ng
ap
or
e
Vi
et
Na
m
Ca
m
bo
di
a
Ic
el
an
d
M
al
ay
si
a
in
es
e
Ta
ip
ei
Br
un
ei
Is
ra
el
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Th
ai
la
nd
Sa
ud
iA
ra
bi
a
Ko
ng
,C
hi
na
M
ex
ic
o
Ko
re
a
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
Ch
ile
No
rw
ay
Ca
na
da
Tu
rk
ey
Re
st
of
w
or
ld
In
di
a
In
do
ne
si
a
So
ut
h
Af
ric
a
Ne
w
Ze
al
an
d
Ar
ge
nt
in
a
ni
te
d
St
at
es
Au
st
ra
lia
Ru
ss
ia
n
Fe
d
Ja
pa
n
EU
27
Br
az
il
Ch
in
a
2009 1995
Offshoring: EU27
Offshoring: other economies
2009 1995
empirical evidence on the length of GVCs in individual industries. Using an index that
takes the value of 1 when there is a single stage of production in a single economy, the
indicator shows that value chains in some industries are long and that a signiﬁcant
share of this unbundling of production is international.
Diﬀerences between industries are to a great extent linked to the technical
characteristics of products. International fragmentation of production in GVCs is far
more developed in manufacturing than in services, because services are less likely
to be sliced up than the manufacturing of products, particularly when services require
face-to-face contact between the provider and the consumer. International frag-
mentation is especially important for modular4 products in high-technology industries.
Parts and components are often produced in one country and exported to another in
which they are assembled. This international division of labour is found in electrical
machinery, radio/television and communication equipment, oﬃce, accounting and
computing machinery, and motor vehicles.
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4. Modular products consist of multiple components that interact through codiﬁed standards and allow companies
to slice up the value chain into separable production stages.
Figure 3: Index of the relative length of GVCs by industry, world average, 2008
Source: Miroudot and De Backer (2013).
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National economies have become more interconnected because GVCs involve
extensive ﬂows of intermediate goods and services. The pattern of trade accordingly
shows that a good produced in one economy and exported to its market of ﬁnal
consumption includes inputs supplied by producers in other economies (ﬁrst tier
suppliers) who themselves source their inputs from third economies (second tier
suppliers). Many products are ‘made in the world’ and countries just like ﬁrms become
increasingly specialised in speciﬁc functions within GVCs (see below for a discussion
on China’s role in assembly activities).
Within GVCs, value is added in diﬀerent countries throughout the production process,
and countries’ exports therefore increasingly include foreign value added. The foreign
content of exports has generally increased during the past two decades5, but
economies diﬀer signiﬁcantly in this respect (Figure 4). In general, foreign value added
depends on the size and patterns of specialisation of an economy. Smaller economies
tend to have higher shares of foreign value added embodied in their exports. Larger
economies have a wider variety of domestically sourced intermediate goods available
and are therefore less reliant on foreign imports of intermediates. Meanwhile, countries
with substantial natural resources, such as Australia, have lower ratios of foreign value
added in exports because mining requires fewer intermediate goods in the production
process.
The EU as a whole had a foreign value added share in its exports of 14 percent in 2009,
which is similar to other large economies such as the United States and Japan. Size and
industrial structure explain to a great extent the heterogeneity in that proportion within
the EU. Smaller EU member states have on average greater shares of foreign value
added: for example, 60 percent of Luxembourg’s exports in 2009 represented value
added created abroad and then imported into Luxembourg. The United Kingdom had
the lowest foreign value added share within the EU in 2009, which is to some extent
explained by its strong orientation towards services. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
is another factor behind the heterogeneity within the EU: countries that have witnessed
large inﬂows of FDI following their accession to the EU, and have attracted sizeable
manufacturing activities, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, have
higher shares of foreign value added. The same is true for countries such as Belgium,
Ireland and the Netherlands, which are also characterised by a high (foreign) MNE
presence.
MANUFACTURING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
79
5. A decrease in foreign value added content of exports was observed in 2009 suggesting some consolidation in
GVCs took place during the ﬁnancial/economic crisis, most likely as a direct result of the huge and simultaneous
drop in international trade during the economic crisis.
The foreign content of the EU’s exports rose by 4 percentage points between 1995 and
2009, reﬂecting the EU’s growing integration within GVCs. The highest share of foreign
value added is observed in chemicals and minerals, for which nearly one quarter of
the overall export value reﬂects foreign content, double the 1995 ﬁgure (Figure 5).
Other industries with relatively high foreign value added content are electrical
equipment, transport equipment and basic metals. EU services have, as expected,
relatively lower foreign value added.
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Figure 4: Foreign value added content of exports by country, 1995 and 2009
Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database).
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4.1.3 Increasing competition from emerging economies in manufacturing GVCs
Manufacturing has increasingly globalised over the past decade, as emerging
economies have become important partners in GVCs especially in manufacturing
industries6. Products often conceived and designed in developed countries are
manufactured and assembled in countries such as China, with intermediate inputs
sourced from other countries. See Box 1 in Chapter 2 for a discussion of the rise of
emerging economies in global manufacturing.
Emerging countries are attractive locations particularly for labour-intensive activities,
as their labour costs are lower than those of more developed economies (Pilat et al,
2006)7. Although labour costs account for only a fraction of total production costs (with
considerable diﬀerences between diﬀerent industries), it is an important factor in the
choice of locations for some ﬁrms8. Emerging regions have indeed increased their
share in value added, especially in traditional industries such as food and beverages,
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6. However, India has become an important exporter of services, as companies have outsourced a range of knowledge
processes, business processes and information technology operations to India (Fernandez-Stark et al, 2011).
7. Cost savings and cheap labour are important drivers of the growth of oﬀshoring to emerging markets, but they are
not the only, nor the most important factors behind investment in these countries.(OECD, 2011). The attractiveness
of emerging economies for MNEs is to a large extent explained by their large and growing (home) markets.
8. Labour costs should be considered relative to a country’s level of productivity. Countries accept high labour costs
if they coincide with high levels of labour productivity; countries with low labour costs typically have low levels of
labour productivity.
Figure 5: Foreign value added content of exports, EU27, 1995 and 2009
Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database).
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textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, and paper (Hepburn, 2011). As labour-
intensive, low-value-added activities have been relocated, manufacturing jobs in
emerging countries have expanded strongly (Figure 6).
Manufacturing activities in emerging economies often take place in areas with special
administrative and regulatory status, ie so-called ‘export processing zones’ (EPZs)
(WTO and IDE/JETRO, 2011). Foreign investors are attracted to EPZs because of the low
costs and the ease of importing and exporting. Low or zero tariﬀ barriers and minimum
administrative requirements allow companies to source intermediates from abroad
eﬃciently for assembly into ﬁnal products, which are then exported. According to WTO
and IDE/JETRO, about one-ﬁfth of exports from emerging and developing economies
originate from EPZs; China accounts for almost 70 percent of world exports from EPZs.
The central importance of Asia as a manufacturing hub in GVCs is largely linked to EPZs:
almost half of Chinese exports are estimated to originate with foreign MNEs in EPZs.
Consequently, China (but this is also true for Mexico) has become specialised in (pure)
assembly activities in manufacturing GVCs. Case study evidence eg relating to Apple’s
iPod and iPhone, shows that China does not necessarily capture a lot of value through
assembly. Overall, EPZs have clearly stimulated exports and created employment but
their performance is overall less strong in terms of value added, because of the high
import content of the exports of assembled goods.
4.1.4 Backshoring on the horizon?
Recently, a number of companies (especially US companies) have considered
repatriating activities they previously oﬀshored to China. The cost structure of
production is changing in emerging countries: in China, for example, average hourly
wage increases of 15-20 percent a year have eroded the country’s cost advantage in
labour-intensive activities. India, Indonesia, the Philippines and others have also
experienced strong wage increases as the middle classes have grown. The average
hourly wage in emerging economies was estimated at about 2 percent of the US
average in 2000 and is expected to reach 9 percent in 2015 (World Economic Forum,
2012). As productivity diﬀerences narrow and the share of labour in total production
costs shrink, savings from oﬀshoring become smaller. Companies respond to these
rising labour costs by increasingly automating factories in emerging countries,
relocating production to other emerging countries where labour costs are still low,
and/or eventually backshoring, or repatriating, speciﬁc activities.
Risk diversiﬁcation is another motive for backshoring and explains why ﬁrms
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increasingly set-up (often shorter) GVCs in higher-cost countries close to their major
markets, in addition to GVCs in low-cost countries. Supply chains have become more
complex and extensive, which often means extra risk which is not always visible and
hence less easy for ﬁrms to control. Just-in-time models, lean structures and the
absence of redundancy mean that a breakdown in one part of the chain may result in
global disruptions, as demonstrated in the aftermath of natural disasters such as the
Japanese earthquake/tsunami in 2011 and ﬂoods in Thailand in 2012. Complete GVCs
in the electronics and automotive industries broke down as important intermediates
were sourced from the aﬀected regions.
Technological advances are expected to support the backshoring trend: digital
manufacturing that relies on clever software combined with novel materials and new
Figure 6: Share of major emerging regions in world manufacturing employment (in
percentage of world manufacturing)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Note: East Asia excluding China includes China - Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, China - Macao Special Administrative Region, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei;
South Asia includes India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; South-East Asia includes
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam; Latin America excluding Mexico includes
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of), Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama; Middle East and North Africa includes
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey; Sub-
Saharan Africa excluding South Africa includes Botswana, Cameroon, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Swaziland, Uganda, United Rep of Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
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production techniques (eg nanotechnology) is expected to reshape production
processes in manufacturing. Digital technology will cut the cost of producing smaller
batches of a wider variety of product; as scale economies decrease, ‘manufacturing on
demand’ is expected to become (more) economically feasible. Additive manufacturing
such as 3D printing, for example, builds products from successive layers of material
and enables products to be tailored to individual customers’ needs.
In spite of backshoring’s growing appeal, there is no consensus on how big this has or
will become. Analysis by the Boston Consulting Group (2011) suggests that
backshoring (also called on-shoring or re-shoring) could lead to a manufacturing
renaissance in the United States9. However, it is expected that oﬀshoring to emerging
countries will remain an important strategy, though costs are rising in these countries.
In addition, emerging countries oﬀer large and rapidly growing markets for manu-
factured products given their growing middle classes. Nevertheless, GVCs are very
dynamic and will continue to evolve as costs increase, technologies continue to
change and ﬁrms reconsider their operations. Backshoring to developed economies
might become more prevalent for technological and quality products characterised by
fast product cycles and for which market feedback is important. The mass production
of labour-intensive, commoditised products will most likely remain concentrated in
emerging economies where production costs, including labour, are lower.
4.1.5 The participation of EU manufacturers in GVCs
Economies participate in GVCs both as users of foreign inputs and as suppliers of
intermediate goods and services used in other economies’ exports (Koopman et al,
2011). One indicator of the participation of countries in GVCs is the percentage of a
country’s exports that are part of GVCs: either because of upstream links – that is
looking back along the value chain and measuring foreign inputs/value added included
in a country’s exports – or downstream links – ie measuring the domestic inputs/value
added of the country contained in the exports of other countries by looking forward
along the value chain.
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9. The Boston Consulting Group estimates that in areas such as transport, computers, fabricated metals and
machinery, 10-30 percent of the goods that the United States now imports from China could be made at home by
2020, boosting American output by $20-55 billion a year.
This participation indicator provides an insight into the position of countries in GVCs;
economies can be positioned upstream or downstream in GVCs10. Upstream economies
produce the raw materials or knowledge assets at the beginning of the production
process (eg research, design), while downstream economies assemble processed
products or specialise in customer services. The position of a country in the value chain
can aﬀect the degree to which it beneﬁts from a GVC. Activities such as R&D and design,
and also certain services, tend to create more value added than assembly (OECD,
2013).
Smaller economies typically show higher backward participation rates as they source
relatively more inputs from abroad, while larger economies have higher forward
participation rates. For example, the foreign content of US exports (ie backward
participation) is about 15 percent, but US participation in GVCs rises to almost 40
percent when the use of US intermediates in other economies’ exports is taken into
account (Figure 7). Industrial structure also matters. Resource-intensive countries like
Australia, Brazil and Norway, for example, have higher forward participation rates,
because their natural resources are included in other countries’ exports down the value
chain. Also the GVC participation of China is partially characterised by the use of
Chinese intermediates in the exports of other countries (ie forward participation);
nevertheless backward participation is relatively more important for China given the
extensive use of foreign intermediates in China’s important assembly activities.
The EU27 as a whole has the lowest GVC participation rate (ie 30 percent) of all 57
economies for which data is available, driven both by upstream and downstream links.
As expected for a large integrated economic area, the use of EU intermediates in other
(non-EU) countries’ exports is greater than the use of non-EU intermediates in EU
exports. The participation of individual EU member states in GVCs, however, is
signiﬁcantly greater, with smaller member states displaying greater (backward)
participation, as expected, and larger member states such as Germany, France and
the United Kingdom showing relatively higher forward participation.
The signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the EU27 as whole (ie EU27 treated as one
economy, only taking into account extra-EU exports/imports) and individual member
states11 suggests the existence of important GVC linkages between EU member states.
Distinguishing between geographic zones (EU15, other EU and non-EU) indeed shows
MANUFACTURING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
85
10. Miroudot and De Backer (2013) discuss the position of OECD and non-OECD economies in individual industries in
more detail.
11. The participation of individual EU member states in GVCs includes intra- and extra-EU trade ﬂows.
that the participation of individual EU27 member states in GVCs is strongly EU driven.
About half of the inputs for most EU member states come from other European
countries, with the EU15 member states being especially important sources for
intermediates. The same observation is even more valid for downstream linkages:
EU27 member states export intermediates to other EU15 countries in particular for
use in those countries’ exports.
Overall, EU member states are strongly integrated into European value chains,
concentrated around the EU15 (with Germany as a central player). The extra-EU
linkages of individual member states within GVCs seem to be more important when it
comes to the sourcing of intermediates, in particular from member states at the
borders of the EU27. These results are in line with other analyses. A recent survey in
France showed that most oﬀshoring by French ﬁrms went to other EU member states,
primarily to the EU15 (Fontagné and D’Isanto, 2013). Amador et al (2013) discussed
the regional integration of production within the EU and the euro area between 2000
and 2011, and demonstrated the dominant EU origin of foreign value added in EU
countries. Likewise, Di Mauro et al (2013) argued that the internationalisation of
production has fostered an industrial restructuring in diﬀerent EU economies and
between the EU and the rest of the world, allowing EU ﬁrms to vertically specialise in
European and global value chains.
The strong regional character of GVCs is also observed in other parts of the world. Within
the NAFTA region, Canada and Mexico are heavily oriented towards the other NAFTA
countries, in particular the United States: almost half of the imported intermediates
embodied in their exports comes from the NAFTA zone. In Asia also, the majority of the
intermediates embodied in exports are sourced from within the region, reﬂecting the
importance of ‘Factory Asia’ where advanced parts and components are often produced
in developed economies such as Japan and Korea and then exported to emerging
economies such as China and increasingly Vietnam and Cambodia where the
intermediates are assembled into ﬁnished products. In spite of their increasingly global
character, GVCs still display a strong regional focus for much the same reasons that
trade overall is still highly regional. The foreign value added of economies’ exports
originates largely in neighbouring economies.
This strong regional concentration is related to the role of distance and trade costs in
vertical trade because inputs are often shipped multiple times. Although transport
costs have consistently fallen, they still matter, particularly for products characterised
by a large weight-to-value ratio (Harrigan, 2010; Van Assche, 2012). Hummels (2007)
estimated that for the median individual shipment US exporters paid $9 in transport
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costs for every $1 they paid in tariﬀ duties. Furthermore, timely deliveries of
intermediates are crucial for the smooth functioning of GVCs (Hummels and Schaur,
2012), and Harrigan and Venables (2006) showed that the adoption of just-in-time
techniques pushes ﬁrms to locate production of time-sensitive components closer to
home.
Figure 7: GVC participation, 2009 (% of total exports)
Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database).
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Figure 8 shows the GVC participation of the EU27 (in comparison with China, Japan
and the United States) and individual member states for total manufacturing,
electronics, automotive and chemicals. The results underline the strong EU orientation
of European manufacturing, notwithstanding important diﬀerences between
industries. The EU27’s manufacturing GVCs seems to be less integrated overall than
those of other large economies such as China, Japan and the United States. This is
explained by the lower foreign sourcing of intermediates (ie backward participation)
and by the lower use of EU intermediates in the exports of non-EU countries. More
research is needed to disentangle the relationship between EU and global linkages –
if they are mutually exclusive or interdependent, and under which conditions – as this
can be expected to impact the long-term competitiveness of EU manufacturing12.
Participation in chemical GVCs is roughly equal for the EU27, China, Japan and the
United States, although the results on forward participation show that Japanese and
US intermediates are included in global exports of chemicals more than EU
intermediates. Within the EU27, a number of smaller countries show especially high
participation rates mainly driven by the imports of intermediates. In Ireland this is
related to the investments of large, especially American, pharmaceutical companies,
while Belgium and the Netherlands are important ports that serve as gateways for
basic chemicals. The participation of other countries, such as Germany, France and
the United Kingdom, in GVCs is more closely linked to the use of their intermediates by
other countries’ chemical industries.
The gap in GVC participation between the EU27 and the other large economies is
greatest in the electronics industry. China’s strong integration into electronics GVCs,
mainly through assembly activities further down in the value chain, is clearly reﬂected
in the high backward participation of China in this industry. In contrast, the participation
of Japan and particularly the United States in electronics GVCs is strongly driven by the
use of their advanced intermediates in the electronics exports of other countries.
Sourcing of intermediates from outside the EU is of major importance for the EU
electronics industry and explains, more than intra-EU sourcing, the participation in
GVCs of smaller EU member states such as Hungary, Malta, Finland, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. Major electronics-producing countries, such as Germany, France and
Italy, export intermediates for further production/ﬁnal assembly within and outside
the EU.
In contrast to the global linkages in electronics, the EU automotive industry has a much
more regional character despite the importance of GVCs in this industry (see Figure
3). Auto manufacturers in EU member states source the majority of their intermediates
from other EU countries, while sourcing from outside the EU27 is signiﬁcantly lower.
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12. The participation of China, Japan and the United States in GVCs is however not only due to ‘global’ linkages; as
discussed above, linkages with neighbouring countries within NAFTA and Factory Asia explain the results to some
extent.
High transportation costs make intercontinental shipping very costly especially for
downstream activities, eg complete cars or subsystems. In addition, political pressure
might also motivate leading ﬁrms in the automotive industry to locate production close
to end markets13. The large (backward) participation rates in GVCs of countries like
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, illustrate the shift eastwards of
assembly activities in this industry.
Network analysis of vertical trade between countries in the electronics and automotive
industries largely conﬁrms these insights and provides further insights on the central
position of Germany within European value chains (Asian Development Bank, 2011)14.
The analysis of the electronics industry clearly shows the existence of three hubs in
the global production of electronics: south-east Asia, NAFTA and Europe centred on
Germany. The Asian hub is globally dominant and is built around Japan as lead
manufacturer/producer of parts and components, and China as the contract manu-
facturer. The dominance of the Asian hub is not only because of strong intra-Asia
linkages, but also because of the strong relationships between Asia and the NAFTA hub
(especially the United States and in second order Canada and Mexico), and Asia and
Europe (Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), though the Asia-Europe
links seem less strong.
The automotive industry also has a strong regional concentration in the same hubs
(Asia, NAFTA and Europe), but the links between these hubs are much more limited
compared to the electronics industry. Japan clearly occupies the central position
within the Asian production hub, while there is strong integration between the United
States, Canada and Mexico within NAFTA. The European hub is centred on Germany for
which, in particular, the links with central and eastern European countries such as the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary have become increasingly important
since the accession of these countries to the EU (IMF, 2013).
The involvement of Germany in European and global value chains in manufacturing
has increased in the past two decades as a consequence of decreasing trade costs
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13. The high cost and visibility of automotive products can create the risk of a political backlash if imported vehicles
make up too large a share of total vehicles sold. This in turn creates pressure for supplier co-location within regional
production systems for operational reasons, such as just-in-time production, design collaboration and the support
of globally produced vehicle platforms (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010).
14. Based on bilateral trade data for 75 countries, vertical trade relationships for each country pair are calculated on
the basis of a supplier’s country share in parts and components by an industry in the hosting country, weighted
by that industry’s share of total ﬁnal goods exports. Network analysis is then used to visualise a world map of
vertical trade relationships based on the dyadic network relations between countries on the industry level.
within the EU and new opportunities for ﬁrms to oﬀshore part of their production
process. This is reﬂected in the rising foreign content of German exports: while in 1995,
81 percent of German exports represented domestic value-added, this share had fallen
to 73 percent by 2009 (Figure 4). The foreign content of German exports is particularly
high in industries such as basic metals, chemicals and minerals and transport equip-
ment (35 percent): when a car is exported from Germany, typically one third of the
value comes from other countries.
The increased supply links of the German economy through the oﬀshoring of
production to lower-cost countries in eastern Europe has resulted in claims that
Germany has become a ‘bazaar’ economy (Sinn, 2006). The preceding analysis
qualiﬁes this to some extent. Figure 7 clearly shows that most of Germany’s foreign
inputs are sourced from other EU countries, but that the share of these inputs
contributed by EU15 member states is greater than the share contributed by the
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. In the transport equipment industry,
for example, about half of the inputs are sourced from France, Italy and the United
Kingdom; on average, less than 3 percent of inputs used in Germany are imported from
eastern European countries. Second, the data shows that Germany is also a major
exporter of intermediates that are used in third-country exports. This forward
participation represented 25 percent of German exports in 2009.
Summarising, the results overall show the regional organisation of global manu-
facturing with production concentrated around hubs in Europe, NAFTA and Asia.
Participation in GVCs within Europe is strongly EU oriented with a central position for the
EU15, and in particular Germany, in EU manufacturing. The internationalisation of
production has resulted in the deeper integration of EU manufacturing, with member
states specialising in industries/activities according to their comparative advantage.
This has resulted in the rising foreign, primarily EU, content of EU countries’ exports,
and has signiﬁcantly beneﬁtted the competitiveness of the EU27 and individual
member states in a global perspective.
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Figure 8: GVC participation in manufacturing industries, EU27, 2009 (% of total
exports)
Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database). Note: The indicator at the
industry level is expressed relative to country exports (instead of industry exports) in order to take into account the
importance of the industry in the total export composition of a country, which explains the lower participation rates
of countries in individual industries.
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4.2 Global value chains and manufacturing competitiveness
4.2.1 Growing interdependencies between economies
With companies and countries now embedded in international networks of production,
GVCs increasingly challenge policy thinking about competitiveness. Today’s economies
no longer rely exclusively on domestic resources to produce and export goods and
services. Instead, their exports increasingly embody the technology, labour and capital
of the countries from which they import intermediate goods. As a result, the com-
petitiveness of national economies increasingly depends on the competitiveness of
their partners. Policymakers need to understand these patterns and know how
concentrated or diversiﬁed this international sourcing is.
The international competitiveness of economies is typically assessed on the basis of
export market shares and indicators of revealed comparative advantage (RCA)15. But
indicators based solely on export data (in gross terms) may misrepresent the real
specialisation of countries in GVCs: for example, they may simply reﬂect the fact that
a country is specialised in the ﬁnal assembly of a good, imports all the necessary
intermediate inputs and adds little value to the good itself. Competitiveness should no
longer be assessed (solely) at the level of industries or products, but also in terms of
activities (“What you do matters more than what you sell”, The Conference Board,
2012). In a world of GVCs, comparative advantage increasingly reﬂects strengths at
the level of activities, tasks and production stages.
Using export ﬂows expressed in value-added terms allows countries’ capacities to add
and capture value across activities in GVCs to be better captured. Economies heavily
engaged in GVCs, such as China, tend to have signiﬁcantly lower shares of total exports
based on domestic value added than they have in terms of gross exports. Because of
the strong growth in processing, trade and assembly activities, China rapidly became
the largest exporter in output (ie gross) terms, but on the basis of the domestic value
added embodied in exports, the United States was still the largest exporting economy
in 2009.
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15. Empirical measures of comparative advantage go back to the seminal work of Balassa (1965). The shares of a
given sector in a country’s exports are compared to that sector’s share in world exports. A value greater than 1 is
said to show that a country possesses a comparative advantage and is specialised in that industry, while a value
less than 1 points to a comparative disadvantage. Measures of comparative advantage suﬀer from a number of
shortcomings, however (for an overview, see Sanidas and Shin, 2010).
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Figure 9: RCA based on gross exports and value added exports, two industries and
two countries, 2009
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Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database)
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Figure 9 shows RCA measures in gross and value-added terms for ‘basic metals and
fabricated metal products’ and for ‘electrical and optical equipment’. It also gives a
more detailed breakdown by industry level for Germany and Slovakia. The ﬁgure shows
signiﬁcant variations in both the ranking and size of RCA measures across and within
countries (see also Koopman et al, 2011). Though positions in the rankings change, the
rankings show a relatively high degree of stability16. Unsurprisingly, industries that
involve a high level of international sourcing exhibit on average greater dissimilarities
between the two RCA measures. RCA measures based on value added also provide
new insight into the international specialisation of countries. In general, larger
countries show smaller dissimilarities between the two RCA measures, because they
are less dependent overall on international sourcing.
4.2.2 International sourcing enhances export specialisation and competitiveness
Outsourcing and oﬀshoring within GVCs typically have negative connotations and are
associated with ﬁrm closures and job losses at home. The strong manufacturing growth
of emerging economies is sometimes perceived to have come at the expense of
signiﬁcant losses of jobs in developed economies. It is argued that companies from
developed economies move manufacturing to China and other emerging economies
only to take advantage of the low labour costs, thereby hollowing out their national
manufacturing industries.
But oﬀshoring beneﬁts the home country signiﬁcantly in terms of productivity,
innovation and competitiveness. Companies that oﬀshore labour-intensive jobs to low-
cost countries can even help save domestic jobs when oﬀshoring strengthens their
international competitiveness; the tasks that are moved oﬀshore increase the
productivity of activities that are not relocated if inputs sourced from abroad are
cheaper and of higher quality. The importing of intermediates also increases countries’
ability to export; the international sourcing of intermediates in GVCs helps ﬁrms to
reduce costs, acquire higher-quality inputs and improve productivity and export
competitiveness. Policy interventions intended to limit such competitive eﬀects, often
aimed at protecting individual ﬁrms or industries, may then have the opposite eﬀect
and thus reduce competitiveness.
16. This is to some extent explained by the relatively high level of industry aggregation in the OECD-WTO TiVA Database;
more disaggregated industries will typically show greater dissimilarities between RCA measures in gross and value-
added terms.
Analysis by the OECD (Box 1) shows that outsourcing and oﬀshoring in the context of
GVCs helps to make countries more competitive and to improve their export
specialisation. GVCs positively aﬀect the international specialisation of countries by
expanding their sourcing possibilities both within the domestic economy and abroad.
This greater use of intermediates helps countries to increase their value added in
export activities. Basically, the use of cheaper, more diﬀerentiated and better-quality
intermediates allows ﬁrms and countries to specialise in industries and activities
according to their comparative advantage, ie where they are more eﬃcient than other
ﬁrms and countries. In today’s global economy, success in international markets
depends as much on the capacity to import high quality inputs as on the capacity to
export.
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BOX 1: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS ON INTERNATIONAL SOURCING
AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
The empirical model described in this box adds interconnectedness through
outsourcing and oﬀshoring to the existing framework of determinants of export
specialisation. The analysis includes external economies of scale, the country’s
capital endowment (dependent on capital intensity at the industry level; Romalis,
2004) and high-skilled labour endowments (dependent on high-skill intensity at
the industry level) as variables to capture the more traditional explanations of
international trade.
Increased sourcing of intermediates is captured through outsourcing and oﬀshoring
on the industry level to reﬂect the choices companies face when sourcing inputs
for their production processes. As discussed previously (see Figure 2), outsourcing
is captured in the variable ‘intermediates use intensity’ at the industry level (ie the
cost of intermediate inputs as a share of total output), while oﬀshoring is proxied
by the variable ‘intermediates import intensity’ (ie the share of imported
intermediates in total intermediates used by that industry). Both variables are
expressed relative to world averages for the same industry and therefore point to
intensities that deviate from technological norms of production for either of the two
activities.
The export specialisation or competitiveness of countries are measured in revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) in gross and value-added terms, taking into account
the limitations of traditional RCA measures in the presence of GVCs (see above).
Deardorﬀ (2012) describes how RCA measures can be used, together with other
data, as a guide to what causes actual patterns of trade between countries and
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whether these are driven by the traditional explanations of comparative advantage
or by other factors. Most studies however have used export ﬂows to study
determinants of international competitiveness; only a few have used RCAs in
econometric models (Dalum et al, 1998; Sleuwaegen and De Backer, 2001).
Rather than test the traditional explanations of international specialisation, the
results conﬁrm the core determinants of specialisation formalised in international
trade theory: physical and human capital endowment favour export specialisation
in industries that use these factors of production intensively. Large market size is
also found to drive export competitiveness and points to the importance of
(external) economies of scale across industries.
The positive relationship between oﬀshoring and RCAs in gross terms partly reﬂects
the fact that exports expressed in gross terms increasingly include imported inter-
mediates. The positive eﬀect on RCAs in value-added terms, however, clearly signals
the signiﬁcant impact of increased sourcing on the export specialisation and
competitiveness of countries. The impact of sourcing is also positive when
outsourcing and oﬀshoring are restricted to the sourcing of intermediates within the
industry (‘narrow deﬁnition’) instead of from any source (‘broad deﬁnition’).
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Table 1: The effects of outsourcing and offshoring on the export
competitiveness of countries
RCA in value added (symmetric)
Variables I II III IV V VI VII
Domestic demand index 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.074***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Physical capital endowment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
x physical capital intensity (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High-skill endowment 1.828*** 1.849*** 2.057*** 2.104*** 1.724*** 1.866*** 1.807***
x high-skill intensity (0.253) (0.251) (0.251) (0.249) (0.247) (0.254) (0.249)
Outsourcing index (broad definition 0.165*** 0.154***
– intermediate use intensity) (0.020) (0.019)
Offshoring index (broad definition 0.097*** 0.097***
– imported intermediates intensity) (0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcing index (narrow definition 0.058*** 0.065***
– intermediate use intensity) (0.004) (0.004)
Offshoring index (narrow definition 0.006*** 0.008***
– imported intermediates intensity) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 18639 18612 18603 18603 18612 18603 18603
R-square 0.192 0.197 0.209 0.212 0.205 0.197 0.211
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17. There are three main categories of knowledge-based capital: computerised information, innovative property and
economic competencies (Corrado et al, 2005).
4.2.3 The importance of innovation and knowledge-based capital in GVCs
Because of greater competition from emerging countries, innovation has become
crucial for the long-term competitiveness of OECD manufacturing. Innovation and
knowledge increasingly determine the creation and growth of value added and
employment in manufacturing, and multi-factor productivity growth is also closely
linked to innovation and improvements in eﬃciency (OECD, 2010).
Innovation is closely related to the broad accumulation of so-called intangible or
knowledge-based assets, which involve tacit, non-codiﬁed knowledge in areas such as
R&D, branding, design and the complex integration of software with organisational
structures17. Investment in knowledge-based capital has been rising since the 1980s
RCA in value added (symmetric)
Variables I II III IV V VI VII
Domestic demand index 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Physical capital endowment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
x physical capital intensity (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High-skill endowment x high-skill 1.963*** 1.961*** 2.124*** 2.151*** 1.858*** 1.992*** 1.935***
intensity (0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.250) (0.257) (0.252)
Outsourcing index (broad definition 0.098*** 0.088***
– intermediate use intensity) (0.020) (0.019)
Offshoring index (broad definition 0.075*** 0.074***
– imported intermediates intensity) (0.007) (0.006)
Outsourcing index (narrow definition 0.057*** 0.063***
– intermediate use intensity) (0.004) (0.004)
Offshoring index (narrow definition 0.006*** 0.008***
– imported intermediates intensity) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 18639 18612 18603 18603 18612 18603 18603
R-square 0.191 0.193 0.2 0.202 0.203 0.195 0.208
Source: OECD calculations. Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are
indicated by: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
in developed economies: in the United States and the United Kingdom, investment in
knowledge-based capital now exceeds investment in physical capital such as
equipment, material and buildings.
Knowledge-based capital is at the heart of the manufacturing competitiveness of more
mature economies: it is the source of the advanced knowledge and capabilities needed
to develop sophisticated and complex products18. Investment in brand equity, design,
organisational capital and business models allows developed-economy manufacturers
to compete on aspects other than cost. Developed economies are typically specialised
in higher-value, more technology-intensive products, and in higher value-added
activities in manufacturing. Emerging economies are generally specialised in more
labour-intensive and low-cost assembly activities that create less value added.
Most of the value creation in a GVC is often found in upstream activities, such as the
development of a new concept, R&D or the manufacturing of key parts and com-
ponents, or in downstream activities, such as marketing, branding or customer service.
Final assembly, which is often oﬀshored to emerging economies, represents only a
small part of value generation. In general, activities that can be oﬀshored tend to be
commoditised and create relatively less value added. Position in the value chain is
thus an issue of interest to many policymakers. Emerging economies for example ﬁnd
that they do not create/capture much value from their extensive manufacturing
activities. GVCs have changed the nature of global competition because companies
and countries no longer only compete for market share in high value-added industries
but increasingly also for high value-added activities within GVCs.
Knowledge-based capital is also increasingly important in the governance of GVCs
because ﬁrms can use their speciﬁc capabilities to shape the industry architecture
and to capture a larger share of value. Superior capabilities allow ﬁrms to innovate and
compete in their own market segment, but also to change the competitive conditions
of the whole value chain. Firms are often able to manage linkages with other ﬁrms
within a GVC to make themselves less replaceable, while making other ﬁrms more
dependent on them. Because the latter has to co-operate with them to create value,
such ﬁrms can leverage their position in GVCs and capture more value. As industries
and products become more fragmented and decentralised, competencies in terms of
system integration skills can leverage companies’ innovation activities in GVCs. The
lead ﬁrm manages the diﬀerent stages of the value chain and makes the diﬀerent
elements work together. The example of Apple shows that its strong design capabilities
18. Sutton (2012) explains in detail how ﬁrm capabilities act as the central channel for economic growth of countries.
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enabled it closely manage the integration the diﬀerent components and services into
its diﬀerent products.
Econometric analysis (Box 2) shows that investment in knowledge-based capital is
an important source of competitiveness for economies engaged in GVCs. Countries
with knowledge-based assets are likely to beneﬁt more from their integration in GVCs
through oﬀshoring within higher-skill and higher-technology industries. Knowledge-
based assets at the ﬁrm level allow companies to innovate faster and better, to position
themselves in higher value-added activities in GVCs and to govern the architecture of
their GVCs.
19. Column I of the OLS results reproduces results for the subsample of 14 countries (for which data on knowledge-
based capital are available) used in this experiment. Column II replaces high-skilled labour endowment with
intangible capital endowment, dependent on high skill intensity at the industry level. Column III introduces two
interaction variables to measure separately the impact of knowledge-based capital endowment on specialisation
in industries that are both high-skill- and oﬀshoring-intensive.
BOX 2: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS ON INTERNATIONAL SOURCING,
KNOWLEDGE-BASED CAPITAL AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
The analysis described in this box extends the model discussed in Box 1 (which
demonstrated the importance of outsourcing and oﬀshoring on countries’
competitiveness) by including knowledge-based assets as a factor of production
that may contribute to the specialisation patterns of countries. Like other production
factors, knowledge-based capital measured at the country level is included
dependent on the intensity with which knowledge-based capital is used at the
industry level in order to capture diﬀerential eﬀects across industries. While data
on physical capital has long been available, data on knowledge-based capital at the
economy level has only recently become available (Corrado et al, 2012). This data
is largely limited to developed economies, and this should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results of the econometric work described below.
The results show ﬁrst that knowledge-based capital enhances the export com-
petitiveness of skill-intensive industries. The more a country invests in
knowledge-based capital, the more likely it is to develop a comparative advantage
in international trade in such industries (Table 2, column II)19. This ﬁnding is in line
with the positive eﬀects of factors of production such as physical and especially
human capital (Table 2 column I) and underlines the importance of knowledge-
based capital as a productive resource.
4.2.4 The growing importance of services in manufacturing GVCs
Costs along the value chain are inﬂuenced by the quality of services involved in the
logistics chain as manufacturing ﬁrms increasingly use and produce services as inputs
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Second, the positive eﬀect of knowledge-based capital is greater in industries that
are high-skill- and oﬀshoring-intensive (Table 2, column III), suggesting a strong
complementarity between knowledge-based capital and integration in GVCs.
Oﬀshoring magniﬁes the positive eﬀects of knowledge-based capital in terms of
export specialisation.
Table 2. The effect of knowledge-based capital on the export competitiveness of
countries
RCA in gross exports (symmetric) RCA in value added (symmetric)
Variable I II III I II III
Domestic demand index 0.024*** 0.020** 0.019** 0.023** 0.019** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Physical capital endowment x 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
physical capital intensity (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High-skill endowment x 3.077*** 3.064***
high-skill intensity (0.475) (0.483)
Outsourcing index (broad definition 0.111*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.081*** 0.097*** 0.095***
– intermediate use intensity) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Offshoring index (broad definition 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.161*** 0.094*** 0.107*** 0.096***
– intermediates import intensity) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Knowledge-based capital endowment 0.040*** -0.01 0.041*** -0.007
x high-skill intensity (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010)
Knowledge-based capital endowment x high-skill 0.685*** 0.665***
intensity x intermediates import intensity (0.097) (0.097)
Knowledge-based capital endowment x -0.286*** -0.278***
intermediates import intensity (0.042) (0.042)
Observations 6585 6585 6585 6585 6585 6585
R-square 0.316 0.317 0.323 0.308 0.31 0.315
Source: OECD calculations. Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are
indicated by: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.
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into their products (Nordås, 2010). Consequently, services have taken on greater
importance for manufacturing competitiveness; manufacturing exports include
signiﬁcant value added in service industries (Figure 10). On average, the value created
directly and indirectly by services as intermediates represent more than 30 percent
of the total value added in manufactured-goods exports. OECD and non-OECD countries
show signiﬁcant shares of service inputs in their manufacturing exports, with smaller
countries sourcing relatively more service inputs from abroad.
The value of manufactured products increasingly reﬂects service inputs because
services play a crucial role as ‘enablers’ of GVCs. Logistics, communication services,
business services and so on facilitate the eﬃcient functioning of GVCs because they
help to transfer goods, data, technology and know-how across borders and to co-
ordinate dispersed activities quickly and smoothly. Transport and communications
networks are the backbone of GVCs and services provided to these networks, often by
specialised suppliers domestically or internationally, directly beneﬁt manufacturing
activities.
Services are not only embodied in manufactured products, but are increasingly sold
together with goods as embedded services. Since GVCs increasingly allow for the
unbundling of business functions, and because pure production activities are
increasingly located in emerging economies, manufacturers in developed countries
rely more on complementary non-production functions to create value. Manufacturing
ﬁrms increasingly use services to gain a competitive advantage. Services help not
only to increase productivity but also to diﬀerentiate, customise and upgrade products
and develop closer, more longstanding relationships with customers (Kommers-
kollegium, 2012).
It should be noted however that the increasing use of services in manufacturing is to
some extent a statistical artefact. Many services activities were previously done in-
house but are now increasingly outsourced and oﬀshored by manufacturing
companies (Pilat et al, 2006; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1998; The Economist, 2011).
The services content of manufacturing exports shown in Figure 10 constitutes a lower
bound for the contribution of services to manufacturing output because it only counts
traded services; services such as R&D are often performed in-house.
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4.3 What policies are needed, and which are not?
The international fragmentation of production in global value chains challenges the
way policymakers should look at the global economy. It is essential to understand
how GVCs work, how they aﬀect economic performance, and how policy can help
countries derive beneﬁts from their participation in global value chains. The growing
interconnectedness between economies as a result of GVCs directly changes the
rationale of government policies in areas related to globalisation, such as trade policy,
investment policy, competitiveness, innovation and upgrading. The negative eﬀects of
trade protection for example are particularly important for GVCs in which parts and
Figure 10: Services content of gross manufacturing exports, 2009
Source: OECD/WTO (2013), OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database).
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
La
tv
ia
Fr
an
ce
Ita
ly
Ge
rm
an
y
Be
lg
iu
m
Fi
nl
an
d
Sp
ai
n
Ire
la
nd
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Sw
ed
en
Po
la
nd
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Au
st
ria
Gr
ee
ce
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sl
ov
en
ia UK
De
nm
ar
k
Cz
ec
h
Re
p
Cy
pr
us
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Hu
ng
ar
y
M
al
ta
Ro
m
an
ia
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Ic
el
an
d
In
di
a
EU
27
Ho
ng
Ko
ng
,C
hi
na
Si
ng
ap
or
e
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Tu
rk
ey
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
Ne
w
Ze
al
an
d
Au
st
ra
lia
Is
ra
el
Ca
m
bo
di
a
Ch
ile
Ja
pa
n
No
rw
ay
Ch
in
es
e
Ta
ip
ei
So
ut
h
Af
ric
a
Ca
na
da
Br
az
il
Ru
ss
ia
n
Fe
d
M
ex
ic
o
Ko
re
a
Vi
et
Na
m
Un
ite
d
St
at
es
M
al
ay
si
a
Ch
in
a
Ar
ge
nt
in
a
Th
ai
la
nd
In
do
ne
si
a
Domestic Foreign
Domestic Foreign
EU27 countries
Other economies
MANUFACTURING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
105
components cross borders many times. As imports are essential for exports, tariﬀs
and non-tariﬀ barriers in GVCs are eﬀectively a tax on exports. Export restrictions can
also aﬀect the eﬃcient functioning of GVCs and increase costs. OECD (2013) discusses
the policy challenges for diﬀerent domains in detail.
However, because the drivers of manufacturing competitiveness in GVCs increasingly
include factors that are outside the scope of national policies, the direct inﬂuence of
policy on growth and job creation within national borders is limited. There is a growing
tension in competitiveness policies between the global character of individual ﬁrm
strategies that include international activities in GVCs, and government policies that
target local jobs and value added. In an era when some MNEs’ operations are larger
than some national economies, the contribution of domestically-owned ﬁrms to the
national economy is no longer easy to pinpoint. Likewise, the returns on investment
by domestic ﬁrms in the national economy – and the support that governments
provide to that investment – may partly leak to other countries through linkages to
GVCs. This leakage may be compounded by the tax planning strategies of MNEs.
One response to the loss of manufacturing and the growing fragmentation of pro-
duction has been a call for industrial policies, often with a strong focus on
manufacturing. Such policies capture a range of initiatives. In some cases, they
discourage manufacturers from relocating activities abroad. In others, they give implicit
support to the manufacturing sector. Many of the defensive policies aimed at
supporting manufacturing ignore the realities of today’s global economy. In a world of
GVCs, ﬁrms require imports from abroad and will need to oﬀshore some of their
activities in order to remain competitive at home. Old-style industrial policies
characterised by industry-speciﬁc support policies or national champions have no
role to play in a world characterised by GVCs. They distort international competition
and the eﬃcient operation of value chains, and run the risk of an international subsidy
war, with taxpayers as the main losers. More fundamentally, subsidies are not the way
to encourage long-term investment and the building of capabilities.
GVCs are also at the heart of the discussion on ‘making things instead of making ideas’,
which relates to the debate on the future of manufacturing in developed economies.
The fragmentation of production has so far led to a division of labour in which OECD
countries have specialised in upstream activities such as R&D, design and innovation,
while emerging countries have specialised in manufacturing and assembly activities.
The result of this global restructuring process is that, while OECD countries still create
a large part of the value generated by GVCs, they are often no longer able to maintain
large numbers of manufacturing jobs. Policies that focus exclusively on manufacturing
may ignore the growing importance of services for value creation in GVCs, including
for the production of manufactured goods.
This is not to say that governments cannot play a useful role in maintaining
manufacturing capabilities. Clearly, manufacturing continues to matter in a world of
GVCs. Tangible goods continue to dominate global trade, even if much of the value
embodied in goods now derives from inputs of services. Recent technological
advances, such as the emergence of 3D printing, may enable manufacturing ﬁrms to
engage in tailored production – but with the eﬃciencies of mass production – close to
their markets. This could reduce the need for oﬀshoring. Strategies and policies that
support the building of such new capabilities, including the necessary skills,
infrastructure and research, therefore provide a new way forward to ensure the future
of manufacturing in advanced economies. Existing innovation policies remain
important for the creation and capturing of value within GVCs, but may need to be
reoriented to take better account of the organisation of the global economy in terms of
activities and tasks instead of industries or products. To remain competitive, developed
economies will need to focus on tasks with high value added to compensate to some
extent for their typically higher costs.
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5 Meeting the manufacturing
ﬁrms involved in GVCs
BY REINHILDE VEUGELERS, FRANCESCA BARBIERO AND
MICHAEL BLANGA-GUBBAY
Introduction and motivation
Recent empirical international trade literature has shown the importance of better
understanding the heterogeneity of ﬁrms within sectors and countries. In particular,
using the unique, large and rich EFIGE survey database on ﬁrms’ internationalisation
strategies, Altomonte et al (2012) in Triggers of competitiveness, characterise the
types of ﬁrms that are more likely to be internationally active, and how their proﬁles
interact with the productivity eﬀects of internationalisation. Mayer and Ottaviano
(2007) in The Happy Few show how the trade performance of countries and sectors
depends on a few ﬁrms.
This ﬁrm-level literature has focused mostly on single internationalisation strategies:
exports, imports, oﬀshoring or outsourcing, and the choice between these strategies
as substitutes. What these ﬁrm-level studies only marginally touch on is the impact of
global value chains (GVCs) and the consequent development of more complex
combinations of internationalisation strategies and more complex connections
between ﬁrms in global value chains: simultaneously carrying out certain tasks abroad
and others at home, for which components are imported and the output of which is
exported to other markets, possibly for further processing.
In this chapter, we use the EFIGE database to study the prevalence and impact of GVCs
at the ﬁrm level. The EFIGE database provides unique detailed information on ﬁrms’
internationalisation strategies, allowing us to look at combinations of international
strategies typically associated with involvement in GVCs: the importing of components,
oﬀshoring or internationally outsourcing certain parts of the value chain, exporting
ﬁnished goods or semi-ﬁnished goods for further processing and trade. EFIGE also
allows us to position ﬁrms within the value chain. The analysis shows great hetero-
geneity among ﬁrms involved in GVCs, and that only a few ﬁrms are intensively
involved. The ﬁrms that are involved, however, matter for Europe’s knowledge-based
growth and competitiveness performance, because they are large, trade-intensive,
more innovative and more productive.
We start by presenting the data and our approach to identifying the extent of ﬁrms’
involvement in global value chains. In section 5.1, we look at the complexity of ﬁrms’
international strategies, as reﬂected in how many international activities they are
simultaneously involved in. GVC-involved ﬁrms are ‘multiple-mode ﬁrms’, of which
those with the greatest level of involvement simultaneously organise production
abroad, import components for local production and export their produced goods. We
also identify the ﬁrm’s position in the value chain – whether or not the ﬁrm is producing
to order for other ﬁrms. To check the validity of our construct for GVC involvement of
ﬁrms, we look at how these ﬁrms measure up against other indicators typically used
in the literature on GVCs, most notably the extent to which they import components
rather than buy locally, and the import content of their exports. This is set out in section
5.2. Section 5.3 details how concentrated country and sector value added, employ-
ment and particularly trade are in the few ‘multiple mode’ ﬁrms. Multiple-mode ﬁrms
are not only important for total employment and trade, they are also likely to matter for
competitiveness because of their productivity proﬁle. Section 5.4 looks at the
performance proﬁle of multiple-mode ﬁrms, analysing if greater levels of GVC
involvement are associated with higher productivity. Section 5.4 also looks at
innovation and human capital investment in particular as drivers of productivity.
Section 5.5 assesses whether GVC involvement has helped to shield ﬁrms from the
crisis or if, on the contrary, has made them more vulnerable to the crisis. Section 5.6
identiﬁes the type of European ﬁrm that focuses its international value chain
deployment on the European Union, and looks at the impact this might have on the
performance of such ﬁrms.
5.1 The EFIGE data and GVC variables
5.1.1 The EFIGE data
We use the EFIGE dataset, a representative and cross-country comparable sample of
ﬁrms with manufacturing activities in Europe1. For this set of ﬁrms, EFIGE provides
detailed survey evidence on their international activities: what they import and from
where, what they export and to where, and what and where they produce abroad, either
1. For more detailed information on the EFIGE database, see: http://www.bruegel.org/datasets/eﬁgedataset/.
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through oﬀshoring (ie through foreign manufacturing aﬃliates) or through outsourcing
(contracting with other manufacturing ﬁrms abroad). The database also provides
information on other ﬁrm characteristics, such as performance, ownership, skill level
of workers and innovative performance.
The EFIGE dataset covers 14,759 ﬁrms, including about 3000 from each of Germany,
France, Italy and Spain, 2200 from the United Kingdom and 500 from each of Austria
and Hungary. The survey excludes ﬁrms with fewer than 10 employees, thus slightly
oversampling large ﬁrms to ensure their representativeness because of their critical
role for competitiveness2. About 600 ﬁrms belong to a foreign group, of which 350 are
from another European country as the reporting unit. As there is only one EFIGE wave,
covering the period 2007-2009, no comparisons over time can be made with the
current dataset. Table 1 provides an overview of the main manufacturing sectors
covered by EFIGE.
Table 1 EFIGE main sectors
NACE 1.1 Sector Number of firms
15-16 Food, drink and tobacco 1504
17-19 Textiles and clothing 1020
20-22, 36 Wood, paper, printing, furniture 2714
24 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals3 555
25-26 Rubber, plastic and other non-metallic 1600
27-29 Metal, metal products 5118
30-33 Electrical and optical equipment 1422
34-35 Transport equipment 412
Source: Bruegel.
5.1.2 GVC involvement: multiple-mode internationalisers
To identify the ﬁrms, sectors and countries that are most involved in GVCs, we look at
those ﬁrms that use multiple modes when operating internationally, especially those
that combine production abroad with the importing of components and the exporting
of their goods.
2. See Altomonte and Aquilante (2012).
3. Because of the low number of observations in the EFIGE sample from the pharmaceutical sector, this sector could
not be separated from chemicals.
First we classify ﬁrms as internationally active only if their trade turnover (either
turnover from imports of intermediate goods and services for domestic production,
exports of domestic production or international production activities) is above the
twenty-ﬁfth percentile in their sector, or if their share of international activity (import,
export or international production) over total turnover is above the twenty-ﬁfth
percentile. We use both criteria combined to identify those ﬁrms that are substantially
internationally active (in terms of turnover and shares)4.
For the ﬁrms that are substantially internationally active, we identify GVC involvement
through the number of international activities the ﬁrms are substantially engaged in.
Starting from three types of activity – exporting, importing and foreign production
(both inter-ﬁrm, international outsourcing, and/or intra-ﬁrm oﬀshoring, foreign direct
investment), we can construct seven mutually exclusive categories, listed in Table 2.
Firms with high levels of GVC involvement are those that import a substantial proportion
of their components and export a substantial proportion of their goods, and also
oﬀshore or (internationally) outsource substantial parts of their activities (triple-mode
ﬁrms). Firms with a medium level of involvement are those that are substantially
involved in two modes of international activity (dual-mode ﬁrms): mostly, these are
ﬁrms that import substantial amounts of components/services and export their
products. Less common among the dual-mode ﬁrms are those that simultaneously
produce abroad and also import or export. Firms with low levels of involvement are
only engaged in one mode of international activity: only exporting, or only importing
(single-mode ﬁrms). Foreign production is typically combined with exporting or
importing. Firms that are solely international producers but that do not import or export
are rare5.
4. Combining shares and volumes as criterion, we want to avoid excluding those ﬁrms that for instance have a
relatively low trade turnover but a considerably high share of trade over total turnover (ie small ﬁrms with small
turnover but high share, and larger ﬁrms with small share but high turnover).
5. This is consistent with studies that show FDI to be a more advanced internationalisation mode compared to simple
exporting, which is often seen as the ﬁrst mode for ﬁrms that expand internationally, requiring less in the way of
ﬁxed set-up costs.
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Table 2: Categories of GVC-involved ﬁrms
Number Detailed categories Number
of firms of firms
NO 4232 Firms without substantial imports, exports, 4232
Zero mode international production
LOW 4742 Pure importers of components/services 1630
Single mode Pure exporters 3072
Pure international producers (through FDI 40
or international outsourcing)
MEDIUM 4999 Importers and exporters 4738
Dual mode Importers and international producers 96
Exporters and international producers 165
HIGH 786 Importers, exporters and international 786
Triple mode producers (through FDI or international
outsourcing)
Source: Bruegel.
In the total EFIGE sample, 29 percent of the ﬁrms are not substantially involved in
international activities. While 32 percent are only substantially involved in one mode
of international activity, 34 percent combine two modes. Only 5 percent of the sample
ﬁrms are triple-mode ﬁrms, illustrating the skewed distribution of GVC-involved ﬁrms.
Of these triple-mode ﬁrms, 60 percent are engaged in oﬀshoring/FDI 90 percent are
engaged in international outsourcing. About half of the triple-mode ﬁrms (47 percent)
indicate that the main destination for their foreign production (outsourced or oﬀshored)
is their home country, from where it is re-exported to third countries, further illustrating
the complexity and interrelatedness of their international activities6. Firms that use
multiple modes when internationalising, especially those that combine production
abroad with the importing of components and exporting of their goods (triple-mode
ﬁrms), are identiﬁed as the ﬁrms most involved in GVCs compared to those that use
only one or even no internationalisation mode substantially.
Triple-mode ﬁrms are much more prevalent in the textiles and electr(on)ics sectors –
in which they make up 12 percent and 10 percent of the ﬁrms respectively. They are
also more prevalent in the transport equipment (8.7 percent) and chemicals/
6. Unfortunately, given the small number of triple-mode ﬁrms, further splitting this category into diﬀerent
subcategories runs the risk of arriving at too small numbers for a representative analysis.
pharmaceuticals (7.6 percent) sectors. By contrast, in the wood and paper sector, only
3 percent of the ﬁrms are triple-mode ﬁrms. For the food, drinks and tobacco sector, the
ﬁgure is 2 percent – the lowest prevalence of triple-mode ﬁrms in the sectors we
consider. This sector also has the highest proportion of zero-mode ﬁrms: 42 percent.
These sectoral patterns are very much in line with ﬁndings from the existing GVC
evidence (see eg, OECD, 2013).
Table 3: Multiple mode internationalisation by sector
Zero Single Dual Triple
Total 28.7% 32.1% 33.9% 5.3%
Food and tobacco 42.4% 32.5% 23.0% 2.1%
Textile 19.8% 27.9% 40.7% 11.6%
Wood, paper, printing, furniture 34.4% 35.4% 26.8% 3.4%
Chemical and pharmaceuticals 10.1% 31.7% 50.6% 7.6%
Rubber and plastic 26.9% 32.9% 35.5% 4.7%
Metal, machinery and equipment 29.3% 32.2% 34.1% 4.4%
Electrical and optical equipment 18.7% 29.7% 42.0% 9.6%
Transport equipment 22.8% 25.0% 43.4% 8.7%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Among the countries in the sample, Spain and Germany have the lowest prevalence of
triple-mode ﬁrms. But Germany has more dual-mode ﬁrms, while Spain has more ﬁrms
that are not substantially engaged in any international activity (34 percent). The two
smallest countries in the EFIGE sample, Austria and Hungary, have higher shares of
triple-mode ﬁrms. Of the large EFIGE countries, France has the highest prevalence of
triple-mode ﬁrms.
Tables 3 and 4 make clear that even within sectors and countries that are typically
identiﬁed in the GVC literature as being more GVC-involved (for example, Hungary and
France, and sectors such as electronics and textiles), there is still substantial
heterogeneity in terms of how intensively ﬁrms within these sectors and within these
countries are GVC-involved.
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Table 4: Multiple mode internationalisation by country
Zero Single Dual Triple
Total 28.7% 32.1% 33.9% 5.3%
Austria 17.6% 30.5% 42.7% 9.3%
Hungary 27.1% 30.7% 35.3% 6.9%
France 31.9% 31.6% 29.4% 7.1%
Germany 23.2% 32.2% 42.6% 2.0%
Italy 28.0% 34.4% 33.1% 4.6%
Spain 33.9% 32.7% 30.6% 2.7%
UK 23.9% 31.2% 39.8% 5.1%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE
Which types of ﬁrms within sectors and countries are more likely to be triple-mode
ﬁrms, involved in importing, exporting and international production? Box 1 details our
analysis. We ﬁnd that older, incumbent ﬁrms, larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms that are part of an
international group are more likely to be substantially internationally active, as typi-
cally found in the international trade literature. But these ﬁrms are also signiﬁcantly
more likely to deploy more complex internationalisation strategies involving GVCs,
being dual or triple-mode internationalisers.
The sectoral proﬁle (Table 3) remains robust in the econometric results. Compared to
the food and tobacco sector, ﬁrms from the textiles, chemicals and rubber and plastics,
metal products, electronics and transport equipment sectors are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be dual and triple-mode ﬁrms, all other ﬁrm characteristics being equal. The
country results in Table 4, however, no longer hold, suggesting that other ﬁrm
characteristics, particularly ﬁrm size, largely account for diﬀerences between
countries. For France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, none of the diﬀerences in the
prevalence of triple-mode ﬁrms remain signiﬁcant, all other things being equal, while
Hungarian companies are less likely to be triple-mode ﬁrms.
7. For the country aﬃliation, the reference country is the UK, for the industry aﬃliation, the reference sector is food
and drink and tobacco;
8. Although our group of internationalised ﬁrms includes only ﬁrms that have substantial international activities from
at least one mode, the results are nevertheless very consistent with previous analysis of the EFIGE data, which
looked at the probability of international activities, without any restriction on the minimum size of international
activities (see Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; and Altomonte et al, 2012).
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BOX 1: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
We estimate the probability that a ﬁrm belongs to the group of zero, single, dual or
triple-mode internationalisers as a function of a set of ﬁrm characteristics. These
characteristics include country and industry aﬃliation7, size, ﬁrm age, whether the
ﬁrm is part of a foreign group and whether the ﬁrm faces competition from abroad.
The econometric technique used is a multinomial logit8.
Table 5: Multinomial logit, single, dual and triple mode with zero mode
as base case
Single vs zero Dual vs zero Triple vs zero
Age of the firm 0.176*** 0.305*** 0.474***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Facing foreign competition 0.941*** 1.707*** 2.069***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
Being part of Foreign group 1.010*** 1.536*** 1.631***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Small firms 0.253*** 0.588*** 0.665***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14)
Medium-sized firms 0.730*** 1.534*** 2.323***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
Large firms 0.524*** 2.016*** 3.736***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
Country and sector affiliation fixed effects are included, but not reported
Obs=14443; Pseudo R-square=0.136; Chi-square= 5019.813
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Bruegel. Note: Small ﬁrms: 20-49 employees; Medium-sized ﬁrms: 50-249 employees; Large ﬁrms: 250
employees or more.
Firm age, competition from abroad, foreign ownership and ﬁrm size are signiﬁcantly
positively associated with international activities, be they single, dual or triple-mode.
But the association is stronger for dual-mode ﬁrms and even more so for triple-mode
ﬁrms. This indicates that older, larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms that are part of an international
THE MANUFACTURING FIRMS INVOLVED IN GVCS
115
9. For intra-group customer ﬁrms we know whether the group ﬁrms are national or international.
10. This deﬁnition is similar to that given in Accetturo (2012).
11. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the destination ﬁrm would itself be producing for other ﬁrms or selling to
ﬁnal customers (private or public), limiting the identiﬁcation of the positioning of the pivotal ﬁrm within the value
chain. We also do not know whether the destination ﬁrm will be selling directly for further exports or for the local
market.
5.1.3 Positioning in national and international value chains
The EFIGE survey provides some information that allows us to identify where ﬁrms are
positioned in the value chain for their goods. More concretely we can draw out some
details about each ﬁrm’s main clients: whether they are private or public customers, or
are other ﬁrms (both intra-group and external). We also know the ‘nationality’ of these
other, destination, ﬁrms, ie if they are ﬁrms operating in the same region/country or
operating abroad9. Using this information, we deﬁne ﬁrms whose total turnover is fully
determined by producing to order for other ﬁrms as intermediate ﬁrms10. These
intermediate ﬁrms are positioned in global value chains when they produce to order for
other ﬁrms located abroad11.
Of the total EFIGE sample, 32 percent of ﬁrms produce to order for other ﬁrms. Of the
ﬁrms that are substantially internationally active, about one in ﬁve (22 percent)
produce to order for other ﬁrms located abroad. Controlling for other ﬁrm charac-
teristics, intermediate ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to be single mode in terms of
their international activities, and signiﬁcantly less likely to be triple-mode ﬁrms.
group are not only more likely to be involved in international activities, but are also
more likely to be involved in more complex international strategies associated with
GVC-involvement, combining the importing of components, exporting and foreign
production.
Compared to UK ﬁrms, German and French ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to be
single and dual-mode ﬁrms, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these
countries for triple-mode ﬁrms. Spanish ﬁrms are less likely to be dual and triple-
mode ﬁrms. Austrian ﬁrms are conﬁrmed to be signiﬁcantly more likely to be
triple-mode ﬁrms. Hungarian ﬁrms are however signiﬁcantly less likely to be triple-
mode ﬁrms.
In terms of sector, ﬁrms from the chemicals and electr(on)ics sectors, and car manu-
facturers, are signiﬁcantly more likely to be involved in international activities,
especially at dual-mode, and particularly triple-mode, level.
5.2 Multiple mode ﬁrms and GVC involvement
Before we analyse the multiple mode ﬁrms in more detail, we ﬁrst look at whether ﬁrms
with multiple international activities can indeed be expected to be more involved in
GVCs. To this end, we check how triple and dual-mode ﬁrms, compared to zero and
single-mode ﬁrms, score against two indicators that have typically been used in the
existing GVC literature as proxies for GVC involvement: intermediate import ratio
(section 5.2.1) and import content of exports (section 5.2.2).
5.2.1 Intermediate import ratio
The intermediate import ratio (IIR) (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) is the share of
imported intermediates in total intermediates used by a sector. Sectors and countries
that are heavily import-dependent for their intermediates are assumed to be more
involved in global value chains. The EFIGE dataset allows us to compute a micro-
equivalent of the IIR: a ﬁrm’s purchased intermediates (materials and services) from
abroad as a share of its total purchases of intermediates. On (weighted) average, EFIGE
ﬁrms have an IIR for materials of 28 percent (the median ratio being 20 percent). Not
unexpectedly, the IIR for services is lower at 20 percent (the median ratio being 10
percent) reﬂecting the stronger proximity preference of services purchases compared
to materials purchases.
We ﬁnd, in line with the existing GVC evidence, that ﬁrms in the textiles and clothing
sector have the highest IIR for materials. The chemicals and rubber and plastics sectors
also have relatively high IIRs for materials. Food ﬁrms have the lowest, and metals and
metal products ﬁrms have a relatively low IIR. The IIR is higher for materials than for
services for all sectors, though the diﬀerence is smallest for ﬁrms in electr(on)ics.
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When looking at countries, ﬁrms from Hungary have the highest IIR, particularly for
materials. This is indicative of the extensive assembly activities in Hungary. In general,
smaller countries are more likely to have a higher IIR (see also Austria). Compared to
other large countries (Germany, Spain, the UK), French ﬁrms have the highest IIR for
materials, conﬁrming greater involvement in global value chains12.
Table 6 indicates if ﬁrms with multiple international activities have a higher IIR. There
is a clear positive association: triple-mode ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher IIRs than
dual-mode ﬁrms, which in turn have signiﬁcantly higher IIRs than single-mode ﬁrms.
This is the case for both materials and services. This evidence is consistent with
multiple-mode ﬁrms being more likely to have designed their value chains globally. A
multivariate analysis of which types of ﬁrm have a higher IIR ratio conﬁrms these
12. All the sector and country eﬀects are robust when simultaneously controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics (age,
size, foreign ownership, competition) in econometric analysis (not reported).
Figure 1: IIR by sector, 2008
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
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country, sector and multiple-mode patterns13. In line with the results reported in Table
6, the multivariate analysis conﬁrms that dual-mode, and especially triple-mode ﬁrms,
have signiﬁcantly higher IIR ratios for materials. Triple mode ﬁrms also have higher IIR
ratios for services. These results conﬁrm that internationally outsourcing or oﬀshoring
production will lead to an increase in imports of intermediates, both of materials and
services. In line with this, the eﬀect of foreign ownership is very positive and
signiﬁcant. However, larger ﬁrms tend to source a smaller share of their intermediates
from abroad. This is consistent with the notion that larger ﬁrms might be more vertically
integrated, or have their own local cluster of component suppliers. These results only
hold for materials, not for services, as the footnote makes clear.
13. The multivariate analysis controls for ﬁrm age, competition, foreign ownership, ﬁrm size and sector and country
aﬃliation. The sector results conﬁrm the results from Figure 1, with ﬁrms from textiles and from chemicals and
rubber and plastics having higher IIRs, while ﬁrms in food and metal products have signiﬁcantly lower IIRs. The
country dummies conﬁrm the results of Figure 2, with ﬁrms from Austria, France, and especially from Hungary
having higher IIRs. Also, Italy has a signiﬁcantly higher, although more modestly higher, IIR. For the imports of
services, only triple-mode ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to buy their services from abroad, but dual-mode
ﬁrms are not. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of ﬁrm size, ownership, country and sector of aﬃliation
for importing services. But interestingly, young ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to import services from abroad.
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Figure 2: IIR by country, 2008
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
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Table 6: IIR and multiple mode internationalisation
Single Dual Triple
Intermediate import Average 21% 32% 38%
ratio materials Median 10% 20% 30%
Observations 1407 3027 548
Intermediate import Average 14% 22% 27%
ratio services Median 5% 10% 20%
Observations 271 797 260
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
5.2.2 The import content of exports
Section 5.2.1 described how imported intermediate inputs are important for most
sectors. But how much of these imported imports contribute to exports? This is a
further speciﬁc characteristic of global value chains, involving more complex forms of
internationalisation than simple exporting or importing. The GVC literature has often
referred to the concept of import content of exports (ICE), for which several indicators
have been constructed (eg OECD, 2013). While the GVC literature needs to use a
combination of information from input-output tables and (bilateral) trade data to
construct ICE ratios at the country or sector level, the EFIGE data provides information
on import and export activities at the ﬁrm level that can be used to construct these
indicators.
Using EFIGE ﬁrm-level data, the ICE of a sector/country is computed as the total
reported value of imports in terms of turnover as a share of the total value of exports
in terms of turnover, where the totals have been obtained by summing up all sample
ﬁrms’ shares in the sector or country14.
For the total EFIGE sample, about one third of all reported exports are made up from
imported intermediates (32 percent). Figure 3 shows how the sectoral pattern for ICE
is somewhat diﬀerent to the IIR pattern. Like for the IIR, food and tobacco sector ﬁrms
score low on the import content of their exports, further conﬁrming their lower level of
involvement in global value chains. Firms with the highest ICE scores are from the
chemicals and rubber and plastics sectors. In line with their higher IIR, this further
conﬁrms the high level of involvement in global value chains of these sectors. Textiles
14. To construct this indicator we assume that both parts of production that are sold at home versus abroad share the
same structure of imported intermediates, an assumption typically made in this literature.
ﬁrms, which have a high IIR, only have an average ICE ratio. Metals and machinery
sector ﬁrms have higher IIRs, but low ICE scores.
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Figure 3: Import content of exports by sector, 2008
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of EFIGE.
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The evidence from EFIGE therefore suggests that although there is a correlation
between the GVC indicators most commonly used in the GVC literature – IIR and ICE –
there is still substantial heterogeneity, with a number of sectors scoring high for one
indicator, but not necessarily for the other. This makes the analysis of GVC involvement
sensitive to which indicator is used.
The ICE indicator suggests a strong correlation between imports and exports, at least
at the sector level where the ICE indicator was calculated. However, for individual ﬁrms
within sectors, there is only a weak correlation between imports and exports. This low
correlation is because of a substantial number of ﬁrms that are either exclusively
importing (but not exporting) or exclusively exporting (but not importing). Even among
those ﬁrms that both import and export simultaneously (dual and triple mode ﬁrms),
there is a strong tendency towards one or the other: ﬁrms that are major importers are
not major exporters and vice versa. More typically, ﬁrms are either mainly importing
or mainly exporting. This somewhat surprising result from the ﬁrm-level analysis
suggests that the link between imports and exports at the sector/country level not
only occurs within ﬁrms, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, between ﬁrms,
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with some ﬁrms in the sector doing most of the importing, while others do most of the
exporting. This suggests that importers cluster with the exporters in a country/sector,
rather than that most ﬁrms are themselves combining importing and exporting
activities in a substantive fashion. Unfortunately, EFIGE, being focused on
internationalisation patterns, has no information on the local links between ﬁrms that
are importing and those that are exporting. Because the ICE ratio does not work well at
the ﬁrm level, we will not use it further in the analysis.
5.3 GVCs, multiple-mode internationalisers and their importance for value added,
employment and trade
Although few in number, ﬁrms that combine foreign production with the importing of
components and exporting of their produced goods matter substantially for
employment and value added. The 5 percent of ﬁrms that are triple-mode ﬁrms account
for about 27 percent of total sample value added and 24 percent of total sample
employment. The group of dual-mode ﬁrms, which makes up 34 percent of ﬁrms in
the sample, accounts for 53 percent of total sample value added and 45 percent of
total sample employment. Firms with multiple international activities are therefore the
bigger ﬁrms that are likely to matter substantially for the aggregate performance of
sectors and countries.
Figure 4: Share by category of ﬁrm of total trade, value added and employment,
2008
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Distribution of firms Total trade Value added Employment
Triple mode
Dual mode
Single mode
Zero mode
Figure 4 summarises the average ﬁrm values for employment and value added by type
of international involvement, illustrating that multiple mode ﬁrms are indeed the larger
ﬁrms, both in terms of employment and value added, though more in terms of the latter
than the former. Thus, there is a substantial labour productivity premium for multiple-
mode ﬁrms, especially triple-mode ﬁrms. This translates into triple-mode ﬁrms being
able to sustain higher unit labour costs. However, within the triple-mode ﬁrm group,
the divergence between average and median values indicates that the average is
skewed because of the exceptional performance of a small number of ﬁrms.
Table 7: Employment, value added and multiple-mode internationalisation
Zero Single Dual Triple
Total number 4232 4742 4999 786
Employment Average 33 44 97 276
Median 20 25 34 60
Value added Average 1246 2377 7930 20005
(thousands of euros) Median 833 1123 1783 3699
Labour productivity Average 734 1042 2467 5471
Median 589 699 911 1449
Unit labour cost Average 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.93
Median 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.71
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Multiple-mode ﬁrms are even more likely to matter for trade ﬂows and the external
competitiveness of nations, because they are also more trade intensive compared to
single mode ﬁrms, with both a higher import intensity and a higher export intensity,
with especially the latter diﬀerence most pronounced, as Table 8 shows.
Table 8: Import intensity, export intensity and multiple-mode internationalisation
Single Dual Triple
Import intensity Average 8% 14% 16%
Median 2% 8% 10%
Export intensity Average 29% 42% 43%
Median 20% 32% 36%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
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In general, total trade ﬂows are likely to be concentrated in a small number of ﬁrms
(see Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Ten percent of EFIGE ﬁrms account for about 87
percent of total trade in the EFIGE sample (91 percent of imports; 85 percent of
exports). These top 10 percent trading ﬁrms are much more likely to be triple-mode
ﬁrms: 24 percent of the top 10 percent are triple-mode ﬁrms, compared to 5 percent
for the sample overall. They are also more likely than average to be dual-mode ﬁrms:
64 percent of the top 10 percent ﬁrms are dual-mode ﬁrms, compared to 34 percent
for the sample overall.
As a consequence of their large size and higher trade intensity it is not surprising, as
Figure 4 shows, that the triple-mode ﬁrms, which make up 5 percent of the total
sample, account for almost 30 percent of total sample trade. The 34 percent of sample
ﬁrms that are dual-mode account for 63 percent of total trade. Firms that only import
or only export, which are the ﬁrms one typically has in mind when discussing
internationalisation, only account for 7 percent of total sample trade. Multiple-mode
ﬁrms therefore substantially drive the total trade ﬂows of countries and sectors.
Table 9 shows the sectors in which multiple-mode ﬁrms are particularly dominant in
terms of trade ﬂows. This is particularly evident for electr(on)ics and transport
equipment: triple-mode internationalisers account for more than 40 percent of
electr(on)ics sector exports and almost half of transport equipment exports. Simple
exporters account for less than 1 percent of total transport sector exports and less
than 5 percent of electr(on)ics sector exports. Triple-mode ﬁrms account for more than
40 percent of textile sector imports, and more than half of rubber and plastics sector
exports. In the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector, simple importers account for
less than 1 percent of total imports.
5.4 GVCs, multiple-mode internationalisers, productivity and innovation
Multiple-mode ﬁrms matter not only because they are the bigger producers, employers
and traders. They are likely to matter for countries’ competitiveness because of their
outstanding productivity proﬁle.
5.4.1 Multiple-mode internationalisers and productivity
Are ﬁrms that are simultaneously importing components, producing abroad and
exporting their goods the best performing ﬁrms? We know from the empirical trade
literature that more productive ﬁrms are more likely to become internationally active
because they can more easily absorb the ﬁxed costs associated with inter-
nationalisation. Melitz (2003) introduced this argument for exporting ﬁrms; Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) for oﬀshoring ﬁrms. One can expect this to hold a fortiori for
multiple-mode ﬁrms that are simultaneously involved in exports, imports and location
of activities abroad. Only the best-performing ﬁrms will be able to take on the ﬁxed
costs associated with multiple-mode internationalisation. At the same time, GVC
involvement can be expected to improve ﬁrm performance, if only because it gives
access to more eﬃcient sourcing and larger markets. It does however also make GVC-
involved ﬁrms more vulnerable to external shocks.
Table 7 identiﬁed the superior labour productivity performance of multiple-mode ﬁrms,
and especially triple-mode ﬁrms. Our measure for productivity in this section is Total
Factor Productivity (TFP), in line with previous EFIGE analyses (Mayer and Ottaviano,
2007; and Altomonte et al, 2012)15. Because in the EFIGE dataset, TFP is measured
simultaneously with the identiﬁcation of the internationalisation strategy, we cannot
identify any causal relationship (ie whether multiple-mode internationalisation
strategies make ﬁrms more productive rather than whether more productive ﬁrms
move into multiple-mode internationalisation).
15. Total Factor Productivity refers to the estimated productivity of all inputs taken together and it is a measure of the
overall eﬃciency of a ﬁrm. There are several procedures in the literature for TFP estimation based on ﬁrm-level
production functions. In line with previous EFIGE analyses, we use the Levinsohn-Petrin method (see Altomonte
et al, 2012, for a more detailed discussion of the various methods).
THE MANUFACTURING FIRMS INVOLVED IN GVCS
124
Table 9: Share of import and export turnover by sector and level of ﬁrms’
international activities
Import turnover Export turnover
Single Dual Triple Single Dual Triple
Total 4% 75% 21% 9% 58% 33%
Food and tobacco 18% 64% 18% 18% 45% 37%
Textile 4% 55% 42% 13% 55% 32%
Wood, paper, printing, furniture 7% 71% 22% 19% 62% 19%
Chemical and pharmaceuticals 1% 76% 23% 11% 62% 28%
Rubber and plastic 4% 42% 54% 13% 56% 31%
Metal, machinery and equipment 9% 68% 23% 9% 53% 37%
Electrical and optical equipment 9% 55% 37% 5% 54% 41%
Transport equipment 6% 61% 33% 1% 51% 48%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
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Table 10 provides some ﬁrst descriptive evidence that multiple-mode ﬁrms indeed
have higher TFP scores. Compared to ﬁrms that have no substantial international
activities, single-mode ﬁrms (typically engaged in exporting or, though less so, in
importing) already have higher TFP scores. Dual-mode ﬁrms score even higher, and
triple-mode ﬁrms have the highest TFP scores.
Table 10: Productivity and multiple-mode internationalisers
Zero Single Dual Triple
TFP Average 0.86 0.96 1.09 1.32
Median 0.78 0.81 0.92 1.09
Observations 2018 2403 2593 421
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Because the TFP distribution of ﬁrms is highly skewed, it makes more sense to look at
the full distribution of productivity levels, rather than averages (see also Altomonte et
al, 2012). Figure 5 shows the kernel-density functions for our four categories of
internationalising company16.
16. A kernel density shows the shares of ﬁrms (density) that reach each productivity level. It shows the probability of
picking a ﬁrm with a certain productivity level when the ﬁrm is randomly drawn from each category of activities.
Figure 5: TFP density and multiple-mode internationalisers, 2008
Source: Bruegel calculations on the basis of EFIGE.
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Figure 5 conﬁrms that ﬁrms, particularly triple-mode ﬁrms, with greater GVC
involvement are on average characterised by higher TFP scores. The ﬁgure shows that
the superior performance of these triple-mode ﬁrms holds especially in the upper tail
of the distribution, ie triple-mode ﬁrms are not just more likely to have on average a
higher TFP score, they are especially more likely to be the best performers.
The intermediate import ratio (IIR) which is associated with GVC involvement also
shows a positive correlation with TFP, especially for the upper part of the distribution.
Table 11 looks at the weighted average TFP at diﬀerent quantiles of the IIR distribution.
While TFP performance increases for ﬁrms with higher quantiles of IIR, better TFP
performance is especially evident at the high end of the IIR, ie for ﬁrms that import at
least 75 percent of their components from abroad. This is consistent with a positive
association between substantial sourcing of components from abroad and higher
overall eﬃciency.
Table 11: TFP and IIR
IIR_mat First quantile Second quantile Third quantile Fourth quantile
Average TFP 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.18
Observations 693 893 573 786
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
The TFP proﬁle for ﬁrms that are positioned as intermediate ﬁrms in value chains is
more complicated. In general, ﬁrms that are producing to order for other ﬁrms are
associated with lower productivity levels. But this is particularly the case for those
intermediate ﬁrms that only supply to other ﬁrms in their home country. Intermediate
ﬁrms that are involved in global value chains, ie that produce for other ﬁrms abroad,
have increasingly higher productivity performance scores, the more complex the
internationalisation strategies they deploy.
The multivariate analysis reported in Box 2 conﬁrms a positive but insigniﬁcant
productivity premium for single-mode internationalisers. More importantly, it conﬁrms
a signiﬁcant and sizeable productivity premium for dual-mode and particularly for
triple-mode internationalisers. This shows that these ﬁrms are more productive not
only because they are typically larger and older, but because their productivity
premium is intrinsically connected to their more complex international involvement,
combining several internationalisation modes at the same time. In addition, the
multivariate analysis conﬁrms that ﬁrms that produce to order for ﬁrms abroad are
signiﬁcantly more productive than their domestic counterparts. The most eﬃcient
intermediate producers are more likely to participate in global, rather than domestic,
value chains. Based on their unique capacities, intermediate producers can be pivotal
ﬁrms in global value chains, resulting in better productivity performance.
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Figure 6: (Weighted) average TFP for intermediate producers, 2008
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
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BOX 2: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE-MODE
INTERNATIONALISATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
We look at ﬁrm characteristics that signiﬁcantly correlate with higher TFP levels in a
multivariate fashion, using OLS (ordinary least square) as the estimation method.
Our main focus is on the impact of the internationalisation choices of ﬁrms: ie if a
single, dual or triple internationalisation mode is adopted, the base comparison
being ﬁrms that have no substantial international activities (Model I). We also check
(in Model 2) if intermediate ﬁrms have diﬀerent TFP proﬁles. We control for other
ﬁrm characteristics (size, age, foreign ownership, foreign competition), and sector
and country aﬃliation. Table 12 shows the relevant results.
Table 12: OLS estimates of multiple-mode international ﬁrms on TFP
Dep. Variable: TFP Model 1 Model 2
Single Mode 0.012 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Dual Mode 0.056*** 0.053***
(0.02) (0.02)
Triple Mode 0.071** 0.071**
(0.03) (0.03)
Intermediate home 0.016
(0.02)
Intermediate abroad 0.035**
(0.02)
Firm age, fixed firm size effects, countryand sector dummies, foreign group and foreign competition
included; Dependent variable is log(TFP)
Obs 7312 7312
R-square 0.283 0.284
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Bruegel.
According to the results, there is a small and insigniﬁcant productivity premium for
single-mode internationalisers, but a signiﬁcant productivity premium for dual-mode
internationalisers (mostly importers and exporters). Nevertheless, the highest
productivity premium is for the triple-mode ﬁrms which import components, carry
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5.4.2 Multiple-mode internationalisers, innovation and human capital
Although TFP captures all growth-contributing factors that are not labour and capital, the
‘residual’ is usually interpreted in the literature as capturing ‘innovativeness’. Can we
interpret the TFP premium for GVC-involved ﬁrms and for the ﬁrms that are producing
to order for ﬁrms abroad as evidence of greater levels of innovation being the driver for
the superior productivity of these ﬁrms? The EFIGE dataset contains direct information
about the innovation proﬁle of sample ﬁrms, ie whether they introduced any new
product and/or process innovations in the time period considered. This allows us to
test more directly if multiple-mode ﬁrms are more innovative, and if this drives their
greater productivity performance.
out foreign production and export their produced goods. Although the productivity
premium is signiﬁcant for triple-mode ﬁrms, there is more heterogeneity in terms
of productivity in this group, as was already clear from the descriptive analysis.
When disaggregating the triple-mode ﬁrms into those that use intra-ﬁrm FDI versus
inter-ﬁrm outsourcing for their international production, the results (not reported)
conﬁrm a strong positive and signiﬁcant productivity premium for triple-mode ﬁrms
engaged in inter-ﬁrm outsourcing, while there is too much heterogeneity in the TFP
performance of triple-mode ﬁrms that engage in FDI.
With respect to the positions of ﬁrms within value chains, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that
produce to order for other domestic ﬁrms have no speciﬁc productivity advantage,
all things being equal. The negative productivity proﬁle in the descriptive statistics
for local intermediate producers is therefore due to other ﬁrm characteristics, such
as their smaller size. Firms that produce to order for ﬁrms abroad, however, have a
signiﬁcant productivity premium, all other things being equal.
These results take into account the eﬀects of other ﬁrm characteristics. Larger and
older ﬁrms and foreign-owned ﬁrms are more productive. The country-aﬃliation
results show that ﬁrms in all countries in the EFIGE sample, except for Austria, have
higher TFP levels than UK manufacturing ﬁrms. The sector aﬃliation results show
that all sectors except for textiles and clothing have higher TFP levels than food and
tobacco.
Table 13: Innovation and multiple-mode internationalisers
No innovation Product Process Both
Zero 50% 15% 18% 16%
Single 36% 21% 16% 26%
Dual 24% 24% 14% 37%
Triple 17% 31% 9% 43%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE. Note: the table shows the proportion of ﬁrms that have introduced product or
process innovations, both or none.
Firms that import components and export their goods, and particularly those that also
produce abroad, are more likely to introduce product innovations (either on their own
but particularly in combination with process innovations). Multiple-mode ﬁrms,
especially triple-mode ﬁrms, are much less likely to only introduce process
innovations, often associated with cost cutting or the introduction of labour-saving
technologies. This is consistent with greater levels of GVC involvement being
associated with better innovation performance. It does not support the common view
that GVC ﬁrms are cost-cutting process innovators.
Multivariate analysis conﬁrms the positive association between multiple-mode
internationalisation and innovation, particularly for the combination of product and
process innovations and for triple-mode internationalisers17. It also conﬁrms that,
compared to internationally inactive ﬁrms, single- and dual-mode ﬁrms are more likely
to introduce only process innovations. But this does not hold for triple-mode ﬁrms.
Firms producing to order for other ﬁrms at home are less likely to be involved in
innovation strategies, and if they innovate they are most likely to be process
innovators only. This is consistent with the importance for intermediate ﬁrms of
specialising in process innovation to improve eﬃciency. In contrast, ﬁrms producing
to order for ﬁrms abroad are more likely to be innovative, and those that are innovative
are also more likely to be involved in process innovation, most often in combination
with product innovation: not only improving the eﬃciency of production processes
THE MANUFACTURING FIRMS INVOLVED IN GVCS
130
17. Using a multinomial logit speciﬁcation, we look at which ﬁrm characteristics determine the likelihood of ﬁrms
introducing product innovation, process innovations or the combination of product and process innovations. Our
main focus is on the use of single, dual or triple internationalisation modes, the base comparison being ﬁrms that
have no substantial international activities. We also check for any extra eﬀect applying to intermediate ﬁrms. We
control for other ﬁrm characteristics (size, age, foreign ownership, foreign competition), and for sector and country
aﬃliation. We also control for R&D investments, human capital and ICT investments as inputs into the innovative
process. Results are not reported.
but also improving the quality of the components they deliver. Opening up to
international value chains is thus associated with more complex innovation
strategies18.
Table 14: Innovation and intermediate producers
No innovation Product Process Both
Intermediate home 45% 14% 20% 20%
Intermediate abroad 30% 21% 17% 32%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Developing complex innovation strategies requires R&D resources, ICT infrastructure
and a highly-skilled human capital base. A graduate-level workforce is particularly
important for supporting innovation strategies that are aimed at introducing new
products19. In line with and in support of their more complex innovation proﬁle,
multiple-mode ﬁrms are also more likely to recruit university graduates. This is the
case particularly for triple mode ﬁrms, which are more directed towards product rather
than process innovation.
Table 15: Human capital and multiple-mode internationalisers
Average % of university graduates in workforce
Zero 7%
Single 9%
Dual 11%
Triple 15%
Intermediate home 6%
Intermediate abroad 9%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE. Note: Average = weighted average.
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18. The multivariate analysis, controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics, conﬁrms that ﬁrms that produce to order for
other ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to be involved in only product innovation, and are more likely to be involved
in only in process innovation. In addition, ﬁrms that produce to order for other local ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less
likely to have complex innovation strategies, combining process and product innovation, which does not hold for
ﬁrms producing to order for foreign ﬁrms.
19. The multivariate analysis of innovative performance controls for several inputs into the innovation process. It ﬁnds
that R&D investments increase the probability of innovative performance, for product and process innovations.
While ICT investments are signiﬁcant drivers for process innovations, human capital is most associated with product
innovations.
Firms that produce to order for other ﬁrms, particularly those which supply other
domestic ﬁrms, are less likely to hire university graduates. Firms that supply foreign
ﬁrms are somewhat more likely than local intermediate ﬁrms to recruit university
graduates, but not substantially more likely20.
5.5 GVCs, Multiple Mode Internationalisation and crisis sensitivity
Recent research shows that the impact of the crisis on ﬁrms’ performance diﬀers
according to the organisational mode of global transactions that the ﬁrm is involved in
(Altomonte di Mauro et al, 2012), and by ﬁrms’ positioning in GVCs (Békés et al, 2011).
With the positive association between greater GVC involvement and productivity and
innovation, one could expect that ﬁrms with greater GVC involvement would be
shielded from the crisis by their greater productivity, making them less sensitive to
the crisis and consequently less likely to shed their high-skilled workforces. However,
there is also evidence that GVCs act as a channel for the rapid transmission of real and
ﬁnancial shocks, amplifying national ﬂuctuations in demand for ﬁnal goods, making
GVC-involved ﬁrms more crisis-sensitive (OECD, 2013).
Using the EFIGE survey, it is possible to investigate whether or not ﬁrms experienced
a reduction in turnover between 2008 and 2009, and by how much. Tables 16 and 17
break this down according to ﬁrms’ level of GVC involvement. The descriptive analysis
shows that GVC-involved ﬁrms are somewhat more likely to have experienced
reductions in turnover, but the diﬀerences between them and non-GVC involved ﬁrms
are small.
Firms that produce to order for other ﬁrms are more likely to have been aﬀected by
the crisis: four out of ﬁve such ﬁrms report reductions in turnover. This holds for ﬁrms
servicing other national ﬁrms, and for those servicing ﬁrms abroad.
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20. A multivariate analysis for human capital (results not reported) conﬁrms that investment in human capital
increases with higher levels of international involvement: dual and particularly triple-mode ﬁrms are more ambitious
in terms of human capital accumulation strategies, hiring relatively more workers with university degrees. The
multivariate analysis also conﬁrms the signiﬁcantly lower ratio of graduate hiring by ﬁrms who produce to order,
both home and abroad.
Table 16: Multiple-mode ﬁrms and turnover reduction during the crisis
Reduction in turnover in 2009
No reduction <10% 10%-30% >30%
Zero 31% 20% 31% 18%
Single 28% 19% 35% 18%
Dual 27% 18% 36% 19%
Triple 28% 19% 39% 14%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Table 17: Intermediate producers and turnover reduction during the crisis
Reduction in turnover in 2009
No reduction <10% 10%-30% >30%
Intermediate home 23% 16% 37% 25%
Intermediate abroad 21% 16% 39% 24%
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
The multivariate analysis conﬁrms these ﬁgures21. While GVC involvement does not
signiﬁcantly correlate with crisis sensitivity, positioning in supply chains does:
intermediate ﬁrms are more likely to have experienced a reduction in turnover,
particularly severe cuts (>30%). This holds irrespective of whether they supply ﬁrms
at home or abroad. At the same time and all else being equal, the results show that
ﬁrms that invest in innovation strategies are less likely to have seen cuts in turnover,
or have experienced smaller cuts in turnover. This evidence corroborates the assertion
that more developed innovation proﬁles are important for ﬁrm resilience in the face of
external shocks.
5.6 European versus global value chains
The furthering of the integration of European Union member states oﬀers European
ﬁrms the possibility to organise their value chains at EU level, thus avoiding higher
coordination and transportation costs compared to global value chains. At the same
time such a regional focus might limit the beneﬁts from value chains, restricting the
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21. We analyse the ﬁrm characteristics that are conducive to a higher crisis sensitivity in a multivariate fashion using
an ordered probit with the categories being: no change in turnover, <10%, 10-30%, > 30% loss in turnover. The use
of multiple internationalisation modes and the intermediate producer status variables are our key ﬁrm
characteristics of interest. Simultaneously we correct for ﬁrm size, age, foreign ownership, competition from abroad,
the presence of inputs for innovation (R&D, human capital, ICT) and sector and country aﬃliation. Results are not
reported, only discussed in the text.
scope for access to markets and resources to nearby geographical areas, thus
foregoing global opportunities.
We can identify in the EFIGE dataset if European based ﬁrms remain mostly within
Europe when they internationalise, or if they are internationalising globally. For exports
and foreign production, we can identify the share which remains within Europe. For
imports we can only identify whether or not the ﬁrm is importing from in- or outside
Europe.
Table 18. Intra-EU internationalisation and multiple-mode ﬁrms
Single Dual Triple
Intra-EU exports as share of total exports Average 71% 69% 64%
Median 80% 80% 70%
Observations 2653 3971 658
Intra-EU FDI as share of total FDI Average 59% 51% 50%
Median 98% 50% 50%
Observations 43 190 504
Intra-EU outsourcing as share of total outsourcing Average 51% 46% 46%
Median 40% 60% 40%
Observations 50 181 367
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
The majority of exports from EFIGE ﬁrms goes to other EU countries. While the share of
exports from single- and dual-mode ﬁrms that remains within the EU is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent, ﬁrms that combine exports, imports and foreign production (triple-mode
ﬁrms) send a lower share of their exports to other EU countries, although on average
it is still almost two-thirds. In terms of foreign production, the EU is less dominant, with
about 50 percent of FDI remaining within the EU; for outsourcing, the ﬁgure is
somewhat less than 50 percent. There is little diﬀerence between dual- and triple-
mode ﬁrms in this respect (but note that only a few single- and dual-mode ﬁrms are
engaged in FDI or active outsourcing).
We use this information to identify the ﬁrms with international activities concentrated
in the EU. We label these ﬁrms European Value Chain ﬁrms (EVCs). We categorise
single-mode ﬁrms as EVCs if the international activities in which they are engaged are
predominantly (>50 percent) within the EU. For dual-mode ﬁrms, an EU focus implies
that both of their modes (typically imports and exports) remain mostly (>50 percent)
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in the EU. Triple-mode EVC ﬁrms are those for which all of their modes (exports, imports,
foreign location of activities) are mostly (>50 percent) within the EU.
About one out of two single-mode internationalising ﬁrms (49 percent) can be labelled
as EVC ﬁrms, using our deﬁnition. About one out of three dual- and triple-mode
internationalising ﬁrms can be labelled as EVC ﬁrms (respectively 37 percent and 36
percent). Among ﬁrms that produce to order for other ﬁrms abroad, almost one out of
two has an EU focus (47 percent).
Multivariate analysis (results not reported) conﬁrms that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between triple- and dual-mode ﬁrms in terms of their EU focus: triple-mode
ﬁrms are not signiﬁcantly more likely to be extra-EU oriented compared to dual-mode
ﬁrms. But single-mode ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more EU-focused. This is consistent with
a simple internationalisation strategy that conﬁnes its geographic scope to nearby
markets. Firms that are intermediate producers in international value chains are
signiﬁcantly more likely to be EU-focused in their international scope. For these types
of ﬁrms, geographic closeness to their value-chain partners seems to be more
important than it is for non-intermediate internationalisers. The multivariate analysis,
controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics, also shows somewhat surprisingly that large
ﬁrms are more likely to be EU-focused. Firms that belong to another EU group are
unsurprisingly more likely to be EU-oriented in their international scope. French and
German ﬁrms are less likely to be EU-focused in their internationalisation, as are ﬁrms
from the metals and metal equipment, electr(on)ics and transport equipment sectors.
To examine whether an EU focus for international activities has an impact on ﬁrm
performance, we look at the TFP proﬁle of EVC ﬁrms.
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Table 19: Multiple-mode ﬁrms, EU focus and TFP
Single Dual Triple
Non-EVC EVC Non-EVC EVC Non-EVC EVC
TFP Average 0.98 0.96 1.08 1.12 1.34 1.29
Median 0.82 0.81 0.90 0.95 1.08 1.11
Observations 756 748 1649 944 256 165
Source: Bruegel on the basis of EFIGE.
Table 19 reports the (weighted) average and median TFP values for the diﬀerent cases.
For single-mode ﬁrms, an EU focus makes little diﬀerence to TFP. For dual- and triple-
mode ﬁrms there is also only a small diﬀerence between EVC ﬁrms and non-EVC ﬁrms.
All of these diﬀerences are small and are furthermore sensitive to other ﬁrm
characteristics. None of the diﬀerences show up signiﬁcantly in multivariate analysis
(not reported). Also there are no signiﬁcant productivity diﬀerences between ﬁrms
that produce to order for other ﬁrms abroad, whether they have an EU focus or not.
Overall, the evidence therefore suggests neither a productivity premium nor a discount
for European ﬁrms that concentrate their international value chain conﬁguration on
Europe.
5.7 Main ﬁndings
The sectoral and country prevalence of multiple-mode internationalisers is very
consistent with the sectoral and country patterns of GVC sensitivity in the macro-
economic GVC analysis, as reported in chapter 4. But even within sectors and countries
that are typically identiﬁed in the GVC literature as being more GVC-involved (countries
such as Hungary and France, and sectors such as electronics, textiles and clothing
and chemicals), there is still substantial heterogeneity in terms of how intensively
ﬁrms within these sectors and within these countries are GVC involved, warranting an
analysis of GVC involvement at the ﬁrm level, to better understand which ﬁrms are
more heavily involved in GVCs.
We ﬁnd that older, larger ﬁrms and those that are part of an international group are not
only more likely to be substantially internationally active, as typically found in the
empirical ﬁrm-level trade literature, but are also signiﬁcantly more likely to be multiple-
mode internationalisers, deploying complex internationalisation strategies typically
associated with GVC involvement: combining imports of components, exports and
foreign production of parts of their value chain.
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The ﬁrm-level analysis also shows that the performance of sectors and economies is
skewed towards GVC-involved ﬁrms. There are relatively few multiple-mode ﬁrms,
combining diﬀerent international activities; in particular, few ﬁrms combine the
importing of components and exporting of produced goods with the organisation of
part of their production activities abroad. But these few ﬁrms, given that they are larger
and more trade intensive, substantially drive the creation of total value added,
employment and, particularly, trade ﬂows in most sectors and economies. Getting to
know them therefore matters.
Multiple-mode ﬁrms, particularly the triple-mode ﬁrms, also have the highest pro-
ductivity premia, are signiﬁcantly more likely to introduce new product innovations,
have a more sophisticated human capital base, hire relatively more workers with a
university degree and consequently are more able to support higher unit labour costs.
Despite their greater vulnerability to external shocks, multiple-mode ﬁrms are not more
likely to be crisis sensitive, thanks to their superior productivity performance.
Our analysis also shows that ﬁrms that are producing intermediate goods for global
value chains also have a signiﬁcant productivity premium compared to intermediates
producing for local value chains. These international intermediate producers also
develop more complex innovation strategies, combining improved production
processes with newly developed components. Based on their unique capabilities,
intermediate producers can be pivotal to global value chains, creating and capturing
substantial value. By contrast, ﬁrms with an intermediate position who supply only
domestic value chains do not realise any productivity premium and are less likely to
introduce product innovations.
While GVC involvement does not signiﬁcantly correlate with crisis sensitivity, posi-
tioning in the value chain does: intermediate ﬁrms are more likely to experience a
reduction in turnover, irrespective of whether they supply customers at home or
abroad. At the same time, and all else being equal, the results show that ﬁrms that
invest in innovation strategies and human capital are less likely to have seen cuts in
turnover, or have had smaller cuts in turnover, during the crisis. This evidence
corroborates the assertion that innovation strategies are important for ﬁrm resilience
in the face of external shocks.
Although for most European manufacturing ﬁrms the EU is the major arena for their
international activities, multiple-mode ﬁrms are less likely to be solely focused on EU
markets. However, ﬁrms with international activities which constrain their scope to the
EU do not experience any productivity discount nor premium, suggesting that for
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European value chain ﬁrms, the foregone opportunities of global sourcing are cancelled
out by the higher coordination costs of global value chain organisation.
Overall, our analysis of global value chain involvement and its impact on performance
at the ﬁrm level provides consistent evidence that the ﬁrms that take on the
opportunities of global market access, and which source resources globally, are well
placed to be the engines of Europe’s innovation-based growth and to drive its external
competitiveness on the basis of globally sustainable comparative advantage. Given
their highly speciﬁc characteristics, it matters for policy makers to better understand
who they are, what they do and what challenges they face. The ﬁnal chapter of this
Blueprint delves deeper into the implications for EU policy.
In any case, more ﬁrm-level analysis is needed, particularly to trace the performance
of GVC-involved ﬁrms over time in order to better identify the causal relationship
between internationalisation strategy and performance: do ﬁrms need to be strong
before they can beneﬁt from the opportunities oﬀered by engagement in global value
chains, or does engagement in global value chains make ﬁrms stronger, and able to
weather the gales of ﬁerce global competition?
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6 Energy competitiveness
BY GEORG ZACHMANN AND VALERIA CIPOLLONE
High energy prices have raised concerns that the competitiveness of European
manufacturing will suﬀer. In this chapter, we describe the recent development of
energy prices and qualitatively explore what is driving them. We then provide an
empirical assessment of which sectors are likely to be most negatively aﬀected by
high international energy prices, and the implication of this for overall competitiveness.
We conclude with recommendations to policymakers.
6.1 Energy is becoming relatively expensive in Europe
In Europe, natural gas prices for industrial users quadrupled and electricity prices for
industrial users more than doubled in nominal terms between 1990 and 2012,
according to the International Energy Agency. The European electricity price increase
has hugely outstripped the modest price increase in the United States (Figure 1).
European industrial-user electricity prices, which were 35 percent above US prices in
1990, were 120 percent above US prices in 2012. For natural gas, the development
has been even more striking. US prices returned to their 1990 level in 2012.
Consequently, the price divergence that started after 2005 resulted in European
natural gas prices exceeding the corresponding US prices by almost a factor of four.
These aggregate numbers, however, should be treated with caution. Energy prices for
diﬀerent groups of industrial user vary signiﬁcantly and prices are diﬀerent in diﬀerent
US states and in diﬀerent European countries or even regions. For example, a Deloitte
(2013) report on Belgian electricity prices found that industrial consumers pay €6.5
to €10 /MWh more for electricity in Flanders and €7 to €25 /MWh more in the Walloon
region, compared to the average price similar consumers pay in surrounding countries.
In diﬀerent countries, electricity prices for industrial users are driven by diﬀerent
combinations of wholesale electricity prices, network tariﬀs and taxes and levies. In
France, for example, consumers beneﬁt from comparatively lower taxes and partly
regulated wholesale prices, and in Germany consumers beneﬁt from low wholesale
prices as a result of subsidised renewables, and partial exemption from the cost of the
network and the feed-in tariﬀs.
ENERGY COMPETITIVENESS
140
Figure 1: Natural gas and electricity price paid by industrial users, 1990-2012
Source: IEA.
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Nevertheless, the general trend of increasingly higher European energy prices
compared to the US is uncontested and is a cause for serious concern on the part of
European Union energy-intensive industry, which is reﬂected in EU policy. For example
the Action Plan for a competitive and sustainable steel industry in Europe, adopted by
the European Commission in June 2013, states that “European industry is faced with
higher energy prices than most of its international competitors, a trend which has
been ampliﬁed by price development dynamics of recent years”.
There are ﬁve main reasons for the absolute and relative increase in European energy
prices:
First, global commodity prices have increased in the past two decades. The price of
Brent oil increased from about $40 /barrel in 1990 to more than $100 in the ﬁrst half
of 2013. The price of Australian coal – a proxy for internationally traded coal –
increased from about $65/tonne in 1990 to almost $100/tonne in the ﬁrst half of 2013.
And the price of US natural gas increased from about $2.30/million British thermal units
(mmbtu) to $3.75/mmbtu in the ﬁrst half of 2013 (all prices expressed in 2013
values). Increasing consumption in emerging economies is one of the main reasons
for this development. China’s energy consumption alone increased from 26 billion
gigajoules in 1990 to 110 billion gigajoules in 2011, surpassing that of the US in 2010.
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Figure 2: Industrial user electricity prices in €/kWh in Europe, second half 2012
Source: Eurostat. Note: 500 MWh < Consumption p.a. < 2 000 MWh.
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Second, US natural gas and electricity prices have increased less than global energy
prices because the US has been able to develop huge cheap US hydrocarbon
resources. Since 2008, the production of tight and shale gas has exceeded the
reduction in conventional gas sources, leading to an increase in US production from 21
trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2008 to 25 tcf in 20121. Because of a lack of natural-gas
exporting infrastructure in North America, increased supply has led to a surplus that
has caused regional prices to drop from around $9/mmbtu to less than $4/mmbtu2.
Despite the economic crisis, US natural gas consumption has not decreased because
low prices made it attractive – especially in power generation. Between 2007 and
2012, natural gas consumption in the US power generation increased by 34 percent,
while coal consumption dropped by 21 percent. This switch to natural gas led to a
stabilisation of the electricity production cost, and industrial-user electricity prices
marginally decreased after 2008.
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1. US natural gas marketed production (millions of cubic feet) according to www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2A.htm.
2. North America was a net importer of natural gas until 2011. In 2008 it consumed about 2 percent more natural gas
than it produced. In 2012, production in North America exceeded consumption by 1 percent for the ﬁrst time.
Figure 3: US natural gas production in trillion cubic feet
Source: US Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 Early Release.
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Third, European natural gas and electricity prices have increased faster than global
energy prices. While the supply situation for natural gas in the US has been very
favourable, domestic production in the EU has declined faster than consumption. The
dependency rate3 increased from 49 percent in 2000 to 66 percent in 2012. At the
same time, declining natural consumption (-15 percent between 2005 and 2012)
because of the economic crisis and an increased share of coal in power production
(the US switch from coal to natural gas put pressure on global coal prices) has been
unable to bring natural gas prices in Europe down. The reason is that natural gas prices
in Europe are largely determined by long-term contracts – many of them including
take-or-pay provisions. A large proportion of imported natural gas is still purchased at
oil-indexed prices that do not reﬂect current market conditions.
A fourth reason for Europe’s above-average increase in energy prices is its energy
policy. Europe is pursuing a comparatively ambitious decarbonisation agenda. For
some years, carbon prices of €15-20 resulted in higher electricity prices – since 2011,
this eﬀect has withered with the collapse of the carbon price. Several EU countries
have invested heavily in electricity generation from renewable energy sources. This
policy is motivated by an aim to reduce the cost of these new technologies, which can
replace imported fuels and reduce carbon emissions. Such deployment-driven
reduction in the cost of new technologies brings about reductions in the cost of energy
in the long-term. Between 2000 and 2012, 93 gigawatts of wind turbines and 53
gigawatts of solar panels were deployed in the EU. The cost of electricity produced by
these facilities was higher than that of conventional units. Furthermore, the large-scale
deployment of solar panels and wind turbines in some regions required network
extensions and greater levels of system services. The increased cost of the electricity
system was mainly borne by electricity consumers.
Finally, European energy prices are comparatively high because market structure
(number and ownership of energy-sector assets), market design (the way prices are
set) and policy do not incentivise the most economic investment, production and
consumption choices (see Zachmann, 2013). Signiﬁcant regulatory uncertainty biases
investment decisions towards high-variable and low-capital cost intensive tech-
nologies (eg extensions to the lifetime of low-eﬃciency plants instead of new
high-eﬃciency units). Regulated prices are a disincentive for energy eﬃciency
investment. National renewable support schemes cause substantial ineﬃciencies
(solar PV in Germany instead of Greece). And incompatible national rules for ensuring
national supply security create expensive over-redundancies and prevent eﬀective
competition between energy companies in diﬀerent countries.
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3. The share of imports in total energy consumption.
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4. Energy behaves like other production factors in the Samuelson factor-price equalisation theory. See Samuelson
(1948).
BOX 1: SOURCES OF LONG-TERM CONVERGENCE
In the long-term there are numerous drivers that cause the energy price in diﬀerent
countries to converge:
Direct trade in energy between the low-cost and the high-cost country is the most
obvious channel for price convergence. If the US decides to allow exports of natural
gas to Europe and both sides invest in the necessary infrastructure – LNG
liquefaction plants in the US, LNG regasiﬁcation plants in the EU, and the necessary
vessels and pipeline network extensions – the price diﬀerential between the two
sides of the Atlantic will converge towards the transport cost. If the US decides to
not export to Europe directly, because European natural gas prices are lower than
Asian prices, prices might still converge. Asian imports of US gas might replace
imports from other parts of the world – such as the Middle East. The capacities in
these exporting countries might be rerouted to Europe.
A second source of convergence is the relocation of energy consumption4. Just ﬁve
energy consuming industries – chemicals and petrochemicals, non-metallic
minerals, food and tobacco, iron and steel and paper, pulp and print – are
responsible for more than 25 percent of European natural gas consumption. If some
of those industries were to relocate, natural gas demand would shift. The resulting
lower demand in Europe would put downward pressure on prices, while the higher
demand in the US would put upward pressure on prices.
A third source of convergence arises from the eﬀect of the US fuel switch. As a result
of low gas prices, other fossil fuels such as oil and coal will be less in demand in the
US. This will drive down the prices of these globally traded commodities – eventually
reducing the cost of energy in Europe.
A fourth source of convergence stems from increased investment in alternative
energy sources and energy eﬃciency in Europe. Higher energy prices in Europe will
incentivise more investment in replacements for natural gas. In the longer-term,
these investments will reduce the demand for natural gas and its price in Europe.
Finally, forward-looking natural-gas suppliers with market power in Europe might
have an incentive to reduce prices in anticipation of the above-mentioned eﬀects.
In our view, the future development of natural gas prices in Europe will be driven by
6.2 Electricity prices and the competitiveness of manufacturing
Electricity is a major production factor in many sectors. Therefore, policymakers are
concerned that above-average electricity prices make domestic products uncom-
petitive on international markets. One would expect countries that experience
increasing electricity prices compared to their competitors to see a fall in their export
market share. This eﬀect cannot be easily conﬁrmed by trade data. In fact, an increase
in the electricity price relative to other countries in most cases during the 1990s and
2000s has coincided with an increase in manufacturing export market share (Figure
4). As the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant5 and many major factors6 are ignored we cautiously
conclude that electricity price movements are unlikely to be signiﬁcantly responsible
for changes in export shares during the 1990s and the 2000s.
But even if energy prices are not major drivers of countries’ total exports, they certainly
aﬀect the competitiveness of individual sectors. Sectoral competitiveness is a
multidimensional concept that involves supply side, demand side and institutional
determinants. On the supply side, cost, quality and availability of sector-speciﬁc
production factors are key drivers. For example, many textile products require cheap
plentiful labour, while low capital costs allow specialisation in exporting chemical
products produced in capital-intensive reﬁneries. On the demand side, the size of, and
distance to, the market is an important determinant of sectoral competitiveness. A
large domestic market might, for example, allow producers of aircraft to reach a size
that is competitive globally. On the institutional level, the legal, regulatory and tax
system of a country co-determine whether a country is likely to specialise in a certain
sector. For example, environmental regulations could drive dirty production oﬀshore.
Finally, there is no simple cause-and-eﬀect relationship between determinants and
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5. A regression with the ‘change in export market share’ as dependent and the ‘change in relative electricity price’ as
independent variable, results in a beta of 0.010. But, even if the model were well speciﬁed we could only be 90.6
percent sure that beta is indeed larger than zero.
6. For example, in some countries electricity prices might increase because of high electricity demand caused by a
booming export economy.
Russian exporters, and whether they start to aggressively price gas in order to
stabilise/increase their European market volume. There is a strong rationale for such
a strategy in the medium term, because otherwise Europe has strong incentives to
invest in (i) diversifying natural gas production and imports, (ii) oﬀshoring energy-
intensive activities to low-energy cost regions, (iii) invest in energy eﬃciency, and
(iv) invest in replacements for natural gas.
sectoral specialisation. Sectoral specialisations within countries interact through
knowledge spillovers, shared supply-chains and other eﬀects that result in agglomera-
tions of sectors not explained by the previous factors. For example, countries that
export cars are likely to be good at exporting motorcycles as well. The development of
the individual drivers of specialisation is itself aﬀected by the current specialisation.
For example, countries that have a strong chemical industry are likely to invest in the
education of chemical engineers and the infrastructure for importing raw materials
and exporting ﬁnal products, reinforcing the sector. Because of this complexity, it is
diﬃcult to reliably model how external shocks on an individual determinant aﬀect a
country’s export specialisation pattern.
In order to explore how high European energy prices might aﬀect sectoral com-
petitiveness, we analyse how energy prices interacted with sectoral specialisation in
the past. We use electricity prices as a proxy for country-speciﬁc energy costs because
electricity – because of its network-dependence – is not a globally traded commodity,
and in fact is signiﬁcantly heterogeneous in diﬀerent countries. To evaluate the role of
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Figure 4: Effect of a change in relative electricity price on a change in average
manufacturing export market share between 1996-2000 and 2001-2008 for OECD
countries
Source: Bruegel.
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energy costs for sector specialisation we consider 27 OECD countries between 1996
and 2011. This allows us to compute the revealed comparative advantage, which
captures a country’s level of specialisation in certain exports, and to see how this is
aﬀected by country-level diﬀerences in energy prices. So, for each sector, we estimate
whether countries with above-average electricity prices are more likely to specialise
in it, or not.
As discussed, other factors are likely to play an important role for specialisation
patterns. Countries with above average unit labour costs tend not to specialise in
labour-intensive products such as textiles, and countries with above-average capital
costs tend not to specialise in capital-intensive products such as chemicals and
metals7. Consequently, some of the specialisation patterns we might have attributed
to energy price diﬀerentials previously might actually be driven by other factors. To
reduce the risk of overstating the importance of energy prices for sectoral specialisa-
tion because of such omitted variables, we control for four other important factors:
cost of capital, cost of labour, size of the home market and level of development of the
country8. In the analysis, cost of labour is represented by average hourly com-
pensation, cost of capital is proxied by the 10 year interest rate for each country’s
sovereign bond, size of the home market is represented by the nominal GDP and level
of development is represented by per-capita GDP.
The results conﬁrm that larger countries are more likely to specialise in many
products9. This eﬀect appears to be more because of the population size of the country
than its wealth10. In terms of capital and labour cost, some products behave as
expected: ‘cotton sacks/bags’ is more likely to be found in countries with low wages
and high interest rates; and ‘electric and electronic keyboard instruments’ in countries
with low interest rates and high wages. Others behave contrary to expectation:
according to our results, ‘ball bearings’ are more likely to be found in countries with
high wages and low interest rates. Hence, we cannot exclude that we seriously under-
represent the complexity of the drivers of sectoral specialisation in our model11.
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7. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, trade ﬂows are driven by factor abundance: a country will export
products that require factors relatively abundant on its territory and import the others.
8. Introducing more factors and more complex interactions between factors would be desirable but is limited by the
number of available observations.
9. The probability that a country specialises in about 1300 of the 2800 product categories covered by the analysis
is positively related to the country’s GDP. The reverse is only true for about 400 product categories.
10. We ﬁnd that in product categories for which specialisation is positively related to GDI, it is typically negatively
related to GDP per capita.
According to our analysis, about 600 product types are more likely to be produced in
low electricity-price countries than in high-price countries (those products have a
negative coeﬃcient in the ‘electricity price’ columns in Table 1). Some of them are quite
intuitive – such as sodium chlorate (used for bleaching paper) or ammonium nitrate
fertiliser12 – because energy costs represent a high share of the production cost. We
also count about 1000 products that are more likely to be exported by countries with
high electricity prices (those products have a positive coeﬃcient in the ‘electricity
price’ columns in Table 1). These products come from rather diverse sectors that are
typically less energy intensive.
We have so far focused on whether countries with above or below average energy
prices export more or less of a certain product. But export specialisation in manu-
factured products can only to a limited extent react to the current energy price. Past
investment patterns are strong drivers of export specialisation – an existing aluminium
smelter might continue producing even if the electricity price rises comparatively high,
while even if the electricity price is very low, the absence of a fertiliser plant prevents
exports of ammonium nitrate. In the long-term however, investment also reacts to
energy prices. Anecdotal evidence suggests that investment in energy-intensive
sectors drops when energy prices rise. Germany had rising energy prices and saw
investment increase more than in the US in the less energy-intensive ‘machinery and
equipment’ sector. At the same time, the US increased investment in the energy-
intensive basic metals sector by more than twice as much as Germany (Figure 5).
To somewhat capture these investment eﬀects, we look at the diﬀerences in the
revealed comparative advantage in 2011, 2006 and 2001, and the price diﬀerential
over the respective preceding ﬁve-year periods. Country production specialisation
appears to be inﬂuenced by energy prices also over the medium-term13. We ﬁnd more
than 100 products that countries with low energy prices tend to specialise in. Again,
ammonium nitrate and sodium chlorate feature in this group of energy-intensive
products that are more likely to be exported by low-energy cost countries. But we also
ﬁnd more than 500 products that are more likely to be exported by high-energy cost
countries. These tend again to be of a rather diverse nature.
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11. Our model explains about 15 percent of the variation of specialisation in the analysed products. Only for 2 percent
of the products we explain more than half of the specialisation. It is diﬃcult to do better, as the limited sample size
constrains the degrees of freedom and hence the number of control variables we could sensibly include in the
estimation.
12. About 3-5 percent of the world’s natural gas production is consumed in the production of ammonium nitrate.
13. We consider 3-10 years as medium-term.
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Table 1: Selected results for a logistic regression of product-level competitiveness
on electricity prices (short-term)
Product name Electricity Extent of Product name Electricity Extent of
price fit (R2)* price fit (R2)*
coefficient coefficient
Sports gloves etc. 10.3 72% Goat meat, fresh/chld/frz -9.3 45%
Cellulose acetate plasd 6.1 70% Sodium chlorate -8.3 36%
Shotgun barrels 6.0 61% Newsprint rolls/sheets -8.0 42%
Wig making materials 6.0 45% Conif wood pulp semi-blc -6.8 39%
Indust driers non-electr 5.9 48% Cotton seeds -6.2 41%
Ammonium chloride 5.7 51% Flax tow/waste -5.9 24%
Silk yarn non waste, bulk 5.5 45% Meat, equine, frsh/chl/frz -5.8 26%
Cellulose acetate non-pl 5.4 66% Chem wood pulp disolving -5.6 45%
Raw silk not thrown 5.1 45% Mixed alkylbenzenes nes -5.5 27%
Cotton sacks/bags 5.1 46% Semi-chemical wood pulp -5.4 22%
Honing/lapping machines 5.0 61% Ammonium nitrate fert. -5.1 20%
Elec keyboard instrumnts 5.0 58% Silicon dioxide -5.1 57%
Vulc rubber thread/cord 4.9 66% Potassium sulphate fert. -5.0 24%
Sawing machs,metalworkng 4.9 38% Tall oil -5.0 32%
Shotgun/rifle parts nes 4.8 34% Wooden shingles/shakes -5.0 33%
Dry-cleaning machines 4.8 46% Potatoes, presvd/frozen -4.9 29%
Tetracyclines and derivs 4.7 36% Zirconium wrt/artics nes -4.9 42%
Parts for fans/gas pumps 4.6 43% Radiation detectors etc -4.8 44%
Safety/relief valves 4.3 34% Urea (fertilizer) -4.8 31%
Motorcycles etc >800cc 4.1 56% Cotton garnetted stock -4.8 26%
Leather sandals 4.1 33% Nickel unwrought -4.5 46%
Source: Bruegel. Note: We report here the 21 largest and 21 smallest coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 0.1% level. The regression controls for country diﬀerences in labour compensation, interest rate, GDP and GDP
per capita. * R2 is the McFadden pseudo R² for the logit estimate, and indicates how much of the diﬀerences between
countries in export competitiveness is actually explained by the factors under consideration.
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Figure 5: Gross ﬁxed capital formation in two sectors in two countries at current
prices (index = 2000)
Source: OECD STAN.
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Table 2: Selected results for a logistic regression of product-level competitiveness
on electricity prices (medium-term)
Product name Electricity Extent of Product name Electricity Extent of
price fit (R2)* price fit (R2)*
coefficient coefficient
Metal non-rmvl tools nes 10.4 72% War munition / parts -18.6 73%
Printing machinery 8.5 59% Plywood-standard -9.9 35%
Indust driers non-electr 8.4 53% Fish fillets/ meat.frs/ch -8.6 55%
Wig making materials 7.9 52% Flax tow/waste -8.5 37%
Theophylline etc/derivs 7.9 38% Aircraft undercarriage -7.7 30%
Footw all rub/plast nes 7.3 45% Brandies/ marcs etc. -7.3 26%
Sports gloves etc. 7.1 53% Radiation detectors etc -7.2 55%
Shotgun/rifle parts nes 6.9 43% Newsprint rolls/sheets -7.1 33%
Bookbinding machinery 6.5 46% Semi-chem wood pulp -6.9 34%
Laser/photon mach tools 6.4 60% Wood chips - non-conifer -6.5 40%
Silk yarn non waste, bulk 6.4 47% Semi-chem fluting paper -6.4 30%
Unit construct machines 6.3 51% Ammonium nitrate fert. -6.4 29%
Mink skins unassembled 6.1 46% Chem wood pulp disolvin -6.3 37%
Ski-boots leather uppers 6.0 39% Goat meat. fresh/ chld/frz -6.2 29%
Cutlery sets nes 5.7 43% Silicon dioxide -6.1 58%
Irn,smple stl shapes nes 5.6 51% Sodium chlorate -5.8 29%
Punching etc mchines nes 5.4 45% Quicklime -5.7 29%
Camera parts/ accessories 5.4 48% Tapioca/sago/etc -5.5 21%
Tetracyclines and derivs 5.3 36% Hydrogen peroxide -5.2 23%
Metal mch-tl work holder 5.3 52% Conif wood pulp semi-blc -5.2 28%
Dry-cleaning machines 5.3 46% Iron/steel dross/scale -5.1 21%
Source: Bruegel. Note: We report here the 21 largest and 21 smallest coeﬃcients. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 0.1% level. The regression controls for country diﬀerences in labour compensation, interest rate, GDP and GDP
per capita. * R2 is the McFadden pseudo R² for the logit estimate, and indicates how much of the diﬀerences between
countries in export competitiveness is actually explained by the factors under consideration.
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14. The regression coeﬃcient for the electricity price on the revealed comparative advantage for not alloyed unwrought
aluminium is -3.7. It is signiﬁcant at the 95 percent conﬁdence level (R²=38%).
BOX 2: A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN CASE STUDY: ALUMINIUM, ELECTRICITY PRICES
AND THE CAR INDUSTRY
The aluminium sector is very energy intensive. Electricity accounts for about 30
percent of the production cost. Our analytical results conﬁrm that aluminium is
exported mainly by countries with low electricity prices14. Aluminium is increasingly
used to replace steel in car manufacturing. Currently, the aluminium content of a
European car is 140 kg, three times the 1990 amount. Consequently, it is interesting
to consider if car exports are indirectly aﬀected by electricity prices. Our results
indicate that they are not.
The case of Germany is illustrative. Between 2001 an 2008, energy prices increased
by 166 percent. This coincided with a substantial increase in German net imports of
aluminium of 242 percent. At the same time, car exports continued to rise. Net
exports increased by 142 percent independently from the variation in the domestic
production of one of the most important inputs. So the competitiveness of the
German car industry has not suﬀered from the increase in energy prices. To what
degree this is because other favourable production factors (eg comparatively low
unit labour costs) have compensated for higher aluminium prices, and to what
degree the increasing cost of aluminium production in Germany was not passed-
through to the German car industry because of international competition in the
aluminium market, cannot be analysed here.
Figure 6: German net exports of cars and aluminium versus industrial-user
electricity price
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade and IEA.
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6.3 What drives sectoral specialisation?
To widen the scope of the analysis, we aggregate products into their respective sectors.
Going from more than 2800 products categories to fewer than 100 sectors allows us
to see the bigger picture. Sectoral aggregation15 conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the product
category analysis. Countries with high energy prices are likely to specialise in 19 rather
diverse sectors. Countries with low energy prices exhibit signiﬁcant specialisation in
nine, typically energy intensive, sectors such as ‘pulp, paper and paperboard’, ‘reﬁned
petroleum’, and ‘basic precious and non-ferrous metals’. There is no greater or lower
likelihood of occurrence in low or high energy price countries for 67 sectors. For some
of these, the reason is that they include both products that are primarily exported by
high-price countries and products that are primarily exported by low-price countries.
For example, ‘basic chemicals’ is not signiﬁcant on the sectoral level even though
ammonium nitrate is typically exported by low-price countries and sulphites are
typically exported by high-price countries.
Table 3 identiﬁes the sectors in which according to our analysis either low electricity
price countries reveal a competitive advantage (negative electricity price coeﬃcient)
or high electricity price countries reveal a competitive advantage (positive electricity
price coeﬃcient). We will use this as the basis for further analysis of how electricity
prices shape countries’ manufacturing sectors.
We have, however, to add a note of caution. On the sectoral level, the variables we have
chosen (electricity cost, labour cost, capital cost, GDP, GDP per capita) can on average
explain only slightly more than 30 percent of which countries specialise exporting in
this sector (see the R² in Table 3). In addition, there can be a number of reasons for
the observed coincidences:
1. Causality: the most straightforward reason is that high energy prices discourage
specialisation in energy-intensive products;
2. Joint cause: high energy prices in a country might be the eﬀect of a certain
economic factors (such as economic policy, level of economic development or
factor availability), which also encourage certain sectors. For example, strong
preferences for environmental protection might increase energy prices and
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15. We aggregate the product categories (that are classiﬁed according to HS) into sectors (classiﬁed according to
NACE) using concordance tables provided by United Nations Statistics Division. For each year, between 4409 and
4131 HS products have been linked to 2808-2623 SITC products and to 95 NACE sectors.
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Table 3: Selected results for a logistic regression of sector level competitiveness
on electricity prices (medium-term)
Product Electricity price coefficient Extent of fit (R2)*
Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 11.1 61%
Glass and glass products 8.2 62%
Ceramic goods 7.3 59%
Games and toys 6.2 37%
Paints, coatings, printing ink 6.2 71%
Machinery for production, use of mech. power 6.2 61%
Textile weaving 5.0 46%
Electric motors, generators and transformers 4.6 51%
Cutlery, tools and general hardware 4.6 48%
Optical instruments and photographic equipment 4.0 46%
Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 3.8 50%
Electricity distribution and control apparatus 3.5 35%
Watches and clocks 3.4 52%
Other wearing apparel and accessories 2.7 39%
Ceramic tiles and flags 2.7 48%
Bricks, tiles and construction products 2.6 26%
Motorcycles and bicycles 2.6 22%
Footwear 2.4 31%
Beverages 2.2 15%
Other transport equipment n. e. c. -1.9 23%
Refined petroleum -1.9 17%
Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood -2.2 16%
TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony -2.3 24%
Nuclear fuel -2.6 22%
Pulp, paper and paperboard -3.7 21%
Fish and fish products -3.9 35%
Aircraft and spacecraft -4.8 46%
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals -6.7 45%
Source: Bruegel. Note: We report here the betas for all sectors with coeﬃcients signiﬁcants signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The regression controls for country diﬀerences in labour compensation, interest rate, GDP and GDP per capita.
* R2 is the McFadden pseudo R² for the logit estimate, and indicates how much of the diﬀerences between countries
in export competitiveness is actually explained by the factors under consideration.
encourage environmental technologies, or high cost of capital make both energy
production and production of capital-intensive products expensive;
3. Reverse causality: a historic strength in energy-intensive products might support
the development of a very competitive energy industry;
4. Statistical eﬀects: because of the high number of products (2800), some
observed coincidences might be random.
Even though we do not see an obvious reason why our methodology might over/under-
represent certain sectors, the results entail a high degree of uncertainty.
6.4 Value-added and employment in energy-price sensitive sectors
We evaluate whether the sectors that appear to be negatively aﬀected by high energy
prices are of particular economic importance. We check if these sectors typically have
a higher value added share than sectors that are not or are positively aﬀected by the
energy price. Figure 7 shows that sectors in which countries with high energy prices
are more likely to specialise are characterised by higher value added than sectors in
which countries with low energy prices specialise. Consequently, low energy prices
do not help a country to focus its exports on manufacturing sectors that promise high
value added. There are several reasons for this:
1. Low energy prices seem to encourage specialisation in a few energy-intensive
products. Those are often rather homogeneous and face stiﬀ international
competition and are consequently low value added. By contrast, high energy
prices coincide with specialisation in many heterogeneous products.
2. Low energy prices often coincide with energy exports while high energy prices
coincide with energy imports. Energy-importing countries need to earn a higher
value added in their manufacturing exports in order to be able to aﬀord the
imports.
3. High energy prices might be a result of specialisation in successful sectors. High
export productivity might make investments in energy generation more
expensive, thus increasing energy prices.
Consequently, we refrain from the incorrect interpretation that “high energy prices
encourage specialisation in more productive sectors”. We, however, assert that there
is no evidence that energy prices above the global average undermine in the long-term
the productivity of export sectors.
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Figure 8 shows that sectors in which countries with high energy prices are more likely
to specialise have signiﬁcantly higher employment relative to their production value
than sectors in which countries with low energy prices specialise. This indicates that
countries with high energy prices tend to specialise in sectors with higher employment
per production value than countries with low energy prices. Again, causality is diﬃcult
to establish but we ﬁnd no evidence that high energy prices lead to lower employment
in the manufacturing export sector.
The eﬀect of relative energy prices on manufacturing value added and employment
depends on the sectoral composition in each country. Figure 9 shows that in European
countries, value added is highest in those manufacturing sectors that neither
signiﬁcantly coincide with high nor low energy prices. Only Greece, Norway, Sweden
and the UK have a higher share of manufacturing value added in sectors that coincide
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Figure 7: Box plots for value added of all sectors whose specialization is
(1) signiﬁcantly negative, (2) not signiﬁcant and (3) signiﬁcantly positively
correlated with the energy price
Source: Bruegel. Note: The coloured boxes contain 50 percent of the sectors in each category, the band inside the
box represents the median of each category, 90 percent of all sectors in each category have a value-added over
production value that lies between the upper and the lower bars.
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Figure 8: Box plots for employment of all sectors whose specialisation is (1)
signiﬁcantly negative, (2) not signiﬁcant and (3) signiﬁcantly positively
correlated with the energy price
Source: Bruegel. Note: The coloured boxes contain 50 percent of the sectors in each category, the band inside the
box represents the median of each category, 90 percent of all sectors in each category have a value-added over
production value that lies between the upper and the lower bars.
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16. To clarify, we note that this argumentation is not circular. We identify products that are above-proportionally
exported by countries with low energy prices and aggregate those into sectors. In Figure 6 we do not, however,
check which countries export most of these products (the answer would be the countries with the lowest energy
prices), but we check which share of value added in a country is produced by the sectors that we ﬁnd to coincide
with low energy prices.
with low energy prices. All other countries already specialise in sectors that are above-
proportionally present in high-energy price countries16.
For employment (Figure 10) the picture is similar. In all countries, the highest
employment share is in sectors that do not coincide with low or high energy prices.
Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Norway and Sweden have the highest employment shares
in sectors that coincide with low energy prices. All other countries have higher
employment shares in sectors that coincide with high energy prices. But overall in the
countries covered, more people (130,000) are employed in sectors that coincide with
low energy prices than in sectors that coincide with high energy prices (90,000).
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Figure 9: Share of value added within a country, grouped according to the energy-
sensitivity of the sectors
Source: Bruegel. Note: Based on the sectoral value added data by country from Eurostat.
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6.5 Conclusion
We have shown that whether a country has low or high energy prices does not
determine whether it is a competitive exporter of manufactured products, but it does
inﬂuence in which sectors a country becomes competitive.
Obviously, a country can neither specialise in all manufacturing sectors nor can it have
a relative competitive advantage in all production factors. Nevertheless, subsidising
individual production factors through direct state aid, favourable regulations or tax
exemptions for certain sectors is commonplace in global competition. The costs of
these subsidies are borne by other parts of the economy. If they are levied by putting
higher taxes on capital or labour, the competitiveness gain of the energy-intensive
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Figure 10: Share of employment within a country, grouped according to the
energy-sensitivity of the sectors
Source: Bruegel. Note: Based on the sectoral employment data by country from Eurostat.
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sector might not be enough to compensate for the competitiveness loss of the
‘naturally’ competitive sectors, because the energy-intensive sectors contribute
relatively less to employment and value added.
With our analysis we also challenge the view that certain energy-intensive sectors are
central to the competitiveness of other sectors. One might think, for example, that the
competitiveness of the car industry – one of the largest manufacturing sectors in terms
of employment and value added in Europe – depends on the competitiveness of the
steel and aluminium industry. We, however, ﬁnd that while the aluminium industry is
indeed concentrating in countries with below-average energy prices, the car industry
is not.
There are at least three more reasons to refrain from subsidising energy prices:
First, government intervention in energy pricing (eg regulations) does not create the
necessary stable investment framework for energy consumers, and can destroy
incentives for energy producers. Investment in energy eﬃciency and domestic energy
supply will be reduced, causing the price disadvantage to increase.
Second, volatile energy prices attract very speciﬁc industries that tend to leave as
soon as energy prices are lower elsewhere. Other sectors, which invest in human-
capital formation, knowledge and complex supply chains form a more sustainable
basis for competitiveness.
And third, short-term political intervention might actually prevent structural conver-
gence of energy prices. If large (and potentially even ineﬃcient) consumers are given
an incentive to stay by subsidised energy prices, energy consumption cannot react to
the diﬀerences in resource availability. Other consumers will have to pay more and
suppliers will be under no pressure to price energy more competitively.
Europe will be better able to maintain its competitiveness in manufacturing sectors
by refraining from unsustainable measures such as subsidies to energy consumers.
That said, structural measures for reducing the cost of energy to the economy are of
course a sensible economic policy. Most prominently, making the European internal
market for energy work could signiﬁcantly reduce the cost of energy.
The authors thank Amma Serwaah for excellent research assistance.
ENERGY COMPETITIVENESS
160
7 Policies for manufacturing EU
growth
BY REINHILDE VEUGELERS AND ANDRÉ SAPIR
7.1 EU policies for manufacturing
The policy debate on the future of manufacturing in the EU is entrenched in a heated
and repeated discussion on what kind of industrial policy Europe should pursue. The
concept of ‘industrial policy’ has many facets and is often the source of confusion. The
interpretation can range from policies that set out to protect particular ﬁrms
(champions), policies to safeguard manufacturing, sector-based policies in favour of
strategic sectors, policies supporting ‘competitiveness’, enterprise policies or policies
to improve the broad framework conditions for business.
Broadly however, at risk of over-simpliﬁcation, participants in industrial policy dis-
cussions can be classiﬁed as proponents of a ‘horizontal’ approach or as proponents
of a ‘vertical’ approach. The ‘horizontal’ group wants industrial policy to set the right
framework within which economic processes can take place, but does not believe in
intervening in the processes. Examples of horizontal intervention include competition
policy, regulatory simpliﬁcation, aid in setting up businesses, development of small
and medium-sized enterprises, tax incentives for innovation, and promotion of
education and training. The ‘vertical’ group encourages a more proactive industrial
policy, with more direct, targeted intervention.
In practice however both strands tend to converge substantially at the implementation
stage. The ‘new industrial policy’ perspective builds on both perspectives, calling for a
more targeted approach that is compatible with a horizontal perspective.
While EU industrial policy in its early phase in the 1970s and 1980s could be branded
as quite targeted, a more horizontal approach has been followed since the 1990s. Box
161
1 outlines a brief history of the swings in EU industrial policy, and the corresponding
instruments that have been deployed.
A communication published in 2012 by the European Commission represents its
current position on industrial policy1. The communication was published during a
period of continuing economic crisis in Europe, with manufacturing production and
industrial jobs under pressure, and with a lack of conﬁdence, market uncertainty and
ﬁnancing problems reigning. The communication starts from the premise that “Europe
needs industry”. To quote: “Europe needs to reverse the declining role of industry in
Europe for the 21st century. This is the only way to deliver sustainable growth, create
high-value jobs and solve the societal challenges that we face”.
The Communication sets out a roadmap for reindustrialising Europe, with the aim
to’raising the share of industry in GDP from the current level of around 16% to as much
as 20% in 2020’. ’This should be driven by substantial recovery in investment levels
(gross capital formation and investment in equipment), an expansion of the trade in
goods in the Internal Market (to reach 25% of GDP in 2020) and a signiﬁcant increase
in the number of SMEs exporting to third countries’.
Although the Communication stressed, following the horizontal tradition, the need for
a comprehensive vision “mobilising all the levers available at EU level, notably the
single market, trade policy, SME policy, competition policy, environmental and
research policy in favour of European companies’ competitiveness”, it brought back a
more explicit targeted approach: “After an extensive public consultation, the
Commission proposes to jointly focus investment and innovation on six priority action
lines: advanced manufacturing technologies, key enabling technologies, bio-based
products, sustainable industrial and construction policy and raw materials, clean
vehicles, smart grids”. Reinforcing its targeted approach, the communication was
followed up with action plans for speciﬁc sectors, such as steel2.
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1. European Commission, A stronger European industry for growth and economic recovery, COM (2012) 582.
2. See the Action Plan for a competitive and sustainable steel industry in Europe (2013)
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BOX 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE EU
Although the term of ‘industrial policy’ did not appear in the Treaty of Rome, Europe
was built around a sectoral policy – the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
which set out to reduce overcapacity in coal production, while improving the overall
production system. This ﬁrst industrial policy was a success, both in terms of
outcome (modernisation and reduction of production capacities of companies) and
in terms of coordination between member states. The ECSC provided an inter -
ventionist framework within which companies had to modernise themselves.
During the 1970s and 1980s, many European countries developed industrial policy
programmes. Although there was a clear intention to collaborate and coordinate
national policies, the development of a European industrial policy, with the
community interest put ahead of the national interest, proved hard to implement,
given the lack of resources and tools at the community level.
From the mid-1980s, the ineﬃciency of uncoordinated national industrial policies
became clear. This led to the development of two important horizontal instruments
at EU level: the internal market and competition policy, including state aid. At the
same time, the Single European Act (1986) laid the legal basis for the aﬃrmative
action of the state in the area of research and development.
During the 1990s, there was a move towards a consensus at EU level to pursue a
more holistic, integrated, horizontal approach to industrial policy. The role of EU
industrial policy was to ensure the right framework conditions, through internal
market and competition instruments and by stimulating R&D and innovation. This
1990s view corresponded with the perception that the main challenge for European
industry was to adapt to a global economic context characterised by fast-growing
world markets, rapid technological change and the emergence of new competitors.
After catching up with the United States in the ﬁrst few decades after the second
world war, European industry had to succeed at the frontier of technological change,
requiring innovation-based growth.
EU policy communications on horizontal industrial policy published in 1994 and
2004, and included in the Lisbon programme and its successors up to the EU2020
communication (COM (2010) 2020) all reﬂect this horizontal integrated approach
towards industrial policy. This did not mean that sectoral policies were absent at the
EU level. In fact, the EU ‘New Industrial Policy’ includes both horizontal and vertical
measures. Horizontal initiatives include the work on intellectual property rights
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7.2 The evidence base underpinning EU industrial policy
An assessment of the adequacy of the current EU industrial policy approach needs to
be embedded in a evidence-based understanding of the changing role of manu -
facturing for Europe’s growth. We ﬁrst brieﬂy recap the main insights from the evidence
presented in this Blueprint, which will support our assessment and recommendations
for EU industrial policy.
The relative decline in production, value added and employment characterising
manufacturing in Europe during the past few decades is not likely to be radically
reversed soon, because the forces driving the relative decline are likely to continue to
operate in the near future. The decline is taking place across almost all manufacturing
sectors, although to diﬀerent degrees and with diﬀerent combinations of causes:
demand eﬀects, productivity eﬀects and/or trade eﬀects. It is important to note that the
decline cuts across the high-tech/low-tech sector divide. The decline in the manu -
facturing of electronics in Europe, for example, is a reminder that high-tech is not
necessarily a shield against the loss of jobs. Nevertheless, across all sectors, the loss
of jobs is concentrated in the low-skill segment, with remaining and new jobs being
more skill intensive, even in the low-tech sectors of textiles and food.
The shift towards high value added activities correlates with the growing servitisation
of manufacturing, together with the greater importance of innovative capacity. This
innovative capacity requires a high-quality human capital base with a well-educated
and trained workforce. Innovative capacity is important for all manufacturing sectors,
not only for the high-tech sectors. 
An innovative high-skill capacity helps to make ﬁrms more resilient to shocks and
helps to build sustainable competitive positions in world markets. Participation in
global value chains (GVCs) enables ﬁrms and countries to build sustainable com -
petitive positions, even more so if accompanied with innovative capacity. Only a few
ﬁrms are intensively involved in GVCs, but these few ﬁrms matter for Europe’s know -
ledge based growth and competitiveness performance, because these ﬁrms are large,
(including the EU patent), measures to improve the regulatory environment
including simpliﬁcation and funding for EU (R&D) projects through the multi-annual
Framework Programmes. Sectoral initiatives included an ICT focus motivated by the
EU missing out on the productivity growth from ICT production and use that the US
beneﬁtted from in the second half of the 1990s.
trade-intensive and more innovative, and have highly skilled workforces and higher
productivity. They substantially drive the creation of total value added, employment,
innovation and, particularly, trade ﬂows in most sectors and economies. Firms that
take an intermediate position in global value chains, producing speciﬁc components
for other ﬁrms in the chain, also command higher productivity premiums, particularly
when they can exploit unique innovative capacities.
The participation of European ﬁrms in GVCs is strongly EU-oriented. These European
Value Chains (EVC) have resulted in a deeper integration of EU manufacturing and have
signiﬁcantly beneﬁtted the competitiveness of the EU and its member states in a global
perspective. Firms involved in EVCs are not disadvantaged relative to ﬁrms that develop
more global value chains. This evidence suggests that the European single market
provides a signiﬁcant opportunity to ﬁrms to build European value chains that help
them to compete on global markets.
7.3 Policies to support the contribution of manufacturing to EU growth
Manufacturing global value chains challenge prevailing policy thinking about
competitiveness. The growing upstream and downstream interconnections within GVCs
make countries more interdependent: one country’s exports increasingly embody the
technology, labour and capital of other countries from which intermediate goods are
imported; imports increasingly reﬂect tasks which complement, rather than substitute
for, domestic production; the oﬀshoring of a production stage which can be performed
more eﬃciently abroad makes domestic activities more competitive.
This growing interconnectedness limits the eﬀectiveness of national policies, requiring
more international coordination of policies. For European countries this means ﬁrst
and foremost deeper coordination at EU level, in view of the regional focus of European
ﬁrms’ GVC involvement. European integration has proved to be an opportunity for
developing European value chains, and these EVCs are not disadvantaged relative to
GVCs. The EU focus should not however translate into an inward focus, because
European internationalisation goes hand in hand with openness to the rest of the world
and EVCs have helped to improve Europe’s competitive position in world markets. The
Commission’s 2012 industrial policy communication targeting an ‘expansion of the
trade in goods in the Internal Market to reach 25 percent of GDP in 2020’ runs the risk
of a diverting attention away from global markets and external openness. 
Internal and external openness are necessary conditions for integration into inter -
national production networks. Import tariﬀs and anti-dumping duties on intermediates
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may directly hurt the competitiveness of those domestic ﬁrms that import these
components. In view of the magniﬁcation eﬀect of tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers along
the value chain, openness and the elimination of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers should be
pursued at multilateral level. Barriers between third countries up or down the value
chain matter as much as the barriers put in place by direct trade partners. More uniform
product standards will make participation in GVCs easier for components suppliers.
Global production networks rely on logistics and communication chains. They require
eﬃcient international network infrastructures and competitive complementary
services. To reap the full beneﬁts of GVCs, eﬃcient supporting-services markets are
needed. This calls for the removal of barriers in sectors such as transport, com -
munications and telecommunications, energy, ﬁnance and business services. Within
Europe, this is a call to further the single market in these areas, because substantial
progress still needs to be made, particularly in the energy and services markets.
Exploiting global value chains also requires having in place interconnecting infra -
structure, most notably for transport, telecommunications and energy. Trans-European
network projects for building this cross-border infrastructure should be given a higher
proﬁle in policy terms, and larger budgets.
Secondly, for countries to beneﬁt from GVCs, international ﬂows of capital, labour,
human capital and knowledge within GVCs must become eﬀectively linked to domestic
productive capabilities in certain tasks. Here a host of national and European economic
policies largely determine which position countries occupy in GVCs: which jobs and
what value they are able to create. Several aspects need to be considered.
7.4 Horizontal framework conditions
To ensure the continued presence of a viable manufacturing sector in European
countries, what matters most is the manufacturing activities that are needed to support
Europe’s growth, rather than a blunt GDP percentage target for manufacturing. The
activities to focus on are the higher value-added activities that build on unique and
innovative capabilities. The presence of these activities in Europe will secure
productivity growth and external competitiveness, and retaining them will require
having in place the framework conditions that are most pivotal for these higher value-
added, growth contributing, manufacturing activities. These activities may be in the
manufacturing sector, but they entail signiﬁcant service characteristics.
Because access to large, open and interconnected product markets remains a major
location factor for manufacturing, including for the high-end manufacturing activities,
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internal market and competition policy will and should remain priority EU levers.
Completing the single market for products is perhaps the most important objective to
enable manufacturing to contribute to Europe’s future growth.
In addition, other framework conditions matter if new high-end activities are to be
brought to Europe and retained. These include access to a network of sophisticated
lead customers and suppliers, and access to speciﬁc skills and research capabilities.
The building and reinforcing of innovation networks requires that the integration of the
European Research and Innovation Area be furthered, eliminating barriers to the cross-
border transfer of skills, knowledge and ideas, and stimulating the mobility of high-end
skills across borders and across sectors. This includes between the industrial and
services sectors, including the public research sector. The requirement for access to
the necessary skills makes education and on-the-job training a policy priority, primarily
at national level. A single market for graduate and post-graduate education would
however be a highly relevant European project to pursue.
Access to (cheap) energy is regularly claimed to be important to attract activities,
particularly in speciﬁc energy-intensive manufacturing segments. Eﬀective imple -
mentation of a fully eﬃcient internal market for energy is the key policy at EU level
that would ensure a level playing ﬁeld and lower energy prices.
Furthermore, access to ﬁnance, although less important for established large manu -
facturing entities, is a major issue for SMEs, particularly for the small and new ﬁrms that
want to develop on world markets their ideas for new innovative products. For these
ﬁrms, addressing the fragility and the fragmentation of the ﬁnancial sector in Europe,
especially the risk-capital segments, will be important.
7.5 A targeted approach?
Although sectoral idiosyncrasies exist, the challenges and opportunities identiﬁed
here apply to most if not all manufacturing sectors. The shift towards high-end activities
is not conﬁned to high-tech sectors. The oﬀshoring of manufacturing activities is not
conﬁned to low-tech sectors. And manufacturing and service sectors are increasingly
intertwined. As a consequence, any type of government intervention to support
manufacturing should be suﬃciently generic, and avoid picking particular industries
to support. What matters most is providing the framework conditions for viable
activities to continue to prosper, and for new activities to develop and grow into leading
world market status, irrespective of in which sector they are classiﬁed.
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Increasing the number of SMEs that export to third countries would be a wrong target
to aim at. The evidence presented in this Blueprint shows how small and simple
exporters are typically only responsible for a very small share of trade, in some sectors
less than 1 percent. Neither improving the extensive nor intensive margin will result in
signiﬁcant improvements to competitiveness. What matters more is to provide the
framework conditions to support a GVC innovation-based growth path for enterprises,
whatever their size or age. The target should be productive ﬁrms with unique innovative
capabilities, which are able to develop an internationalisation strategy that involves
more complex strategies than simply exporting.
7.6 The jobs agenda
The oﬀshoring of routine jobs and the structural shift from classic routine production
jobs towards higher value-added types of jobs that have some of the characteristics of
services jobs, has major implications for employment policy. Adjustment diﬃculties
are likely to result, because the skill requirements for the newly created jobs tend to
be higher than and diﬀerent to those for the jobs lost. In addition, negative impacts
are often heavily concentrated in certain regions or sectors. Eﬀective domestic policies
are therefore needed to reduce the adjustment costs borne by displaced workers.
Governments will need to facilitate this structural shift and help displaced workers to
ﬁnd alternative employment and to acquire the necessary skills for Europe’s future
manufacturing activities. This is a challenge familiar from adjustments in the face of
globalisation. Policies to pursue, primarily at EU member-state level, include improving
the functioning of labour markets and strengthening education and training. At EU level,
adjustment programmes, such as the European Globalisation Fund could be upgraded
and made GVC-compatible.
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